The club within the club: the challenge of a soft law framework in a global Arctic context

Abstract

Challenges to Arctic governance presented by rapid ice melt are assessed in light of structural problems facing the Arctic Council, the region’s “preeminent” soft law regime structure. This paper argues the territorializing temptations of the sub-regional Arctic 5 coastal states, which among themselves may overlap and conflict, nevertheless align to keep the Arctic Council focus on functional objectives, notwithstanding attempts at internal reform, calls for a new Arctic treaty, and emerging assessments of a global understanding of Arctic issues, as represented by the newly founded Arctic Circle Assembly. Various jurisdictional designs in the Arctic Ocean, including extended continental shelf delimitations, combine to preference Arctic 5 interests over revisions to the soft law and functional orientation of the current Arctic regime structure.

Keywords:

• Arctic Council
• Arctic 5
• Arctic Circle Assembly
• soft law
• niche governance
• pacta tertiis
• sovereignty

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

Apologies to Hernane Tavares de Sá, author of The Play Within the Play: The Inside Story of the UN (New York: Knopf, 1966).

¹ The Ilulissat Declaration, Arctic Ocean Conference, Ilulissat, Greenland (28 May 2008), http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf (accessed December 8, 2014).

² “Soft power” is a term coined by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. He defines it as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments”. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004): x. “Hard power,” in a political sense, means military or economic might; in a legal sense, “hard law” can be defined as “legally binding obligations that are precise … and that delegate authority for interpreting and implementing the law”. Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance,” International Organization 54, no. 3 (2000): 421. In an important sense, the entire discussion may trace to Lord McNair, who is credited with introducing the idea of “soft law” into legal discourse. See G. Abi-Saab, “Cours Général de Droit International Public,” Recueil des Cours 207 (1987): 32; see also Lászlo Blutman, “In the Trap of a Legal Metaphor: International Soft Law,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 59 (2010): 606.

³ See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), 1969 ICJ Rep. 3, 51 (February 20); Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Gr/Turk), 1978 ICJ Rep.3, 36 (December 19); Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar/Bahr.), 2001 ICJ Rep. 40, 97 (March 16); Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Rom./Ukr), 2009 ICJ Rep. 61, 89 (February 3) (juridically supporting the theme).

⁴ Ilulissat Declaration.

⁵ Ibid. (including matters relating to freedom of navigation, scientific research, settlement of overlapping claims, tourism, search and rescue, and disaster response).

⁶ Ibid. The Antarctic Treaty system is hardly analogous to the situation in the Arctic, however. The Antarctic Treaty suspended claims of sovereignty on a continent far removed from continental surroundings, partially to promote peaceful scientific research; the Arctic region is mostly pelagic space, much of which is subject to international rules relating to the law of the sea. See also Klaus Dodds, “The Ilulissat Declaration (2008): The Arctic States, ‘Law of the Sea,’ and Arctic Ocean,” SAIS Review 33, no. 2 (2008): 45 (noting the Ilulissat Declaration “marginalized alternative governance proposals, such as the Arctic Treaty”). It might be best to recall Stephen Krasner’s definition of “regimes”. Accordingly, regimes “are defined as principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area”. Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables,” in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983): 1.

⁷ Dodds, “The Ilulissat Declaration,” 49 (noting calls for a new treaty in the European Parliament and efforts from environmental groups such as Greenpeace). See also Brooks B. Yeager, “The Ilulissat Declaration: Background and Implications for Arctic Governance” (Remarks prepared for the Aspen Dialogue and Commission on Arctic Climate Change, 5 November 2008), http://www.arctic-report.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/2008.11-Ilulissat-Background-and-Implications.pdf (discussing various interpretations of the Declaration) (accessed December 8, 2014).

⁸ Dodds, “The Ilulissat Declaration,” 49.

⁹ United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature December 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force November 16 (1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS].

¹⁰ Article 234 of the treaty indirectly touches on the Arctic by reference of enhanced police powers of coastal states to regulate in nondiscriminatory ways ice-covered areas. For a discussion of the idiosyncratic qualities of the region of the Arctic due to its status as a semi-enclosed ocean, its “fuzzy” boundaries separating ice and land, contested sovereignties, and in an area of historically limited political agenda, see generally Sebastian Knecht, “Arctic Regionalism in Theory & Practice: From Cooperation to Integration?,” in Arctic Yearbook (2013): 164–83.

¹¹ See “Joint Communiqué and Declaration of the Establishment of the Arctic Council,” issued in Ottawa, Canada, 19 September 1996, reprinted in International Legal Materials 35 (1996): 1382 [the Ottawa Declaration]. The Ilulissat signatories also pledged continuing cooperation with another Arctic forum, the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR), which has its Secretariat located in Kirkenes, Norway.

¹² Ibid., Art. (2).

¹³ See “Finland, Sweden, Iceland left out,” SIKU News (5 May 2008), http://archive.is/mwj95 (accessed December 8, 2014).

¹⁴ See ¶20, Deputy Secretary’s Participation at Arctic Ocean Conference in Greenland, 11 June 2008, https://cablegatesearch.wikileaks.org/cable.php?id=08COPENHAGEN335&q=ilulissat (accessed December 8, 2014). For the reaction of the ICC, see art. 2 (2.6), A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic, April 2009, https://www.itk.ca/publication/circumpolar-declaration-sovereignty-arctic (accessed December 8, 2014). See also Sophie Theriault, “Northern Frontier, Northern Homeland: Inuit People’s Food Security in the Age of Climate Change and Arctic Melting,” Southwestern Journal of International Law 15 (2009): 243 no. 90 and accompanying text (discussing the meeting in Nunavik leading up to the Declaration).

¹⁵ Niche governance regimes are specialized structures within a larger institutional complex. Applied to the Arctic, they conduct generic tasks of governance, concentrating on building knowledge, strengthening norms, enhancing problem-solving, or enforcing rule compliance. See generally, Olav Schram Stokke, “Regime Interplay in Arctic Shipping Governance: Explaining Regional Niche Selection,” International Environmental Agreements, Politics, Law and Economics 13, no. 1 (2013): 65–85, http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10784-012-9202-1#page-1 (accessed December 8, 2014).

¹⁶ See generally Oran R. Young, “Institutional Linkages in International Society: Polar Perspectives,” Global Governance 2 (1996): 1–24 (discussing institutional linkages and polar regions); Oran R. Young, Creating Regimes: Arctic Accords and International Governance. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998) (discussing programmatic aspects of regime formation and the emergence of the Arctic as a distinct regime); Olav Schram Stokke and Geir Hønneland, eds., International Cooperation and Arctic Governance: Regime effectiveness and northern region building (New York: Routledge, 2007) (essays focusing on the Arctic Council, the Barents Euro-Arctic Region and the Council of the Baltic Sea States); Njord Wegge, “The Political Order in the Arctic: Power Structures, Regimes and Influence,” Polar Record 47 (2011): 165–76 (analyzing the Arctic region as a system in its own right).

¹⁷ Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic, 12 May 2011, reprinted in International Legal Materials 50 (2011): 1119–30; Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic, 15 May 2013, Arctic Council, Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response, http://www.arctic-council.org/eppr/agreement-on-cooperation-on-marine-oil-pollution-preparedness-and-response-in-the-arctic/ (multilingual versions of both treaty and appendices) (accessed December 8, 2014). See also US Dep't of State, Fact Sheet: Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (15 May 2013), (English language treaty without appendices) http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/05/209406.htm (accessed December 8, 2014).

¹⁸ Torbjørn Pedersen, “Debates over the Role of the Arctic Council,” Ocean Development and International Law 43 (2012): 151 (quoting a United States diplomatic cable’s summary of its own Deputy Secretary of State [Negroponte]’s and Assistant Secretary McMurry’s view [“unwieldy/smaller group” attributed to McMurry] and of Norway’s Foreign Minister [Stoere]’s view [“right sense of the word”]). (Elsewhere, Pedersen claims Denmark’s Foreign Minister Møeller called the smaller group “necessary;” and that Russia’s Foreign Minister Lavrov said “the Five Arctic Littoral States should show leadership in the Arctic Council.” Ibid. at 150 and 152).

¹⁹ Ibid. at 150 (quoting a United States diplomatic cable’s summary of the Danish Foreign Minister’s view). See also ¶9, statement of Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs political director, Carsten Damsgaard, as quoted in US diplomatic cable, Norway Hosts Informal Arctic Meeting, 21 October 2008, https://cablegatesearch.wikileaks.org/cable.php?id=08STATE111997&q=ilulissat (accessed December 8, 2014); and ¶8, Ambassador Fulton Meets Greenland Premier, 18 August 2009, https://cablegatesearch.wikileaks.org/cable.php?id=09COPENHAGEN356&q=ilulissat (on cable paraphrasing Greenland’s Premier, Kuupik Kleist) (accessed December 8, 2014).

²⁰ Pavel K. Baev, “Russia’s Arctic Ambitions and Anxieties,” Current History 112, no. 756 (2013): 268. Baev also concludes “Moscow seeks to convince the littoral states … of the benefits of dividing the Arctic Ocean’s continental shelf among them by legitimizing claims for expanding ‘Exclusive Economic Zones’ beyond the standard 200 nautical mile limit”. Ibid. at 267. See also ¶5, Denmark Resets Relationship with Russia, 6 November 2009, https://cablegatesearch.wikileaks.org/cable.php?id=09COPENHAGEN494&q=ilulissat (accessed December 8, 2014).

²¹ Peter Hough, International Politics of the Arctic: Coming in from the Cold (New York: Routledge, 2013): 108; see also Piotr Graczyk, “The Arctic Council Inclusive of non-Arctic Perspectives: Seeking a new balance,” in The Arctic Council: Its Place in the Future of Arctic Governance, ed. Thomas S. Axworthy, Timo Koivurova, and Waliul Hasanat (Toronto: Munk-Gordon Arctic Security Program 2012): 280 [hereinafter Axworthy, The Arctic Council].

²² Office of the Spokesman, United States Department of State Media Note, 12 May 2011 (Department of State Announces Successful Conclusion to Arctic Council Ministerial), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/163283.htm (accessed December 8, 2014).

²³ Paula Kankaanpää and Oran R. Young, “The Effectiveness of the Arctic Council,” Polar Research 31, no. 1 (2012): 12.

²⁴ Press statement, Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, February 3, 2010, http://www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/news-communiques/2010/54.aspx?lang=eng (statement of Lawrence Cannon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, announcing the 29 March meeting of Arctic Ocean coastal states) (accessed December 8, 2014).

²⁵ Pedersen, “Debates over the Role of the Arctic Council,” 152 (footnote omitted); and 153 (Ilulissat II).

²⁶ See Peter Worden, “Arctic Circle takes shape,” Northern News Service Online (6 May 2013), http://www.nnsl.com/frames/newspapers/2013-05/may6_13ac.html (labeling the Arctic Council “notoriously exclusive”) (accessed December 8, 2014); “A warmer welcome: The Arctic Council admits its first permanent Asian observers,” The Economist, May 18, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/international/21578040-arctic-council-admits-its-first-permanent-asian-observers-warmer-welcome (calling the Arctic Council a “cozy club” since its 1996 inception) (accessed December 8, 2014).

²⁷ Revised Arctic Council Rules of Procedure as adopted by the Arctic Council at the First Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, 17–18 September 1998, Iqaluit, Canada; revised by the Arctic Council at the Eighth Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, 15 May 2013, Kiruna, Sweden, Part I, art. (1). http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/category/4-founding-documents (accessed December 11, 2014).

²⁸ The Arctic Council grew out of meetings held in Rovaniemi, Finland, in 1989 and 1991, where eight Arctic countries – USSR, USA, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Finland, Denmark , and Canada – met to prepare a strategy to protect the Arctic environment. Their work product resulted in the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), reprinted in International Legal Materials 30 (1991): 1624. Signatories soon recognized that AEPS’ terms of reference needed substantial revision to cover “common Arctic issues,” including sustainable development. A second phase of Arctic administration developed, culminating in the establishment of the Arctic Council. See Timo Koivurova & David L. Vanderzwaag, “The Arctic Council at 10 Years: Retrospect and Prospects,” University of British Columbia Law Review 40 (2007): 123 and 129 (discussing the historical development of the Arctic Council).

²⁹ Ottawa Declaration, art. (2). The indigenous peoples’ organizations consist of approximately 500,000 persons out of a total of four million inhabitants of the Arctic. Indigenous organizations represented as permanent participants of the Arctic Council (with full consultation rights in connection with Council negotiations and decisions) include: the Arctic Athabaskan Council, the Aleut International Association, the Gwich’in Council International, the ICC, the Saami Council, and the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North. See Arctic Council Permanent Participants, http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/permanent-participants/123-resources/about/permanent-participants (accessed December 8, 2014).

³⁰ See “History of the Arctic Council Permanent Participants,” Arctic Council, http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/environment-and-people/arctic-peoples/indigenous-peoples-today/568-history-of-the-arctic-council-permanent-participants (accessed December 8, 2014).

³¹ Ottawa Declaration, art. 2(b).

³² Revised Arctic Council Rules of Procedure, Part II, art. (6).

³³ See Kankaapää and Young, “Knowledge Structures of the Arctic Council,” 8 and 9.

³⁴ See ibid. at 8. The Arctic Council appears to be addressing this issue through its creation of the Task Force to Facilitate a Circumpolar Business Forum. The task force held its first meeting in September 2013. For more information, see http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/task-forces (accessed December 8, 2014).

³⁵ See Ólafur Grímsson, President of Iceland, “Address to the National Press Club, 15 April 2013,” http://press.org/sites/default/files/20130415_grimsson.pdf (noting former French Prime Minister Michael Rocard’s frustrations with permanent observer protocol restrictions on participation at Arctic Council meetings) (accessed December 8, 2014). Observers may, however, present documents and make statements at the discretion of the Council chair. See Pedersen, “Debates over the Role of the Arctic Council,” 148. See also O.R. Young, “Whither the Arctic? Conflict or Cooperation in the Circumpolar North,” Polar Record 45 (2009): 80 (noting frustrations outside actors have had with the Arctic Council).

³⁶ Klaus Dodds, “After Kiruna: The Arctic Council and Arctic Futures,” RUSI, June 24, 2013, https://www.rusi.org/publications/newsbrief/ref:A51C855CD4C0C4/ (accessed December 8, 2014). The Council’s founding document, the Ottawa Declaration, allows for non-governmental organization observers. The Ottawa Declaration, art. 3(c). Its Rules of Procedures limits observer status to organizations “that the Council determines can contribute to its work.” Revised Arctic Council Rules of Procedure, art. 36(c). Eleven non-governmental organizations have been granted observer status, some with apparent environmental agendas. Official observers include: Advisory Committee on Protection of the Seas, Arctic Cultural Gateway, Association of World Reindeer Herders, Circumpolar Conservation Union, International Arctic Science Committee, International Arctic Social Sciences Association, International Union for Circumpolar Health, International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, Northern Forum, University of the Arctic, and the World Wildlife Fund. For more information, see http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/observers (accessed December 8, 2014).

³⁷ See The Economist, op. cit. In addition to China, South Korea, Japan, Singapore, Italy, and India were granted permanent observer status, joining France, Great Britain, The Netherlands, and Spain.

³⁸ Italy and South Korea’s applications also were turned down in 2009.

³⁹ Matt McGrath, “China joins Arctic Council but a decision on the EU is deferred,” BBC News, May 15, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-22527822 (accessed December 8, 2014). An emerging dispute over EU oil imports extracted from Alberta tar sands may further complicate EU’s deferral. Ibid.

⁴⁰ See generally Pami Aalto, Helge Blakkisrud, and Hanna Smith, The New Northern Dimension of the European Neighbourhood (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2009) (examining regional cooperation in the North and EU external relations).

⁴¹ Andrew Willis, “EU Gets Cold Shoulder in the Arctic,” EU Observer, May 13, 2011, http://euobserver.com/foreign/32331 (accessed December 8, 2014).

⁴² See “Greenland’s premier boycotts the arctic council in ‘drastic’ protest,” Nunatsiaq Online, May 15, 2013, http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674greenland_walks_away_from_the_arctic_council/ (accessed December 8, 2014).

⁴³ See Klaus Dodds, “Anticipating the Arctic and the Arctic Council: Pre-emption, Precaution and Preparedness,” in Axworthy, The Arctic Council, 24.

⁴⁴ Nuuk Declaration, on the occasion of the Seventh Ministerial meeting of The Arctic Council, 12 May 2011, Nuuk, Greenland, http://arctic-council.npolar.no/accms/export/sites/default/en/meetings/2011-nuuk-ministerial/docs/Nuuk_Declaration_FINAL.pdf (accessed December 8, 2014).

⁴⁵ Grímsson, “Address to the National Press Club.”

⁴⁶ Ibid. For a list of 2013 corporate supporters, including Google, as represented by its CEO, see http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/163283.htm (accessed December 8, 2014).

⁴⁷ See Paul Koring, “New Arctic group gives Canada political competition,” The Globe and Mail, April 15, 2013, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/new-arctic-group-gives-canada-political-competition/article11243970/ (claiming the new circumpolar forum “seems certain to irk some northern nation”) (accessed December 8, 2014). Mia Bennett, “Iceland president says Arctic lacks ‘effective governance’; launches Arctic Circle,” Foreign Policy Association, April 25, 2013, http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/04/25/iceland-president-says-arctic-lacks-effective-governance-launches-arctic-circle/ (noting the “subtle swipe at the Arctic Council”) (accessed December 8, 2014). Questions about the Arctic Council being supplanted by another type of governance forum predate Grímsson’s speech. See e.g. Timo Koivurova, “Limits and Possibilities of the Arctic Council in a Rapidly Changing Scene of Arctic Governance,” The Polar Record 46, no. 2 (2010): 146–56.

⁴⁸ Grímsson, “Address to the National Press Club.”

⁴⁹ Maltese Ambassador Arvid Pardo, Remarks on the Declaration and Treaty Concerning the Reservation Exclusively for Peaceful Purposes of the Seabed and of the Ocean Floor, Underlying the Seas Beyond the Limits of Present National Jurisdiction, and the Use of Their Resources in the Interests of Mankind, UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.75 (17 August 1967); for more information on Pardo’s promotion of the Common Heritage idea, see A. Pardo, The Common Heritage: Selected Papers on Oceans and World Order 1967–1974 (Malta University Press, 1975).

⁵⁰ “Arctic Assembly: Iceland Prepares for Historic Summit,” The Arctic Journal, October 11, 2013, http://arcticjournal.com/politics/arctic-assembly-iceland-prepares-historic-summit (accessed December 8, 2014). The inaugural meeting of the Arctic Circle took place in Reykjavik on 12–14 October 2013. See “The Inaugural meeting of The Arctic Circle,” Arcus, http://www.arcus.org/events/arctic-calendar/19870 (accessed December 8, 2014). See also Arctic Circle, http://www.arcticcircle.org/about (listing statistics about the 2013 Assembly) (accessed December 8, 2014). The 2014 Assembly was held in Reykjavik on 30 October–2 November. See 2014 Assembly Program, http://arcticcircle.org/sites/arcticcircle/themes/ac/pdf/2014%20Program%20October%2030.pdf (December 8, 2014). The 2015 assembly is scheduled to convene in Anchorage, Alaska, with smaller mid-year meetings planned for Greenland and Singapore. See http://www.arcticcircle.org/mission (accessed December 8, 2014).

⁵¹ “China seeks pragmatic ties with Arctic countries.” ChinaDaily.com, February 11, 2014, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-11/02/content_18844643.htm (accessed December 8, 2014).

⁵² Interests and Roles of Non-Arctic States in the Arctic: Background Brief 7 (National Capital Branch of the Canadian International Council and the Munk-Gordon Arctic Security, Program, 2011), http://www.gordonfoundation.ca/sites/default/files/publications/Arctic%20Seminar%20Background%20Brief_1.pdf (accessed December 8, 2014).

⁵³ MFA Press Statement: Presentation of Credentials of Singapore’s Plenipotentiary Representative to the Caribbean Community, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore, March 16, 2012, http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/media_centre/press_room/pr/2012/201203/press_20120316.printable.html?status=1 (referencing Ambassador Kemal Siddique’s current appointment as Special Envoy for Arctic Affairs).

⁵⁴ “Agreement: South Korean icebreaker can explore Canada’s Arctic,” Alaska Dispatch, May 17, 2012, http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/agreement-south-korean-icebreaker-can-explore-canadas-arctic (accessed December 8, 2014).

⁵⁵ Falk Huettmann and Ashok K. Roy, “Three Poles: The Arctic, Antarctic and Himalayas All Connect,” Daily News Miner, June 2, 2013, http://www.newsminer.com/opinion/community_perspectives/three-poles-the-arctic-antarctic-and-himalayas-all-connect/article_8a954e96-ca8d-11e2-97b5-0019bb30f31a.html (accessed December 8, 2014). The Hindu Kush Himalaya region is comprised of eight countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, India, Myanmar, Nepal, and Pakistan. See The International Center for Integrated Mountain Development, http://www.icimod.org/?q=1 (accessed December 8, 2014). For more on India’s emerging engagement with the Arctic, see Sanjay Chaturvedi, “Geopolitical Transformations: ‘Rising’ Asia and the Future of the Arctic Council,” in Axworthy, The Arctic Council, 233–37.

⁵⁶ The 10 Svalbard research stations are operated by Germany, France, Italy, Great Britain, South Korea, Norway, the Netherlands, China, Japan, and India. See Research Stations in Ny-Ålesund, Kings Bay, http://kingsbay.no/research/research_stations/ (accessed December 8, 2014).

⁵⁷ The Free Trade Agreement between the Government of Iceland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China signed in Beijing, April 15, 2013, Icelandic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.is/foreign-policy/trade/free-trade-agreement-between-iceland-and-china/ (accessed December 8, 2014).

⁵⁸ Rob Huebert, “Canadian Arctic Maritime Security: The Return to Canada’s Third Ocean,” Canadian Military Journal 8, no. 2 (2007): 9–16, http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo8/no2/huebert-eng.asp#skiplink (accessed December 8, 2014).

⁵⁹ Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada’s Northern Strategy Abroad, modified November 25, 2013; http://www.international.gc.ca/arctic-arctique/council-conseil.aspx?lang=eng (accessed December 8, 2014). For information on Canada’s Northern Strategy, announced in 2007 by Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, see Canada’s Northern Strategy, http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2013/08/16/canadas-northern-strategy (accessed December 8, 2014). As a measure of its Arctic identity, reference to the “True North” is contained in the Canadian National Anthem, “O Canada.”

⁶⁰ Grimsey Island, lying approximately 25 miles north of Iceland’s mainland, is an inhabited rockscape (population: 85) belonging to Iceland; it is the only part of Iceland, aside from several rock outcroppings, above the Arctic Circle.

⁶¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Iceland, Free Trade Agreement between Iceland and China, 15 April 2013, http://www.mfa.is/foreign-policy/trade/free-trade-agreement-between-iceland-and-china/ (accessed December 8, 2014).

⁶² See Irene Quaile, “All eyes on the Arctic Council,” DeutscheWelle, May 16, 2013, http://www.dw.de/all-eyes-on-the-arctic-council/a-16811193 (accessed December 8, 2014); Frédéric Lasserre, China and the Arctic: Threat or Cooperation Potential for Canada 5 (China Papers No. 11, Canadian International Council; Center of International Relations, University of British Columbia, 2010) (citing Robert Wade’s 2008 study).

⁶³ See National Strategy for the Arctic Region 1–11 (May 2013); The White House, Washington, DC, 10 May 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf (cover letter citing reasons for articulating the Arctic Region as a strategic priority) (accessed December 8, 2014); see also Dodds, “Anticipating the Arctic,” 2.

⁶⁴ See Jason Samenow, “Snow and Arctic sea ice extent plummet suddenly as globe bakes,” The Washington Post, July 18, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/capital-weather-gang/wp/2013/07/18/snow-and-arctic-ice-extent-plummet-suddenly-as-globe-bakes/ (accessed December 8, 2014). In scientific terms, “ice-free” conditions do not necessitate complete lack of ice. For scientific definitions of varieties of sea ice, see National Snow & Ice Data Center, http://nsidc.org/cryosphere/seaice/characteristics/index.html.

⁶⁵ Melting Snow and Ice. A Call for Action (Center for Ice, Climate and Ecosystems, Norwegian Polar Institute, 13 December 2009), http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/klima/melting_ice_report.pdf (accessed December 8, 2014). The US Navy’s “Arctic Roadmap” projects ice-free conditions for portions of the summer beginning as early as 2030. See David W. Titley and Courtney St. John, “Arctic Security Considerations and the US Navy’s Roadmap for the Arctic,” Naval War College Review 63 (2010): 36. The term “ice free” does not mean water “free of ice”: it means “the ice that once survived the seasonal melt cycle (the multiyear ice) will disappear leaving only first-year ice or annual sea ice[,]” which would be much more thin ice and easier to break up for marine transit. Lawson W. Brigham, “Arctic Marine Transportation,” in McGraw-Hill Yearbook of Science & Technology 2012 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2012): 9.

⁶⁶ See generally J.D. Ortiz, K.K. Falkner, P.A. Matrai, and R.A. Woodgate, “The Changing Arctic Ocean: An Introduction to the Special Issue on the International Polar Year (2007–2008),” Oceanography 24, no. 3 (2011): 14–16 (surveying dramatic changes in ocean physics and biochemistry associated with warming Arctic waters).

⁶⁷ Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas north of the Arctic Circle, United States Geological Survey Fact Sheet (2008), http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/ (accessed December 8, 2014).

⁶⁸ See E.J. Molenaar, “Current and Prospective Roles of the Arctic Council System within the Context of the Law of the Sea,” International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 27 (2012): 553 (noting wide support for strengthening the international Arctic governance regime); Alyson J.K. Bailes, “Understanding the Arctic Council: A ‘Sub-Regional’ Perspective,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 15, no. 2 (2013): 32 (noting gaps in Arctic governance); Koivurova and Vanderzwaag, “The Arctic Council at 10 Years” (assessing the need for Arctic Council reforms on 10th anniversary of its creation); Donald Rothwell, “The Arctic in International Affairs: Time for a New Regime?,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 15, no. 1 (2008/9): 248 (noting the Arctic is facing considerable management challenges individual Arctic States do not want to address); Ioana Georgescu, “Arctic Geopolitics – Time for a New Regime” (master’s thesis, Institut Europeen Des Hautes Etudes Internationals, Nice, 2010): 90, http://www.trunity.net/files/150601_150700/150650/georgescu.pdf (concluding a need for new clear and unambiguous legal and regulatory Arctic regime) (accessed December 8, 2014).

⁶⁹ Bailes, “Understanding the Arctic Council,” 46–47.

⁷⁰ Molenaar, “Current and Prospective Roles of the Arctic Council System,” 554.

⁷¹ Supra note 35.

⁷² Graczyk, “The Arctic Council Inclusive of non-Arctic Perspectives,” 280; see also Molenaar, “Current and Prospective Roles of the Arctic Council System,” 554.

⁷³ See e.g. Leonid Timtchenko, Quo Vadis Arcticum?: The International Law Regime of the Arctic and Trends in Its Development (Osnova: State University Press, 1996) (an early treatment of the necessity of a new Arctic regime).

⁷⁴ See Donald R. Rothwell and Stuart Kaye, “Law of the Sea and the Polar Regions: Reconsidering the Traditional Norms,” Marine Policy 18, no. 1 (1994), at 41 and 58 (1994) (noting difficulties in applying traditional law of the sea concepts and UNCLOS to the polar region).

⁷⁵ See E.C.H. Keskitalo, Negotiating the Arctic: The Construction of an International Region (New York: Routledge, 2004): 72 (noting Antarctic Treaty discussions as a model for the Arctic).

⁷⁶ Bailes, “Understanding the Arctic Council,” 32. Nordic countries such as Sweden and Finland have also kept their distance from other organizations connected to regional military or arms control issues, for instance, the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

⁷⁷ Ottawa Declaration, art. 1(a) and accompanying footnote.

⁷⁸ See Rothwell, “The Arctic in International Affairs,” 242 (noting the 1973 Polar Bear Agreement as a notable exception).

⁷⁹ Koivurova, “Limits and Possibilities of the Arctic Council,” 146–47; Evan T. Bloom, “Establishment of the Arctic Council,” American Journal of International Law 93 (1999): 712.

⁸⁰ Koivurova, “Limits and Possibilities of the Arctic Council,” 149. The four AEPS working groups were Cooperation, Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF); the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME); Emergency Prevention, Preparedness, and Response (EPPR); and the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP). The Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG) was established at the 1998 Ministerial Meeting in Iqaluit, Nunavut, Canada; the Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP) was granted working group status at the 2006 Ministerial Meeting in Salekhard, Russia. For detailed histories and activities of the working groups, see http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups (accessed December 8, 2014).

⁸¹ E.C.H. Keskitalo, Negotiating the Arctic 69 and 74 (New York: Routledge, 2004) (noting strongly politicized perspectives).

⁸² See Pedersen, “Debates over the Role of the Arctic Council,” 149; Nele Matz-Lück, “Planting the Flag in Arctic Waters: Russia’s Claim to the North Pole,” Göttingen Journal of International Law 1 (2009): 240; Molenaar, “Current and Prospective Roles of the Arctic Council System,” 571.

⁸³ Bailes, “Understanding the Arctic Council,” 32–33.

⁸⁴ See e.g. EBM Experts Group (Ecosystem-Based Management Experts Group), http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/expert-groups (accessed December 8, 2014).

⁸⁵ For the list of working groups, see supra note 81.

⁸⁶ Task forces are appointed at Ministerial meetings and are bounded by specific issues and a limited time frame, after which they become inactive. Four task forces are currently active in the Arctic Council: Task Force on Arctic Marine Oil Pollution Prevention (TFOPP), Task Force on Black Carbon and Methane (TFBCM), Scientific Cooperation Task Force (SCTF), and the Task Force to Facilitate the Circumpolar Business Forum (TFCBF). For descriptions of current and past task forces, see http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/task-forces (accessed December 8, 2014).

⁸⁷ A Senior Arctic Officials Report to Ministers at the Nuuk ministerial meeting (2011) identified the working groups as the principal means for advancing the Council’s substantive work. See Belén Sánchez Ramos, “Strengthening the Capacity of the Arctic Council: Is the Permanent Secretariat a First Step?,” in The Arctic Yearbook (2013): 270–1.

⁸⁸ According to Peter Haas, an epistemic community is a term that germinates “in the literature on the sociology of knowledge and has been adapted for use in international relations to refer to a specific community of experts sharing a belief in a common set of cause-and-effect relationships as well as common values to which policies governing these relationships will be applied”. Peter M. Haas, “Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control,” International Organization 43, no. 3 (1989): 384 fn. 20. See generally Peter M. Haas, ed., “Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination,” International Organization 46, no.1 (1992): 1–390 (essays on epistemic communities).

⁸⁹ In 1975, 16 Mediterranean countries and the European Community adopted the Mediterranean Action Plan, a first-ever “Regional Seas Program” operated by the United Nations Environment Program, to control marine pollution and develop common managerial policies to protect the socioeconomic development of the Mediterranean basin. For more information, see United Nations Environment Program, Mediterranean Action Plan for the Barcelona Convention, http://www.unepmap.org/index.php?module=content2&catid=001001002 (accessed December 8, 2014). See also, Gabriela Kütting, Environment, Society and International Relations: Towards More Effective International Environmental Agreements (New York: Routledge, 2000): 62–82 (discussing the history of the Mediterranean Action Plan).

⁹⁰ O.R. Young, “Building an International Regime Complex for the Arctic: Current Status and Next Steps,” Polar Journal 2, no. 2 (2012): 401–02.

⁹¹ See generally Paula Kankaanpää, “Knowledge Structures of the Arctic Council for Sustainable Development,” in Axworthy, The Arctic Council, 84–112 (detailing the boundary-spanning development of the Arctic Council in science and policy discussions); Olav Schram Stokke, “A Legal Regime for the Arctic?: Interplay with the Law of the Sea Convention,” Marine Policy 31, no. 4 (2007): 402–08 (discussing the Arctic Council’s strong environmental governance record as the best approach to circumpolar norm-building while acknowledging its “soft law” status).

⁹² Bailes, “Understanding the Arctic Council,” 31.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Gregory C. Shaffer, and Mark A. Pollack, “Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance,” Minnesota Law Review 94 (2009/10): 707–8; see also Prosper Weil, “Towards Relative Normativity in International Law,” American Journal of International Law 77 (1983): 414 (defining hard law as “norms creating precise legal rights and obligations” and soft law, less charitably, as “norms whose substance is so vague, so uncompelling)”.

⁹⁵ Jean d’Aspremont, “Softness in International Law: A Self-serving Quest for New Legal Materials,” European Journal of International Law 19, no. 5 (2008): 1076. For positivists’ criticism of soft law, see ibid. at 1077–81.

⁹⁶ See Abbott and Snidal, “Hard and Soft Law,” 421; Shaffer and Pollack, “Hard vs. Soft Law,” 707.

⁹⁷ Shaffer and Pollack, “Hard vs. Soft Law,” 708.

⁹⁸ Charles Lipson, “Why are Some International Agreements Informal?,” International Organization 45, no. 4 (1991): 500.

⁹⁹ Kal Raustiala, “Form and Substance in International Agreements,” American Journal of International Law 99, no. 3 (2005): 581 and 582.

¹⁰⁰ See Judith Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Legalization and World Politics,” International Organization 54, no. 3 (2000): 396 (associating fully legalized institutions with high levels of obligation, precision, and delegation). See also Raustiala, “Form and Substance,” 581ff (differentiating contracts and pledges and binding and nonbinding accords).

¹⁰¹ Oscar Schachter, “The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements,” American Journal of International Law 71, no. 2 (1977): 297.

¹⁰² See Martha Finnemore and Stephen J. Toope, “Alternatives to ‘Legalization’: Richer Views of Law and Politics,” International Organization 55, no. 3. (2001): 744–45 (2001) (discussing limited views of law based on formal notions of legalization).

¹⁰³ Abbott and Snidal, “Hard and Soft Law,” 423.

¹⁰⁴ See ibid. at 441–44 (discussing how soft power arrangements can provide a rational adaptation to uncertainty and incomplete knowledge); C.M. Chinkin, “The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 38 no. 4 (1989): 852–53 (facilitating flexibility and freedom to maneuver where changing circumstances require).

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. at 435.

¹⁰⁶ Chinkin, “The Challenge of Soft Law,” 852.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. at 862.

¹⁰⁸ Lipson, “Why are some international agreements informal?,” 500–01.

¹⁰⁹ Shaffer and Pollack, “Hard vs. Soft Law,” 719 (footnote omitted).

¹¹⁰ See D. Thürer, “Soft Law,” in IV Encyclopedia of Public International Law, ed. Bernhardt (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2000): 454 (concluding the term has no clearly defined content); see also Blutman, “In the Trap of a Legal Metaphor,” 606 (citing the work of Thürer, ibid., and A. Aust, Handbook of International Law), and separating the concept of soft law into norms that do not take the shape of a recognized international law, but have legal relevance, and norms that are recognized by international law, but are not enforceable owing to their generality) (internal footnote omitted).

¹¹¹ Weil, “Towards Relative Normativity in International Law,” 423.

¹¹² Raustiala, “Form and Substance,” 586; Richard Bilder, “Beyond Compliance: Helping Nations Cooperate,” in Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000): 72 (calling the concept of soft law “inappropriate and unhelpful” in that it “deprecate[s] the currency of law);” Hartmut Hillgenberg, “A Fresh Look at Soft Law,” European Journal of International Law 10, no. 3 (1999): 500 (calling “soft law” a contradiction in terms); Jan Klabbers, “The Redundancy of Soft Law,” Nordic Journal of International Law 65 (1996): 168 (preferencing the binary distinction).

¹¹³ H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961) (noting the indeterminacy of rules stemming from norms of international law); Schachter, “The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements,” 298 (noting imprecision and generalities are known qualities of treaties of unquestioned legal force). The point is also well recognized by Weil, a critic of soft law approaches. He notes “numerous treaty provisions whereby the parties undertake merely to consult”, or where agreement is based purely on “hortatory or exhortatory provisions”. Weil, “Towards Relative Normativity in International Law,” 414.

¹¹⁴ See e.g. Shaffer and Pollack, “Hard vs. Soft Law,” 708–09.

¹¹⁵ Klabbers, “The Redundancy of Soft Law,” 391 and 387. See also Shaffer and Pollack, “Hard vs. Soft Law,” 744 (arguing: “individual states (or other actors) may deliberately use soft-law instruments to undermine hard law rules to which they object…”.).

¹¹⁶ Graczyk, “The Arctic Council Inclusive of non-Arctic Perspectives,” 276.

¹¹⁷ See Annika E. Nilsson, “Knowing the Arctic: The Arctic Council as a Cognitive Forerunner,” in Axworthy, The Arctic Council 192 (claiming scientific studies such as the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment are the Arctic Council’s most effective products).

¹¹⁸ Remarks of United States Secretary of State John Kerry on the establishment of a Special Representative for the Arctic Region, US Department of State Press Statement, February 14, 2014, http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/02/221678.htm (accessed December 8, 2014).

¹¹⁹ Search and rescue … stemming from the Council’s 2009 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment.

¹²⁰ The principle in full reads pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt.

¹²¹ Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, art. 39, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force on 27 January 1980); Case Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, 1925 PCIJ (ser. A) no. 7, 28–29; Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzόw, 1928 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 17, 45; Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961): 309.

¹²² See Erik Franckx, “Pacta Tertiis and the Agreement for the Implementation of the Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 8 (2000): 49 (arguing the rule’s general acceptance today and noting also its reflection in persistent objector theory).

¹²³ Alyson Bailes correctly identifies the extant structure of the Arctic Council, with its “inner Five” machinations, as a political weakness of the Arctic Council specifically, and a problem for sub-regional institutions generally. Bailes, “Understanding the Arctic Council,” 39. Without reform, she admits “the temptation” for a co-optation of the Council’s agenda by the “5 littoral states will never fade.” Ibid. at 45–46.

¹²⁴ See Kankaapää and Young, “The Effectiveness of the Arctic Council,” 11.

¹²⁵ See generally Scott J. Shackelford, “Was Selden Right?: The Expansion of Closed Seas and its Consequences,” Stanford Journal of International Law 47 (2011): 1–50. Russia’s extended continental shelf claims (in the Barents, Bering, and Okhotsk Seas, and involving contested claims to the Lomonosov and Mendeleev Ridges) cover almost 1.2 million square kilometers; Canada’s total claim (including claims in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans as well) equals the size of its three prairie provinces, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba; Norway’s claim amounts to seven soccer fields for each of its five million people. See Christopher R. Rossi, “A Particular Kind of Dominium: The Grotian “Tendency” and the Global Commons in a Time of High Arctic Change,” Journal of International Law and International Relations 11, no. 1 (2015): 1–60 (in publication).

¹²⁶ See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Annex VI, Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Summary of the Recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in Regard to the Submission made by Norway in Respect of Areas in the Arctic Ocean, the Barents Sea, and the Norwegian Sea on 27 November 2006, https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nor06/nor_rec_summ.pdf; Utenriksdepartementet, The Continental Shelf – Questions and Answers, 30 November 2009, http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/dok/lover_regler/retningslinjer/2009/the-continental-shelf---questions-and-an.html?id=583774 (accessed December 8, 2014); see also Dodds, “The Ilulissat Declaration,” 50.

¹²⁷ See Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) Outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines: Submissions to the Commission: Partial Submission by Canada, United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_can_70_2013.htm (accessed December 8, 2014).

¹²⁸ See The Continental Shelf Project, News of 27 November 2013 and 25 March 2014, http://a76.dk/lng_uk/main.html (accessed December 8, 2014).

¹²⁹ UNCLOS, art. 76(5) (up to 100 nautical miles beyond the 2500 meter isobaths).

¹³⁰ “National Strategy for the Arctic Region,” 9.

¹³¹ See Charles K. Ebinger and Evie Zambetakis, “The Geopolitics of Arctic Melt”, International Affairs 85, no. 6 (2009): 1224–6 (discussing the United Nations’ lack of institutional capacity to handle continental shelf extension claims). The point is reinforced by Norwegian Foreign Minister Stoere’s purported comment, leaked as part of a confidential cable following the Ilulissat meeting, 22 June 2008: “FM Stoere said it is for states, not the commission, to settle overlapping claims by negotiation”. ¶5 Deputy Secretary’s meeting with Norwegian FM Stoere in Greenland, 11 June 2008, https://cablegatesearch.wikileaks.org/cable.php?id=08COPENHAGEN337&q=ilulissat.

¹³² See Ron Mcnab, “The Case for Transparency in the Delimitation of the Outer Continental Shelf in Accordance with UNCLOS Article 76,” Ocean Development and International Law 35 (2004): 11 (noting the CLCS shall consider information submitted by the coastal state and make recommendations on the establishment of the outer limits); see also Michael Sheng-ti Gau, “The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf as a Mechanism to Prevent Encroachment upon the Area,” Chinese Journal of International Law 10 (2011): 6 (arguing that existing international rules and mechanisms cannot sufficiently address the problem of coastal state encroachment).

¹³³ Ibid. at 15.

¹³⁴ See Christopher R. Rossi, “The Northern Sea Route and the Seaward Extension of Uti Possidetis (Juris),” Nordic Journal of International Law 83 (2014): 478 and 502; Rothwell, “The Arctic in International Affairs,” 242.

¹³⁵ Ariel Cohen, “Russia in the Arctic: Challenges to U.S. Energy and Geopolitics in the High North,” in Russia in the Arctic, ed. Stephen J. Blank (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2011): 13.

¹³⁶ Clause 5.1, Navigation in the Water Area of the Northern Sea Route, Russian Federation, Federal Law N 132-Ф3, On Amendments to Specific Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation Related to Governmental Regulation of Merchant Shipping in the Water Area of the Northern Sea Route, adopted by the State Duma 3 July 2012; approved by the Council of Federation, 18 July 2012, signed in Moscow, 28 July 2012 by V. Putin, President of The Russian Federation, http://www.arctic-lio.com/docs/nsr/legislation/federal_law_nsr.pdf (accessed December 8, 2014). Katarzyna Zysk quotes several Russian authorities in support of the legally tenuous assertion that the “integral nature of the [Northern Sea Route] … is not affected by the fact that individual portions of it … may pass into the high seas” – and may, thus, include sea lanes running beyond Russia’s Exclusive Economic Zone. Katarzyna Zysk, “Russia’s Arctic Strategy: Ambitions and Constraints,” Joint Force Quarterly 57, no. 2 (2010): 107 (footnote omitted).

¹³⁷ Canadian Order-in Council, 10 September 1985; Territorial Sea Geographical Coordinates (Area 7) Order, SOR/85-872, http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/regu/sor-85-872/latest/sor-85-872.html?searchUrlHash=AAAAAQATVGVycml0b3JpYWwgU2VhIEFjdAAAAAAB (affirming “Canada has long maintained and exercised sovereignty over the waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago”) (accessed December 8, 2014).

¹³⁸ See Gleb Bryanski, “Russia’s Putin Says Arctic Trade Route to Rival Suez,” Reuters Can. (22 September 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/22/us-russia-arctic-idUSTRE78L5TC20110922 (accessed December 8, 2014).

¹³⁹ For information on the International Maritime Organization’s draft Polar Code, see http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/HotTopics/polar/Pages/default.aspx (accessed December 8, 2014). It is important to note the decision to develop the Polar Code was shaped considerably by the Council’s Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment. See Molenaar, “Current and Prospective Roles of the Arctic Council System,” 571.

¹⁴⁰ Alex Kirby, “U.S. Calls for Commercial Fishing Ban in Arctic As Sea Ice Melt Opens International Waters,” EcoNews, February 25, 2014, http://ecowatch.com/2014/02/25/fishing-ban-in-arctic-sea-ice-melt-opens-international-waters/ (accessed December 8, 2014).

¹⁴¹ See Young, “Whither the Arctic?,” 77.