Two Concepts of Wrongful Harm: A Conceptual Map for the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Second Buffalo Workshop on Ethics and Adaptation: Loss, Damage, and Harm, May 8–9, 2015, University at Buffalo. I am thankful to workshop participants for their helpful comments and to anonymous reviewers for their comments on a subsequent draft. Special thanks go to Kenneth Shockley and Marion Hourdequin for their dedicated work as guest editors and their insightful guidance throughout the revision process. Research support from the Faculty of Liberal Arts and Professional Studies, York University, is gratefully acknowledged.

Abstract

This paper is concerned with the moral concept of harm in the context of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage. This paper delineates between two concepts of wrongful harm: interactional versus architectural. It then examines these options with an eye toward developing a satisfactory normative approach for policy. While the interactional view of wrongful harm supports powerful arguments about moral responsibility, it has some clear limitations. This paper makes a case for the architectural view by underlining that it is not only compatible with the features of the Paris Agreement but also supports a distinctive conception of justice.

Notes

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Second Buffalo Workshop on Ethics and Adaptation: Loss, Damage, and Harm, May 8–9, 2015, University at Buffalo. I am thankful to workshop participants for their helpful comments and to anonymous reviewers for their comments on a subsequent draft. Special thanks go to Kenneth Shockley and Marion Hourdequin for their dedicated work as guest editors and their insightful guidance throughout the revision process. Research support from the Faculty of Liberal Arts and Professional Studies, York University, is gratefully acknowledged.

1. The concept of loss and damage implies both slow onset effects (e.g. gradual sea level rise) and extreme weather events (e.g. cyclones). However, due to the acutely destructive threat that they present, extreme events receive considerable attention in policy debates and in academic research. For an overview, see Taraska (2013); for recent work delineating the moral, political, and policy-related implications of loss and damage, see Boran (2014), Boran and Heath (2016), Shockley (2014) and Thompson and Otto (2015).

2. A more comprehensive historical overview of loss and damage in the negotiations under the UNFCCC is found in Mace and Verheyen (2016).

3. This round of the UN negotiations is known as the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, launched at COP 17 in Durban, in 2011.

4. A first review took place at COP 22 in Marrakech in 2016, opening a path for regular reviews (for details, see UNFCCC, 2016).

5. For an account of the debate at COP 19 in Warsaw, see Taraska (2013).

6. What comes to mind is litigation against large companies or against governments, on the basis of human rights law. A critical discussion of these cases is not within the purview of this essay. For a critical discussion, see Posner (2006–2007).

7. See also Bodansky (2010, pp. 515–516).

8. Detailed discussions of this problem are found in Posner and Weisbach (2010, chapter 5), Caney (2010, pp. 125–127) and Adler (2007).

9. For light on the systemic nature of collective action problems in relation to environmental problems, see Vogel (2015, chapter 7).

10. The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a well understood problem in rational choice. There is an immense literature on it. For representative discussions of its implications for moral philosophy and public policy, see Gauthier (1986), Heath (2006a, 2006b, 2007). For a discussion in relation to social responsibility and economic efficiency, see Arrow (1973).

11. Although this idea runs through Mill’s work (e.g., 1989 [1859], it is most clearly elicited in The Subjection of Women (1989 [1869]).