The Radicalisation of Buddhism in the Twentieth and Twenty-first Centuries: The Buddhist Sangha in Sri Lanka

Abstract

The ideas of non-violence, peace and non-discrimination have been systematically developed in Buddhism. Nonetheless, as research has shown, Buddhist ideas can also contribute to escalation of conflicts, racial belief systems and radical movements. Political theory suggests that political actors regularly try to exploit religion in order to remain in power or to establish exclusive group identities, and so on. From this perspective, religion does not have an independent role; rather, the state co-opts a certain form of religion. However, there is ample evidence that religious actors further their own objectives and strategies, and in extreme cases attempt to take over a political system. The development of Buddhism in Sri Lanka in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is presented here as an example of the radicalisation and politicisation of Buddhism. This case study deals with the role of religious actors in promoting ethno-religious nationalism, the exclusion of the minority population and the justification of violence.

Acknowledgements

I am deeply grateful for the valuable suggestions from co-editor James Mark Shields as well as the critical comments and notes from the anonymous reviewer.

Notes on Contributor

Mirjam Weiberg-Salzmann is Senior Research Fellow in the Cluster of Excellence on Religion and Politics in Modern and Premodern Cultures at The Westfaelische-Wilhelms University, Münster, Germany. She was Lecturer, Department of Sociology and Demography and Assistant Professor, Department of Political and Administrative Science at the University of Rostock from 2004 to 2008 and Research Fellow at the Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt, Germany from 2002 to 2005. Her current research interests include conflict and violence in multi-ethnic and multi-religious states, religious fundamentalism and democracy and democratisation in South Asia. Dr Weiberg-Salzmann studied political and social sciences and economics at The Georg-August University, Göttingen and the University of Rostock, Germany, where she obtained her state examination and PhD in international politics, respectively. She has published a number of books and articles, including ‘Ending Ethnic Civil Wars by Negotiations or by Military Defeat?’, Journal of African and Asian Studies (2013); ‘Genozidale Staaten. Genozidale Kulturen? Die Ordnungen der Gewalt’, Zeitschrift für Genozidforschung (2012); and ‘Die Dekonstruktion der Demokratie durch die Kultur. Der Bürgerkrieg auf Sri Lanka’, Nomos (2011).

Notes

¹D. Johnston and C. Sampson (eds), Religion: The Missing Link of Statecraft (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); P. Norris and R. Inglehart, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); M. Jürgensmeyer, The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1993).

²T. Scheffler (ed), Religion between Violence and Reconciliation (Beirut and Würzburg: Orient Institut der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 2002).

³A. Hasenklever and A. De Juan, ‘Religionen in Konflikten – eine Herausforderung für die Friedenspolitik’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (June 2007), pp. 10–16; A. Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

⁴J. Casanova, Public Religion in the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

⁵L. Groff and P. Smoker, ‘Inner-Outer Dimensions of Religion and Peace’ in Lester Kurtz (ed) Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace and Conflict, vol. 3 (San Diego: Academic Press, 1993), pp. 217–228.

⁶B. Kapferer, Legends of People, Myth and State: Violence, Intolerance and Political Culture in Sri Lanka and Australia (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1988); S. Tambiah, Buddhism Betrayed: Religion, Politics, and Violence in Sri Lanka (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

⁷Four positions prevailed within the debate on secularisation, supporting the decline, disappearance, privatisation and/or transformation of religion. For more on different conceptual and theoretical approaches on secularisation see Mathias Hildebrandt, Manfred Brocker and Hartmut Behr (eds), Säkularisierung und Resakralisierung in westlichen Gesellschaften: Theoretische und ideengeschichtliche Perspektiven (Opladen: Westdeutscher, 2001).

⁸Heinz-Dieter Meyer, Michael Minkenberg and Ilona Ostner (eds), Religion und Politik: zwischen Universalismus und Partikularismus, vol. 2 of the Jahrbuch für Europa und Nordamerika-Studien (Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 2000); E. Fondran (ed), Religion und Politik in einer säkularisierten Welt (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1991).

⁹O. Kallscheuer, Gottes Wort und Volkes Stimme (Frankfurt: S. Fischer, 1994).

¹⁰The third wave of democratisation designated the spread of democratic rulership beginning in southern Europe at the end of the 1970s. The first wave from 1828 to 1926 democratised among others the United States and Mexico; the second wave from 1943 to 1962 Nazi and Fascist regimes (e.g., Germany, Italy, Japan) as well as colonies that were granted independence.

¹¹J. Anderson (ed), ‘Religion, Democracy and Democratization’, Democratization, Special Issue, 11:4 (2004); J.L. Esposito and M. Watson (eds), Religion and Global Order (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2000); K.R. Dark (ed), Religion and International Relations (London: Macmillan, 2000); M. Hildebrandt and M. Brocker (eds), Unfriedliche Religionen: Das politische Gewalt und Konfliktpotential von Religionen (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2005); M. Brocker, H. Behr and M. Hildebrandt (eds), Religion-Staat-Politik (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher, 2003).

¹²T. Scheffler, ‘Introduction: Religion between Violence and Reconciliation’ in Thomas Scheffler (ed) Religion between Violence and Reconciliation, Beirut and Würzburg: Orient Institut der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, p. 5.

¹³Ibid., p. 7.

¹⁴M. Weiberg-Salzmann, ‘Die Rolle des Buddhismus in Entwicklungs- und Transformationsprozessen’ in H. Ihne and J. Wilhelm (eds) Religion und globale Entwicklung (Berlin: Berlin University Press, 2009).

¹⁵E.J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1957); V. Lanternari, The Religions of the Oppressed (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1963); G. Lewy, Religion and Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974).

¹⁶H.-W. Schumann, Buddhismus: Stifter, Schulen und Systeme (München: Eugen Diederichs, 1997); R. Gombrich, ‘Der Buddhismus im alten und mittelalterlichen Indien’ in H. Bechert and R. Gombrich (eds) Der Buddhismus: Geschichte und Gegenwart (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2002), pp. 71–107.

¹⁷D.L. McMahan, ‘Buddhism and the Epistemic Discourse of Modernity’ in P.D. Numrich (ed) The Boundaries of Knowledge in Buddhism, Christianity and Science (Göttingen: Vandenhok & Ruprecht, 2008), pp. 43–58; P. Williams (ed), Buddhism: Critical Concepts in Religious Studies (New York: Routledge, 2005); R. Gombrich, Der Theravada-Buddhismus: Vom alten Indien bis zum modernen Sri Lanka (Stuttgart, Berlin and Cologne: W. Kohlhammer, 1997); D.S. Lopez (ed), Curators of the Buddha: The Study of Buddhism Under Colonialism (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

¹⁸C.S. Queen and S.B. King (eds), Engaged Buddhism: Buddhist Liberation Movements in Asia (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996).

¹⁹B. Kapferer, op. cit.; S. Tambiah, op. cit.

²⁰M. Weiberg-Salzmann, ‘Religion und Politik in komplexen Funktionssystemen: Systemtheoretische Skizzen eines Paradoxon: Buddhistischer Fundamentalismus’, Friedens-Warte: Journal of International Peace and Organization, 82:2/3 (2007), pp.109–135.

²¹These were the official numbers as of 2001. Today, the Sinhalese government quotes different numbers. The 2008 World Factbook, which uses the population census of 2001, counts 73.8% Sinhalese, 4.6% estate Tamil, 3.9% Sri Lanka Tamil, 7.2% Muslim, 0.5% other and 10% unspecified.

²²The term dhammadwipa rarely appears in vaṃsa-literature; it has been over-interpreted by Buddhists and nationalists. In popular reception, dhammadwipa stands for ‘the island of the Buddhist Sinhalese’ rather than the ‘island of the Dharma’, although there is no evidence for this equation in the chronicles; see Peter Schalk, ‘Relativising Sinhalatva and Semantic Transformations of the Dhammadipa’, Journal of Buddhist Ethics, 10 (2003), n.p.; T.J. Bartholomeusz, In Defense of Dharma: Just War Ideology in Buddhist Sri Lanka (London and New York: Routledge, 2002).

²³M.B. Carrithers, ‘Sie werden die Herren der Insel sein’, in H. Bechert and R. Gombrich, op. cit., pp. 140–168.

²⁴K.N.O. Dharmadasa, ‘Buddhist Resurgence and Christian Privilege in Sri Lanka: c. 1940–1965’ in K.M. De Silva, P. Duke, E.S. Goldberg and N. Katz (eds) Ethnic Conflict in Buddhist Societies: Sri Lanka, Thailand and Burma (London: Pinter, 1988), pp. 110–125; R. Gombrich, Theravada Buddhism: A Social History from Ancient Benares to Modern Colombo (London and New York: Routledge, 1988).

²⁵See Tambiah, op. cit.

²⁶For more information concerning the two schools and their involvement in politics see H.L. Seneviratne, The Work of Kings: The New Buddhism in Sri Lanka (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1999); M. Weiberg-Salzmann, Die Dekonstruktion der Demokratie durch die Kultur. Der Bürgerkrieg auf Sri Lanka (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2011), pp. 298 ff.

²⁷A. Tilakaratne, ‘The Role of the Sangha in the Conflict in Sri Lanka’, Journal of Buddhist Ethics, 10 (2003), n.p.

²⁸Gombrich, Theravada Buddhism, pp. 172–210; Dharmadasa, op. cit.

²⁹H.L. Seneviratne, The Work of Kings: The New Buddhism in Sri Lanka (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press), 1999.

³⁰The conflict between A.T. Ariyaratne, leader of the Sarvodaya movement, and President Premadasa (1989–1993) was paradigmatic. Premadasa, who represented a radical Sinhala-Buddhism, saw his position as a national leader threatened by Sarvodaya. This is because Ariyaratne refused to see a legitimation for Premadasa's policy of violence against the JVP and the Tamils in his role as ‘dharmista leader’. Instead, he defined the dhammadwipa as a spiritual, cultural and economic development goal; see Georg D. Bond, ‘Conflicts of Identity and Interpretation in Buddhism: The Clash between the Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement and the Government of President Premadasa’ in Tessa J. Bartholomeusz and Chandra R. de Silva (eds) Buddhist Fundamentalism and Minority Identities in Sri Lanka (New York: State University of New York, 1988), pp. 36–52.

³¹‘Tank’ stands for the old hydraulic irrigation system, which signified the Buddhist monarch's welfare measures for the population and exemplified the highly developed ancient kingdoms. For a historical analysis, including the economic and political reasons for building tanks, see Weiberg-Salzmann, Die Dekonstruktion der Demokratie, op. cit., in particular chapter 3.2, pp. 65–69.

³²See P. Liyanage, ‘Popular Buddhism, Politics and the Ethnic Problem’, Accord: Demanding Sacrifice: War and Negotiations in Sri Lanka, 4 (August 1998).

³³In addition, a unitary state was of importance to the sangha because religious schism was regarded as a significant internal threat.

³⁴For a critical discussion of this myth see J.L. Devananda, ‘Sinhala (Mahavamsa) Buddhism Revisited’, The Sri Lanka Guardian, 26 December 2010, http://www.srilankaguardian.org/2010/12/sinhala-mahavamsa-buddhism-revisited.html.

³⁵In 1948, approximately 20 million Tamils lived in Tamil Nadu; today they number around 65 million. The current religious demographics of Sri Lanka are: 69.1% Buddhists, 7.6% Muslims, 7.1% Hindus, 6.2% Christians and 10% other. See also Kaplan: ‘[Like] the Serbs in the former Yugoslavia and the Shiites in Iran, the Sinhalese are a demographic majority with a dangerous minority complex of persecution’; R.D. Kaplan, Monsoon: the Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power (New York: Random House Publishing Group, 2010).

³⁶See also the Sinhalese killing the Sinhalese; e.g. the killings by Janatha Vimukhti Peramuna and by the government, particularly between 1987 and 1992; J.P. Senaratne, Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1977–1990: Riots, Insurrections, Counterinsurgencies, Foreign Intervention (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1997).

³⁷S. Gunasekera, ‘Sri Lanka's Historical Failure to accommodate Ethnic Diversity’ in G. Freks and B. Klem (eds) Dealing with Diversity (The Hague: Clingendael, Netherlands Institute on International Relations, 2004), pp. 73–84.

³⁸Liyanage, op. cit. For a history of the All Ceylon Buddhist Congress see their homepage: http://www.acbc.lk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2&Itemid=39.

³⁹H.L. Seneviratne, ‘The Monk's New Robes: Buddhist Fundamentalism and Social Change’ in G. ter Haar and J.J. Busuttil (eds) The Freedom to do God's Will: Religious Fundamentalism and Social Change (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), pp. 143–158.

⁴⁰N. De Votta, Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional Decay, and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 64.

⁴¹J. Rösel, ‘Buddhismus als Ziel, Methode, Motiv und Schutz “nationaler” Entwicklung’, Sociologus, 43:1 (1993), pp. 1–23.

⁴²G. Obeyesekere, ‘The Vicissitudes of the Sinhala-Buddhist Identity through Times and Change’ in M. Roberts (ed) Collective Identities, Nationalism and Protest in Modern Sri Lanka (Colombo: Marga Institute, 1979), pp. 279–313; P. Kreuzer and M. Weiberg, Framing Violence: The Role of Culture in Nation- and State-Building: Asian Perspectives (Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 2005).

⁴³Furthermore, the mode of election was changed from majority franchise to representational franchise with a 5% bar.

⁴⁴See also H.L. Seneviratne, ‘On the Failed State’, The Island, 26 June 2006.

⁴⁵Seneviratne, ‘The Monk's New Robes’, op. cit., p. 146.

⁴⁶J. Manor (ed), Introduction: Sri Lanka in Change and Crises (London: Croom Helm, 1984); J. Rösel, Die Gestalt und Entstehung des Singhalesischen Nationalismus (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996).

⁴⁷De Votta, op. cit., p. 112.

⁴⁸See the breakdown of the Bandaranaike–Chelvanayagam Pact of 1957, the Senanayake–Chelvanayagam Pact of 1965, the Indo–Sri Lankan Peace Accord of 1987, as well as proposals for devolution by Kumaratunga in 1995 and 2000 and the Wickremasinghe peace initiative of 2002.

⁴⁹N. Sanmugathasan, ‘Sri Lanka: The Story of the Holocaust’, Race and Class, 26:1 (1984), pp. 63–82.

⁵⁰S.M. Haldhar, Buddhism in India and Sri Lanka: A Comparative Study (New Delhi: Om Publications, 2001); R. Hoole, Sri Lanka: The Arrogance of Power: Myth, Decadence and Murder (Colombo: University Teachers of Human Rights, 2001).

⁵¹Walpola Rahula (1907–1997) was a Buddhist monk, scholar and writer who held that monks should participate in social and political activities. He was also a defender of Sinhala nationalism. Venerable Alle Gunawansa Thero is a prominent Sinhala extremist monk. He is a member of the Executive Founding Committee of the Patriotic National Movement. See G. Obeyesekere, ‘Buddhism, Ethnicity and Identity: A Problem of Buddhist History’, Journal of Buddhist Ethics, 10 (2003), n.p.; also D.W. Kent, ‘Shelter for You, Nirvana for Our Sons: Buddhist Belief and Practice in the Sri Lankan Army’ (PhD dissertation, University of Virginia, 2008), http://www.scribd.com/doc/50088986/buddhist-belief-practice-sri-lanka-army.

⁵²Among other things, monks accused President Jayewardene of satisfying his own interests during the mass violence in 1972 and 1989; see T.J. Bartholomeusz, op. cit., p. 66.

⁵³T.J. Bartholomeusz, op. cit., p. 66.

⁵⁴J.P. Senaratne, Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1977–1990: Riots, Insurrections, Counterinsurgencies, Foreign Intervention (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1997).

⁵⁵For example, militantly xenophobic content was disseminated through religious texts, according to which nirvāṇa could be reached by annihilating the enemies of Buddhism, and the killing of non-believers was sanctioned as non-defiling. See P.D. Premasiri, ‘The Place for a Righteous War in Buddhism’, Journal of Buddhist Ethics, 10 (2003); Bhikkhu (Jotiya Dhirasekera) Dhammavihari, ‘Recording, Translating and Interpreting Sri Lankan Chronicle Data’, Journal of Buddhist Ethics, 10 (2003), n.p.; Bartholomeusz, op. cit.

⁵⁶P. Hutanuwatr, ‘Understanding inter-ethnic Conflicts from a Buddhist Perspective’, in D. Hellmann-Rajanayagam (ed), Peace Initiatives towards Reconciliation and Nation-building in Sri Lanka: An International Perspective: Proceedings of the Workshop 13th-15th July 2001 in Bangi, Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur: The Malaysian Ceylonese Congress (2002), pp. 171–178; Ven. P.M.A.N. Thero, ‘Religious Aspects in the Sri Lankan Conflict’, in D. Hellmann-Rajanayagam, op. cit., pp. 163–170.

⁵⁷Liyanage, op. cit.

⁵⁸A federation was comprehensively rejected. The report nonetheless accepted the 13th constitutional article (i.e., a weak, administrative division of power) out of strategic considerations.

⁵⁹The National Sangha Council is a very influential Buddhist organisation in Sri Lanka. The Council consists of leading Buddhist clergy from the different Sri Lankan sects. In 2000 the Sangha Council even requested the then President Kumaratunga get military assistance from India to fight the Tamil Tigers. Island, 12 January 1997; Daily News, 10 August 1998.

⁶⁰For a detailed analysis of the peace talks see M. Weiberg, Friedenprozess ohne Ende – Am Ende ohne Frieden? Zur Verhandlung des Bürgerkrieges auf Sri Lanka (Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 2003).

⁶¹P. Schalk, ‘Eḷāra and Duṭṭhagāmaṇī – Again’ in P. Schalk and A. van Nahl (eds) Buddhism among Tamils in Tamilakam and Īlam: Part 3 – Extension and Conclusions (Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 2013), pp. 131 ff.

⁶²Seneviratne, The Work of Kings, op.cit.

⁶³See T.J. Bartholomeusz, op. cit., in particular chapter 3: ‘Dharma yuddhaya and dharma warriors in Sri Lanka’, pp. 68–100. For criticism of this position see Mahinda Degalle, ‘Theravada Attitudes towards Violence’, Journal of Buddhist Ethics, 10 (2003), n.p.; also Daily News, 24 June 1998; The Island, 22 July 1995.

⁶⁴V.A. Nanda, ‘An Analysis of the Selected Statements Issued by the Mahanayakas on the North-East Problem of Sri Lanka’, Journal of Buddhist Ethics, 10 (2003), n.p.; C.R. De Silva, ‘The Plurality of Buddhist Fundamentalism: An Inquiry into Views among Buddhist Monks in Sri Lanka’ in T.J. Bartholomeusz and C.R. De Silva (eds) Buddhist Fundamentalism and Minority Identities in Sri Lanka (New York: State University of New York, 1998), pp. 53­–73.

⁶⁵C.R. De Silva and T.J. Bartholomeusz, The Role of the Sangha in the Reconciliation Process, no. 16 in the series A History of Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: Recollection, Reinterpretation & Reconciliation (Colombo: Marga Institute, 2001); I. Frydenlund, The Sangha and its Relation to the Peace Process in Sri Lanka (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 2005).

⁶⁶Bartholomeusz, op. cit., p. 124.

⁶⁷Cf. ‘Dutthagamani-Epos’ in the Mahavaṃsa, chapters 22–32; Rutnam (1988). It has been proven in the meantime that the Dutthagamani–Elara episode has been mistranslated in some parts and recorded in differing versions in different sources. Nevertheless, the legend is still employed as proof of the eternal antagonism between Hindus (Tamils) and Buddhists (Sinhalese). J. Dhirasekera, ‘Dutugemunu Episode Re-examined’, in Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Sri Lanka, 32 (1989), pp. 25­–44. Bechert has also proven that the narrative was merely reported as a brief episode in the older chronicle, the Dipavaṃsa, and that it was only in the later Mahavaṃsa that it took on its anti-Tamil impetus, which was at once introduced and exponentially escalated; Heinz Bechert, ‘Response to Venerable Professor Dhammavihari's “Sri Lankan Chronicle Data”’, Journal of Buddhist Ethics, 10 (2003), n.p.

⁶⁸Bartholomeusz shows that the term dharma yuddhaya was already used in the nineteenth century to agitate against Christians and Muslims – only after independence did the Tamils became the enemies; see Bartholomeusz, op. cit., chap. 3.

⁶⁹A.G.S. Kariyawasam, Buddhist Ceremonies and Rituals of Sri Lanka: The Wheel Publication, 402/404 (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1995); Daily News, 8 July 2004; Reports on ceremonies of the Sangha in the military, 2002, http://www.army.lk/ News_Reports/2002/october/111.htm.

⁷⁰In June 2005, Kumaratunga ordered the counter-admiral Weerasekera away from the East. Among other reasons, this was because he was supporting Sinhalese-chauvinist groups and the local Buddhist clergy in carrying out provocative activities in the province. For example, they had erected a statue of Buddha in a Tamil quarter in Trincomalee. Furthermore, Weerasekera had declared the peace treaty as futile. He demanded military intervention as well as the reinstitution of the anti-terror laws and emergency rule; Sunday Times, 19 June 2005: Situation Report; UTHR (J), The Second Fascist Front in Sri Lanka – Towards Crushing the Minorities and Disenfranchising the Sinhalese, Special Report No. 29, 21, February 2008, http://www.uthr.org/SpecialReports/spreport29.htm.

⁷¹Frydenlund, op. cit.

⁷²M. Weiberg, Friedenprozess ohne Ende, op. cit.

⁷³As a consequence, the prime minister banned such publications from the state-owned press. According to rumours, he attempted to secure the sangha's favour by means of financial donations. LankaWeb, 9 Sept. 2002, http://www.lankaweb.com/ news/items02/ 090902-1.html.

⁷⁴For a list of members see C. Wimalasurendre, ‘Supreme Council of Sangha Named’, The Island, 13 November 2003. According to their self-description, the role of the Supreme Sangha Council is to act as ‘the final and authoritative Sangha organisation that will speak on behalf of the Sinhala race, Buddha Sasana and the country at large’. See C. Wimalasurendre, ‘Move to Free Maligawa Bombers’, The Island, 14 November 2003; also R. Mathes, ‘Sangha Council's Three Proposals to Solve National Problem’, The Island, 20 November 2003.

⁷⁵Sunday Observer, 25 January 2004.

⁷⁶Sunday Observer, 4 July 2004.

⁷⁷Sunday Observer, 7 March 2004.

⁷⁸Sunday Leader, 21 March 2004.

⁷⁹Sunday Observer, 4 July 2004.

⁸⁰Sunday Leader, 9 May 2004.

⁸¹Daily News, 8 April 2004.

⁸²Due to shortage of space I am concentrating on the conversion laws, but we should not forget about the recent anti-Muslim incidents

⁸³The text of this legislation can be found at: http://www.lankaliberty.com/legislation/Privat%20Member%27s%20Bill.pdf. As a result of this legislation, the Minister for Buddhist Affairs introduced a cabinet paper on the same topic; see http://www.lankaliberty.com/legislation/Govt%20Bill.pdf; for an edited draft of the bill: http://www.lankaliberty.com/legislation/Government%20Anti-Conversion%20Bill%20(dated%20Feb%202005).pdf.

⁸⁴Commentary of a Sri Lankan judge: ‘Although the Christians in the West do not practice the religion they lavishly send funds to spread Christianity in the third world countries. In the past Westerners ruled our country by power of the gun. Now they make use of globalisation, multi-national companies, NGOs’ cultural invasion and also Christianity to have a hold on us. It is stated in our Constitution that it is the duty of the State to protect and foster Buddha Sasana. Today there are unethical conversions, conspiracies, and hidden agendas to dislocate Buddhist religion in our country. In this situation some sort of legislation is necessary to safeguard Buddhism while ensuring legitimate activities of other religions'. Sunday Observer, 1 August 2004; also Sunday Leader, 21 August 2004.

⁸⁵Sunday Observer, 4 January 2004, 1 December 2004; Sunday Leader, 4 January 2004; Asia News, 16 May 2006.

⁸⁶Sunday Leader, 21 August 2004.

⁸⁷The prelate had repeatedly spoken up against conversion. Rumours persisted about his violent death, despite the fact that, from a medical perspective, there was clear evidence for heart failure.

⁸⁸Sunday Observer, 22 August 2004.

⁸⁹Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, International Religious Freedom Report (2005).

⁹⁰A. Welikala, ‘The Menzingen Determination and the Supreme Court: A Liberal Critique’, n.d., pp. 1–10, http://www.lankaliberty.com/legal/index.html; Sunday Leader, 15 February 2004.

⁹¹Supreme Court of India, Reverend Stanislaus vs. State of Madhya Pradesh: 1977 AIR 908 (SC), ECHR 140/1996/759/958-960 and ECHR 3/1992/348/421, http://www.lankaliberty/legal/Scdetermination.pdf.

⁹²Asian Tribune, 30 January 2006; Asia News, 11 April 2006.

⁹³A. Meuthrath, Zur Lage der Menschenrechte in Sri Lanka: Einsatz der Kirche für Frieden und Menschenwürde (Aachen: Internationales Katholisches Missionswerk, 2002).

⁹⁴Sunday Observer, 27 November 2005.

⁹⁵Asian Tribune, 22 September 2005.

⁹⁶Daily News, 26 February 2004.

⁹⁷Sunday Observer, 22 August 2004.

⁹⁸Asian Tribune, 30 January 2006.

⁹⁹K. Ratnayake, ‘Killing of Sri Lankan General, another Sign of Civil War’, World Socialist Web Site, 28 June 2006, http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2006/06/sril-j28.html.

¹⁰⁰There are three Nikayas (monastic fraternities or lineages of ordained monks) in Sri Lanka: (1) Amarapura Nikaya, founded in 1800 and named after the city of Amarapura, Myanmar; (2) Siam Nikaya, located predominantly around the city of Kandy and so named because it originated within Thailand; and (3) Ramanna Nikaya, founded in 1864, and said to be similar to the Thammayut Nikaya order of Thailand.

¹⁰¹See an account of the event on the website of a human rights organisation based in Bremen, http://www.humanrights.de/doc_de/countries/sri-lanka/ohlay/200505/hiru.html.

¹⁰²The Sinhala Urumaya (Sinhala Heritage Party, SU or SUP) is an ultranationalist party formed in 2000. In 2002 the SU was involved in a constitutional and legal challenge to the ceasefire agreement made between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. Leading members of the SU are former members of big Sinhalese parties like the UNP, Sri Lanka Freedom Party and JVP. See Sunday Times, 17 October 2004; Daily News, 12 November 2003; D. Sturgess, ‘What Business does the US have with the Sinhala Chauvinists in Sri Lanka?’, World Socialist Web Site, 6 July 2000; Sunday Times, 17 October 2004.

¹⁰³N.N., ‘Sinhalese Extremist Thugs attack Arts Festival in Colombo’, World Socialist Web Site, 17 November 2003, http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2003/11/sinh-n17.html; P. Wijesiriwardana, ‘Sri Lankan Artist speaks about Death Threats by Sinhala Extremists’, World Socialist Web Site, 12 December 2003, http://www.wsws. org/en /articles/2003/12/sril-d12.html.

¹⁰⁴Sunday Observer, 30 October 2005.

¹⁰⁵Therapuththabhaya was a Buddhist monk who left the sangha to fight against the Tamil Chola with the Sinhalese King Dutthagamani, and became one of the 10 great generals of the king. The letter was signed ‘Mayadunne’ – the name of a Sinhalese king who led a rebellion against the Portuguese colonial power together with his son. Later, Mayadunne was killed by his son, who had converted to Hinduism. An English version of this letter can be found on TamilNet, http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=79&artid=14880.

¹⁰⁶N.N. ‘Obscure Sri Lankan Group claims Responsibility for Tamil Journalist's Murder’, World Socialist Web Site, 25 May 2005, http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2005/05/sri2-m25.html.

¹⁰⁷Comparisons to Hitler are very popular in Sri Lanka; see Athureliye Rathana, ‘A Buddhist Analysis of the Ethnic Conflict’, Journal of Buddhist Ethics, 10 (2003), n.p.

¹⁰⁸T. Gunasekara, ‘Immoral, Inane, Unforgivable’, The Lanka Academic, 70 (April 2006), n.p.

¹⁰⁹Sunday Times, 1 June 2008.

¹¹⁰The deputy minister for defence, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, the supreme commander of the aerial defence forces, Marshall Donald Perera, the commander of the army, General Sarath Fonseka, the commander of the navy, Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda, the commander of the air force, Marshall Roshan Goonatilake, the general inspector of the police, Jayantha Wickramaratne, and the chief executive of the civil defence forces, Rear Admiral Sarath Weerasekara, all received scrolls.

¹¹¹Sunday Times, 24 May 2009; The Nation, 24 May 2006.