Disabling ideal theory

ABSTRACT

This article offers a critique of ideal theory from the perspective of disability. Specifically, I make the case that John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin’s idealized writings on disability incorporate ableist assumptions into their abstract thought experiments. In turn, their theoretical frameworks do not adequately identify and analyze the causes of disability-related injustices, nor do they offer sufficient guidance for addressing urgent problems facing people with disabilities today. As an alternative to abstraction, this analysis suggests that normative theory has to confront the contextualized historical processes that have propagated injustices between members of oppressed and privileged groups. Building off of the feminist literature on standpoint epistemology, I emphasize the methodological importance of practicing epistemic humility, critically listening to the ways in which oppressed groups portray their own circumstances and political claims, and integrating empirical research into normative theory.

KEYWORDS:

• Disability
• ideal theory
• feminism
• Rawls
• Dworkin

Acknowledgements

I want to thank the anonymous reviewers, Amanda Barnes Cook, Joel Winkelman, Michael Lienesch, Susan Bickford, Jeff Spinner-Halev, Stacy Clifford Simplican, Claire McKinney, Jason Windett, and Penny Weiss for helpful comments on earlier versions of this manuscript. I am also grateful for the feedback that I received at the Workshop for Politics, Ethics, and Society at Washington University in St. Louis and the Political Science Workshop at Saint Louis University.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1 Even though there is widespread acceptance among political theorists that ideal and non-ideal theory are somehow distinctive, there is little agreement on how or why they should be distinguished from each other. See Stemplowska and Hamlin (2012) for more on this debate.

2 Building from Charles Mills’s broad characterization, “ideal theory” refers to a theory that is constructed through abstraction and idealization “to the exclusion, or at least marginalization, of the actual” (2005, 168). Lisa Schwartzman describes abstraction as the method whereby “certain important features of the social structure are allegedly set aside, or bracketed … ” (2006a, 575). Obviously, there are gradations between ideal and non-ideal theories, and all theory involves some measure of abstraction and idealization. Yet, as Daniel Engster explains, “The more a theory idealizes significant facts about human existence and society and frames its justice principles in abstract terms without developing their practical implications, the more ideal it is” (2015, 9).

3 Elizabeth Anderson describes non-ideal theory’s methodological approach:

Non-ideal theory views political philosophy as akin to practical arts and sciences such as medicine. Physicians start thinking from the problematic symptoms presented to them. They seek a diagnosis of those symptoms, and then tailor treatments to the diagnosis. Such thinking starts from a non-ideal state and seeks solutions to problems identified in that state. (2009, 135)

4 Political philosophers have considered Rawls and Dworkin’s writings from a disability perspective, although most analyses do not focus specifically on their methods for theory construction. For a disability reading of Rawls see Cureton (2008), Kittay (1999), Nussbaum (2006), Richardson (2006), Stark (2007), and Wong (2009). For a disability reading of Dworkin see Anderson (1999), Handley (2003), Stein (2006), Tremain (1996), Wasserman (1998), and Wolff (2009).

5 See Hirschmann and Arneil (2016) and Simplican (2015) for exemplary interdisciplinary research between political theory and disability studies.

6 Similarly, Eva Kittay emphasizes their “entry points”: non-ideal theorists begin theorizing by considering descriptive accounts of actual practices of oppression, while ideal theorists use abstract and fictionalized theoretical assumptions about moral subjects and conditions as their entry point into theory development (2009, 125).

7 Dworkin contends his theory of equality of resources is developed in “the ideal ideal world of fantasy” (2000, 172). Moreover, according to Rawls, “The reason for beginning with ideal theory is that it provides … the only basis for the systemic grasp of these more pressing problems … ” (1999, 8).

8 The survey asked respondents, “Which would you choose: Living with a severe disability that forever alters your ability to live an independent life, or death?”

9 For more on the medical and social models of disability see Shakespeare (2010) and Oliver (2013).

10 Elizabeth Anderson also suggests that Dworkin regards “the condition of the disabled as intrinsically horrible” and consistently typecasts people with disabilities as misfortunate individuals lacking valuable personal assets, noting how they are frequently lumped together with “the ugly, the stupid, and the untalented” (1999, 333–335). Hence, Dworkin uses the term “wretched” to imply that people with disabilities are necessarily in a very unhappy or unfortunate state.

11 For example, Dworkin invokes the caricature of Tiny Tim to argue against equality of welfare (2000, 60). Rather than consulting auto-ethnographies about the lived experience of disability, he relies on a cultural trope.

12 Dworkin distinguishes option luck, which “is a matter of how deliberate and calculated gambles turn out,” from brute luck, which is “a matter of how risks fall out that are not in that sense deliberate gambles” (73–74). Ultimately, the purpose of the brute/option luck distinction is to determine who is owed compensation and hold individuals responsible for the consequences of their choices.

13 See Nielsen (2012) for more on the history of disability discrimination in the U.S.

14 See Charlton (2010) for more on the multiple dimensions of disability oppression.

15 Garland-Thomson (2011) also examines how the particularities of embodiment interact with their social environment.

16 As Eva Kittay warns,

Advocates of disability rights … have argued that their impairments are only disabling in an environment that is hostile to their differences and that has been constructed to exclude them. Yet, the impairment of mental retardation is not easily addressed by physical changes in the environment. (2001, 557)

17 Martha Nussbaum is also doubtful, arguing that “the fact that they [people with disabilities] are not included in the group of choosers means that they are not included … in the group of those for whom principles are chosen” (2006, 16). Critiquing Rawls, she elaborates on the relationship between a subject of justice (a chooser of the principles of justice) and an object of justice (a beneficiary of the principles of justice):

Such people [children, the elderly, those with disabilities] are clearly absent from the contracting group – and … they are ipso facto absent from the group of citizens for whom the principles of justice are framed … Their needs do not shape the parties’ choice of basic political principles, or even their conception of the primary goods of a human life … Thus issues that seem extremely important for social justice – issues about the allocation of care, the labor involved in caring, and the social costs of promoting the fuller inclusion of disabled citizens – fail to come into focus … . (2006, 33)

18 Rosemarie Garland-Thomson extends standpoint theory to articulate what she refers to as “sitpoint theory,” which challenges the ableist assumption that one perceives and understands the world through standing (instead of sitting in a wheelchair) (2005, 1570).

19 Similarly, Collins’s (2000) theory of standpoint epistemology is attentive to intersectionality and does not assume that all Black women think alike.

20 Kittay (2009) also emphasizes the importance of humility, suggesting that Peter Singer and Jeff McMahan lack epistemic humility in their abstract and idealized writings on cognitive impairment.

21 See Kittay (1999) and Mintz (2007) for exemplary auto-ethnographic research.

22 Engster (2015) also argues that engagement with social science research is necessary for political theorists to identify the institutional reforms necessary for achieving justice in existing societies.