Sacred Pillars of Violence: Findings from a Study of the Pakistani Taliban

Abstract

In what ways does religion matter as justification for violence? Based on a larger study of the Pakistani Taliban and their communication and recruitment materials, this article presents some of its main findings in a condensed form. It summarizes the lessons learned about the various roles religion plays in providing justification for taking up arms, namely: as an object to be defended; as a threat; as the purpose of armed struggle; as a (blurred) limit on war; and, finally, as imagery and myth. Although this article specifically looks at the case of the Pakistani Taliban and their religious justifications of violence, the findings might also find resonance in other cases of violent religious movements. The final sections of the article briefly discuss the potential implications of the findings for an overall understanding of the ‘nature’ of religious violence.

Notes

¹This brief synthesis of some of the Pakistani Taliban's religious justifications of violence is based on my dissertation ‘Guardians of God – Understanding the Religious Violence of Pakistan's Taliban’ (Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, 2011).

²David Cook, Understanding Jihad (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005).

³The speech act perspective embraced by securitization theory that originally guided my analysis in ‘Guardians of God’ (op. cit.) holds that legitimacy-bestowing narratives are important to study because they set out the conditions of possibility for action. The theory claims that actors that successfully claim that there is an existential threat against something sacred/precious enable ‘security’ action that move beyond the ordinary realm of politics and negotiation. See Ole Wæver, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’ in Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed) On Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 46–86.

⁴Michael K. Jerryson and Mark Juergensmeyer (eds), Buddhist Warfare (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, the Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000); Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds), Fundamentalisms Comprehended: The Fundamentalism Project, Volume 5 (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

⁵The analytical evidence from the communication and recruitment material that form the basis for the conclusions presented here are found in length in ‘Guardians of God’.

⁶Some of the Taliban factions are reportedly supported by the Pakistan Military Intelligence, the ISI, in order to prevent the influence of those groups who see the Pakistani security forces as legitimate targets. See for example R. Yusufzai, ‘A Who's Who of the Insurgency in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province – Part 2’, Terrorism Monitor, 8:4 (2008), pp. 1–4, and ‘A Who's Who of the Insurgency in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province: Part 1 – North and South Waziristan’, Terrorism Monitor, 6:18 (2009), www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=5169&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=167&no_cache=1

⁷For detailed depictions of the Pakistani Taliban movement(s) see Q. Siddique, ‘Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. An Attempt to Deconstruct the Umbrella Organization and the Reasons for its Growth in Pakistan's North West’, DIIS Report 2010:12, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies; Hassan Abbas, ‘A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan’, CTC Sentinel, 1:2 (2009), pp. 1–4; R. Yusufzai, ‘A Who's Who’, op. cit., 2008, 2009. For the links between the Afghan oriented and Pakistan oriented movements see Mariam Abu Zahab and Roy Olivier Roy, Islamist Networks: The Pakistan–Afghanistan Connection. London: C. Hurst, 2004). For the historical roots of the ‘classical’ Taliban see Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).

⁸The conclusions in this article are based on an analysis of 12 speeches/videos and 25 written documents issued by movements related to the Pakistani Taliban. A comprehensive list of the data can be found in the appendices of ‘Guardians of God’.

⁹‘Guardians of God’. The interviews analyzed are with Umm Hasan, principal of Jamia Hafsa and wife of Abdul Aziz Ghazi, Imam of the Red Mosque, Islamabad (14 June 2008), Sami ul Haq, principal of Darul Uloom Haqqania, leader of Jamaate Ulamae Islam (S), Akora Khattak (16 June 2008), Matiul Haq, TTP, Malakand (16 June 2008), Muslim Khan, leader and spokesman of TTP, Swat (16 June 2008), Khalifa Abdul Qayyum, vice president of Sipahe Sahaba Pakistan, Dera Ismail Khan (16 June 2008) and Muhammad Yahya Mujahid, spokesman Jamaat ud Dawa/Lashkare Tayba, Muzaffarabad (21 June 2008). Initially, I planned to include interviews given to western/international media also. This turned out to be quite difficult, however, because there are strikingly few interviews of this sort given by the Pakistani Taliban. The few instances where they do appear are mostly in niche magazines or websites (and interestingly, carried out by journalist with ‘Muslim’ names), and if they are given to a larger outlet the interviews are conducted and reported very superficially (there can be several reasons for this among them media tendencies to focus on events more than discourses and conceptual differences, and the fear for spreading violent ideologies).

¹⁰This follows the securitization theory's outline of a security narrative that includes a referent object (that which is defended), a threat construction, and the securitizing actors' outline of ‘necessary’ steps to avoid the danger. See also fn. 3.

¹¹Ninian Smart's Dimensions of the Sacred is operational in understanding what aspects of religion are at play/defended by religio-political activists like the Taliban. It can easily be mounted to a securitization and/or discourse analytical framework in order to clarify exactly what is meant by religion. Ninian Smart, Dimensions of the Sacred: An Anatomy of the World's Beliefs (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996).

¹²See ‘Guardians of God’, chapter 5.

¹³In a speech the TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud for instance states, ‘The real objective of Pakistan and the slogan on which it came into being was la ilaha illallah [there is no God, but God]. We will continue our jihad against the government of Pakistan until the system of la ilaha illallah is established in the country’. Video recording, ‘Operation Rah-e-Nijat and the Actual Facts’, retrieved from Utube (Part 2/3), www.youtube.com/watch?v=_aU-_d4wOug&feature=related.

¹⁴A concern over the increasing crime rate in the Pakistani society was a recurrent theme that the activists raised in my conversations with them. Also the communication materials reveals that establishing ‘order’ and ‘peace’ are seen as the ultimate aims of jihad. See ‘Guardians of God’, pp. 166, 179, 195, 207.

¹⁵See for example ‘Message from Hakimullah Mehsud and Wali al-Rahman Mehsud’, video issued by the TTP headquarters, Al-Sahab Media Production, released October 2009 and retrieved from www.archive.org/details/AMEF_Message-Hakimullah-Wali-ur-Rahman-Mehsud_English. A translation is available from Ansar al-Mujahideen at http://ansar1.info/.

¹⁶For an analysis of the Red Mosque events see Qandeel Siddique, ‘The Red Mosque Operation and its Impact on the Growth of the Pakistani Taliban’, FFI Research Report 2008/01915, Oslo: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment.

¹⁷Democracy is both made equivalent to the ‘system of the Christians’ (for example ‘Maulana Fazlullah new video 4’, video recording of a speech by mullah Fazlullah. Retrieved from Utube/Zamaswat.com at www.youtube.com/watch?v=vwpYawdgNtE) and to ‘shirk’ (idolatry). As stated by the Taliban Commander Hakimullah Mehsud in his critique of the Pakistani government: ‘This governmental system is democratic, which is shirk in its entirety’ (‘Message from Hakimullah Mehsud and Wali al-Rahman Mehsud’, op. cit.). Besides using their collaboration with the US army as justification, the TTP also constitutes the Pakistan army as non-Muslims, as kuffar, due to their embracement of democracy: ‘After they have adapted kufr laws, how can they be Muslims? They are most loyal in their friendship with the kuffar, and they are the perpetrators of murder on thousands of Muslims. Therefore, we cannot call them Muslims’ (‘Message from Hakimullah Mehsud and Wali al-Rahman Mehsud’, op. cit.).

¹⁸‘Statement by TTP's Central Spokesman from South Waziristan’, statement by Azam Tariq, issued by TTP, South Waziristan (not dated); ‘Laskare Jhangvi International’, issued by the organization of Lashkare Jhangvi (dated 12 December 2010); ‘Shura Ittihad al-Mujahideen’, issued by Hafiz Gul Bahadar, Baitullah Mehsud and Mullah Nazir (collected in Khyber Pakhtunkwa 19 February 2009).

¹⁹‘Message from TTP Khurram Agency’. Issued by Fazal Sayed Haqqani, leader of the Tehreeke Taliban Khurram Agency (distributed 10 May 2011 in the Khurram Agency).

²⁰See also ‘Guardians of God’, pp. 201–202.

²¹Following are examples of the Quranic chapters referred to and how they are used. Surat An-Nisa (4:61, 4:63, 4:64, 4:88, 4:138, 4:140, 4:142, 4:145): this chapter is especially used to justify jihad against the Pakistani government. Surat Al-Imran (e.g. 3:84, 3:85, 3:86, 3:87, 3:88); this chapter is used to justify violent measures against those constituted as non-Muslims. Surat Adh-Dhariyat (51:54, 51:55, 51:56, 51:57, 51:58) and Surat Al-Baraqah (2:163, 2:164, 2:165, 2:166, 2:167, 2:168); these chapters are used as evidence that God is with the militants who are fighting shirk. Surat Al-Anfal: references to this chapter are applied to urge Muslims to join the Taliban jihad. Surat Al-Maidah (especially the verses 5:50, 5:51 and 5:52): These are referred to as a ‘divine warning’ against making alliances with Jews and Christians and are used to justify that the Taliban fight against the Pakistan army is religiously sanctioned, because Pakistan has formed an alliance with ‘the Jews and Christians’.

²²‘Deoband’ originally designates a city in India where an influential religious seminary [madrassa] tradition was initially established by the Darul Uloom Deoband. The religious scholars [ulama] related to the Deoband seminary in British India were concerned with the encroachment of western culture, and called for resistance through adherence to authentic Islamic values and rejection of customary practices that they believed had watered down true Islam.

²³The Ahl Hadith (‘the people of prophetic narrations’) are the Pakistani Salafis, a puritanical movement closely linked with the Wahhabism of the Arabian Peninsula. The principal tenet of Salafism is the view that Islam was perfect and complete during the days of Muhammad and his companions, but that undesirable innovations have been added over the later centuries due to cultural influences from the West. Brought to India in the late nineteenth century, the Ahl Hadith tradition reasserted the Quran and the hadith as the only supreme authorities in Islam. Although they share the Salafis' critique of western influence and the call to authenticity, the Deobandis are strict believers in taqlid (adherence to prior legal rulings). The materials I have analysed however illuminate that the Pakistani Taliban draw on both ‘deobandianism’ and salafism. See ‘Guardians of God’, chapter 5.

²⁴The two main classical categories of Islamic jurisprudence are muamalaat (the domain of interpersonal/social/political relations) and ibadaat (the domain of worship denoting the individual–God relationship).

²⁵‘Biography of Baitullah Mehsud’, written by Azam Tariq and published in the Hitteen Urdu Magazine (2009 – particular volume/issue unknown). Translation with the title as ‘The life of Baitullah Masood’, http://theunjustmedia.com/Islamic%20Perspectives/Oct10/Amir%20Baitullah%20Masood%20Shaheed.pdf.

²⁶I. Edgar, ‘The Inspirational Night Dream in the Motivation and Justification of Jihad’, Left Curve, 32 (2008), pp. 27–34.

²⁷An example of this broad constitution of discrimination is a letter by Abdullah Mehsud, a powerful Taliban commander who died in 2007: ‘Is there also another side of the picture!’ Letter written by Abdullah Mehsud, distributed in North Waziristan (not dated).

²⁸ Fidayee [meaning ‘self-sacrificing’] operations are characterized by the attempt to infiltrate the target area, inflict maximum harm to the target area, and keep the option to escape from the crime scene alive, whereas a suicide bomber's mission is mainly to blow himself up at a given target.

²⁹For example in the restrictive sense applied by the TTP Commander mullah Fazlullah, ‘Fazlullah speech to suicide bombers’ – video issued by the Swati Taliban, Fatah Studio. Collected from the Khyber Pakhtunkwa, winter 2010/2011.

³⁰A strong proportionality discourse is evident in, e.g. ‘Manifesto’. Issued by Zafar Khan, Shura Ittihade Mujahideen, Collected from Wana in South Waziristan (not dated).

³¹‘Fazlullah Speech to Suicide Bombers’.

³²Ibid.

³³See for example following quotes ‘Today a war between Muslims and non-believers is going on; this is not a fight between the Taliban and the USA. This war is the war between the Muslim Ummah and the non-believers’ (‘Operation Rah-e-Nijat and the Actual Facts’). ‘Our permanent aim should be that of elimination of the Satan and establishment of Allah's rule by sacrificing our bodies’ (‘Maulana Fazlullah new video 2’ – video recording of a speech by mullah Fazlullah. Retrieved from Utube/Zamaswat.com http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zaRLaEGrxh4. ‘In every era the fight between good and bad has taken place and this is also happening today…’ (‘Fazlullah speech to suicide bombers’).

³⁴‘Operation Rah-e-Nijat and the Actual Facts’.

³⁵‘Maulana Fazlullah new video 3’ – video recording of a speech by mullah Fazlullah (the Swati Taliban). Retrieved from Utube/Zamaswat.com, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IxSeugcSsXI.

³⁶For example ‘Statement by TTP's central spokesman from South Waziristan’.

³⁷For example ‘Maulana Fazlullah new video 1’ – video recording of a speech by mullah Fazlullah (the Swati Taliban). Retrieved from Utube/Zamaswat.com, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bC-CDUKJCiU. ‘Maulana Fazlullah new video 4’ – video recording of a speech by mullah Fazlullah (the Swati Taliban). Retrieved from Utube/Zamaswat.com, www.youtube.com/watch?v=vwpYawdgNtE. By the application of these designations the Taliban are portrayed as special and their actions as especially noble. Following quote from a TTP video is a good illustration: ‘The mujahedeen of Tehrike Taliban Pakistan are Allah's slaves, Muhammad's agents; we are servants of the mercy of the worlds, Muhammad, peace be upon him. If hideous jokes and cartoons are made about my Prophet, then your Taliban brothers are the only ones who bring honor through retaliation, who risk their lives and are martyred to show their love for Muhammad, peace be upon him, whereas other people engage in demonstrations, protests, boycotts, and give political statements’ (‘Bloodshed and revenge’) – video released by the TTP headquarter, Umar Studio. Released July 2009 and retrieved from http://www.2shared.com/file/7370960/8370331e/TTPENGDVD.html. Translation released by producers and available at www.alqimmah.net/showthread.php?t=9318).

³⁸For example ‘Is there also another side of the picture!’

³⁹‘Biography of Baitullah Mehsud’.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹See ‘Guardians of God’, chapter 5.

⁴²Arie W. Kruglanski, Lay Epistemics and Human Knowledge: Cognitive and Motivational Bases (New York: Plenum, 1989).