Deciding in the Dark: The Precautionary Principle and the Regulation of Synthetic Biology

ABSTRACT

According to Bedau and Triant decision-makers will be substantially ignorant about the consequences of their candidate choices when making decisions about synthetic biology. Bedau and Triant characterize decisions under such circumstances as decisions in the dark. They then argue that when making decisions in the dark, decision-makers should not appeal to the Precautionary Principle because this principle does not sufficiently accommodate important features of ‘deciding and acting virtuously’. In the paper, I point out that it is unclear how to understand the virtue-based approach in the regulatory context of synthetic biology. I then argue that Daniel Steel’s tripod interpretation of the Precautionary Principle provides a strong response to the problem of incoherence, which I suggest is at the heart of the criticism raised by Bedau and Triant. Finally, I raise a worry that incoherence problems may still crop up within the framework of Steel’s account.

KEYWORDS:

• Synthetic biology
• precautionary principle
• virtue ethics
• decision-making
• regulation

Notes

1. The scholarship on PP is extensive and it is not the aim of this paper to provide a comprehensive review of all the criticisms and (re)formulations of the principle that have been presented and defended over the years. The point of departure for this article is Bedau and Triant’s discussion of the PP in the context of the regulation of synthetic biology. Thus, it should be noted that the notion of ‘deciding in the dark’ or of ‘unknown unknowns’ is not an original point made by Bedau and Triant but a mainstay in the literature.

2. It should be noted that there are alternatives to the idea of ‘balancing virtues’ among virtue ethicists, e.g. the idea that the appropriate virtue ‘silences’ conflicting considerations.

3. Sandin (2009, p. 98) suggests a virtue-based approach to precaution. However, in contrast with Bedau and Triant, who reject PP, Sandin’s idea is that PP can be (re)interpreted as a virtue-based principle stating that a person should ‘perform those and only those actions that a cautious agent would perform in the circumstances’. I think that Sandin’s proposal is problematic for the same reasons that I present in relation to Bedau and Triant’s suggestion.

4. This paper grew out of a workshop on Steel’s book on PP (Steel, 2014). Thus, my focus is on Steel’s discussion of PP and his discussion of the problem of consistency, development of a tripartite analysis, and his version of a plurality account of PP. However, these themes do not originate with Steel. Thus, Sunstein (2005) is a locus classicus for the problem of consistency. Manson (2002) has suggested a tripartite account of PP and Hartzell-Nichols (2013) has put forward the idea of a plurality of precautionary principles, just to mention a few influential contributions to the debate. Other important discussions include Cranor (2004), Gardiner (2006), and Whiteside (2006).

5. The other part of Steel’s analysis of proportionality is the efficiency principle, which is a principle for which precautionary measure among the consistently recommended ones should be chosen. For the purposes of avoiding paradox, the consistency principle is the important one.

6. A similar concern is briefly raised by John (2016).