http://orcid.org/0000-0003-4459-208X
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ABSTRACT
In this paper I undertake a comparative analysis of the symbolic function played by national flags and two specific mausoleums in the configuration of contemporary politics in Spain and Venezuela. In both countries there are signs of political instability, and national flags and the two mausoleums I examine (Francisco Franco’s in Spain and Hugo Chávez’s in Venezuela) have become pivotal to the political manoeuvring of different social factions. The comparison reveals that the national flags in Venezuela and Spain present distinguishable types of multivocality, attending to the differential capacity that they have to facilitate identification and mobilization among various political factions. As for the mausoleums, comparison grounds the argument that their extra-symbolic scaffolding (determined by the combination of location, architectural status and management regime) conditions the type of political manoeuvring they generate and the potential efficacy they can have as foci of collective identification and mobilization.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Luis F. Angosto-Ferrandez is Senior Lecturer in the Departments of Anthropology and Spanish & Latin American Studies at the University of Sydney. He is author of Venezuela Reframed (2015), co-editor of Anthropologies of Value (2016), The Politics of Identity in Latin American Censuses (2016), and Everlasting Countdowns: Race, Ethnicity and National Censuses in Latin American States (2012), and editor of Democracy, Revolution, and Geopolitics in Latin America: Venezuela and the International Politics of Discontent (2014).
ORCID
Luis F. Angosto-Ferrandez http://orcid.org/0000-0003-4459-208X
Notes
1 E.g. Y. Papadakis, ‘Nation, Narrative and Commemoration: Political Ritual in Divided Cyprus’, History and Anthropology, 14:3 (2003), pp. 253–270; Dominic Bryan, Orange Parades: The Politics of Ritual, Tradition and Control (London: Pluto Press, 2000).
2 A seminal development of this approach was Abner Cohen’s Two-Dimensional Man: an Essay on the Anthropology of Power and Symbolism in Complex Society (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974).
3 OECD, ‘Unemployment Rate (Indicator)’, 2018. doi: 10.1787/997c8750-en.
4 OECD, ‘Income Inequality Update’, November 2016, http://www.oecd.org/social/OECD2016-Income-Inequality-Update.pdf.
5 According to data of the Spanish Central Bank, in between 2009 and 2014 there was a net decrease in primary public expenditure of 3.8 percentage points of GDP. See Francisco Martí and Javier J. Pérez, ‘Spanish Public Finances Through the Financial Crisis’, 2016, https://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SES/Secciones/Publicaciones/PublicacionesSeriadas/DocumentosTrabajo/16/Fich/dt1620e.pdf.
7 ‘Más de 17.000 desahucios en el primer trimestre de 2017, un 2,2% más’, Público, 14 June 2017, http://www.publico.es/economia/17000-desahucios-primer-trimestre-2017-2-2.html.
8 M. Portos García, ‘Taking to the Streets in the Context of Austerity: A Chronology of the Cycle of Protests in Spain, 2007–2015’, Partecipazione e conflitto, 9 (2016), pp. 181–210; E. Romanos, ‘Evictions, Petitions and Escraches: Contentious Housing in Austerity Spain’, Social Movement Studies, 13:2 (2014), pp. 296–302; N. Hughes, ‘“Young People Took to the Streets and All of a Sudden All of the Political Parties Got Old”: The 15M Movement in Spain’, Social Movement Studies, 10:4 (2011), pp. 407–413.
9 The support in votes for PSOE halved between 2008 and 2015 (from 11,289,335 to 5,545,315), and votes for PP dropped a 33.4% between 2011 and 2015 (from 10,866,566 to 7,236,965).
10 The non-proportional electoral system enables this mismatch: pro-independence parties obtained 70 out of 135 seats, but only 47.5% of the total vote.
11 CIS, ‘Barómetro de Mayo 2017’, http://www.cis.es/cis/export/sites/default/-Archivos/Marginales/3160_3179/3175/es3175mar.pdf.
12 ‘Interim Compliance Report: Spain’, Group of States Against Corruption, Council of Europe, 3 January 2018, https://rm.coe.int/fourth-evaluation-round-corruption-prevention-in-respect-of-members-of/1680779c4d.
13 S. Jones, ‘Mariano Rajoy Becomes First Serving Spanish PM to Testify in Criminal Case’, The Guardian, 26 July 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/26/mariano-rajoy-becomes-first-serving-spanish-pm-to-testify-in-criminal-case.
14 ‘Why Spain’s Princess Cristina Is on Trial’, BBC World, 29 January 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26047722.
15 ‘U.S. FOB Costs of Venezuela Crude Oil (Dollars per Barrel)’, Energy Information Administration, 2016, https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=IVE0000004&f=A.
16 V. Álvarez, ‘What Happens If Venezuela Doesn’t Pay Its Foreign Debt?’, Venezuelanalysis.com, 4 August 2016, https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/12118; M. Weisbrot, ‘Trump Sanctions on Venezuela Will Cause More Harm’, Center for Economic and Policy Research, 28 August 2017, http://cepr.net/publications/op-eds-columns/trump-sanctions-on-venezuela-will-cause-more-harm.
17 Gross Domestic Product in Venezuela was already marking an economic slowdown by 2009, after years of extraordinary growth, but the redistributive orientation of government policy still fared relatively well for popular classes in that context. A peak in oil prices in the three subsequent years partly reversed the cycle, but the economy did not recover the growth rates of the years preceding 2009.
18 M. Sutherland, Manuel, ‘La caída del salario y la producción en Venezuela: pobreza y derroche rentístico’, 25 October 2016, https://alemcifo.wordpress.com/2016/10/25/la-caida-del-salario-y-la-produccion-en-venezuela-pobreza-y-derroche-rentistico/.
19 Venezuela’s improvement in the United Nations Human Development Index between 2000 and 2011was remarkable even within the generally positive trends in Latin America during the past decade: it rose from 0.56 to 0.735. Up to 2011, income poverty fell from 42.8% to 16.6% and the reduction in extreme income poverty had been even greater, from 20.1% to 8.5%. ‘Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), International Human Development Indicators’, United Nations Development Programme, http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/ven.html.
20 The Bolivarian bloc had only once experienced a national-level electoral drawback in the previous 17 years: the referendum for constitutional reform in 2007. On that occasion, however, the opposition’s victory did not translate into effective institutional powers.
21 Those included victims of security forces, violent protesters, accidents and still unknown causes. For a journalistic report on the causes and legal effects of these deaths, see L. Bracci Roa, ‘Lista de fallecidos por las protestas violentas de la oposición venezolana, abril a junio de 2017 (Actualizado)’, Albaciudad.org, 4 June 2017, http://albaciudad.org/2017/06/lista-fallecidos-protestas-venezuela-abril-2017/.
22 ‘Gobierno y oposición se reúnen este viernes en Dominicana’, El Nacional, 1 December 2017, http://www.el-nacional.com/noticias/politica/gobierno-oposicion-reunen-este-viernes-dominicana_213720.
23 In 2015, dissident sectors of chavismo participated in organized denunciations of the alleged mass-scale mismanagement of the state controlled access to foreign currency since 2004 (which according to some sources would have reached more than $200,000 million). See ‘Plataforma para la Auditoría Pública solicitó investigar presunto desfalco en manejo de divisas’, Correo del Orinoco, 19 September 2015, http://www.correodelorinoco.gob.ve/politica/plataforma-para-auditoria-publica-solicito-investigar-presunto-desfalco-manejo-divisas/.
24 See R. Boothroyd Rojas, ‘Venezuelan Attorney General Launches Corruption Investigation into Former Oil Czar’, Venezuelanalysis.com, 13 December 2017, https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/13547.
25 See ‘Presidente de Venezuela dice que en España “hace falta un Maduro”’, EFE, Caracas, 26 May 2016, https://efe.com/efe/america/mundo/presidente-de-venezuela-dice-que-en-espana-hace-falta-un-maduro/20000012-2937671.
26 A police report with the name of PISA (acronym for Pablo Iglesias Sociedad Anonima [Pablo Iglesias is Podemos’s Secretary General) was created with the support of high-ranking members of the National Police and filtered to some commercial media outlets. It was used as the base for lawsuits lodged against Podemos, though it had no actual backing from any existing police unit nor official rubber stamp. Judges have several times rejected the document as a valid proof. See P. López and A.L. de Miguel, ‘Recortes de periódicos, cuentas y especulaciones: éste es el informe sobre Podemos filtrado por Interior’, Público.es, 15 Marzo 2016, http://www.publico.es/politica/recortes-periodicos-y-especulaciones-informe.html.
27 See ‘Análisis colectivo de la campaña y los resultados del 26J’, http://pabloechenique.info/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Análisis-colectivo-de-la-campaña-y-los-resultados-del-26J.pdf.
28 Illustratively, recent debates in the regional parliament of Castilla la Mancha ended with the withdrawal of the deputies from Podemos and PSOE after its PP peers qualified the recent alliance between the former parties (which enabled a PSOE-led regional government) with comments such as ‘[this political alliance is giving raise to] dictatorial attitudes in the vein of Maduro’s ones’ or ‘it seems that PSOE and Podemos are ready to follow on the steps of a certain country with the Constituent Assembly’ (in reference to the one recently installed in Venezuela). This occurred in the second meeting of the Budgetary Commission, and only a few days after two members of Podemos had entered the regional government led by PSOE’s García Page. See A. Avilés Pozo, ‘“Calumnias”, “comunistas” y apelaciones a Venezuela dejan solo al PP en el debate presupuestario’, Eldiario.es, 14 August 2017, https://eldiario.es/clm/Calumnias-apelaciones-Venezuela-PP-presupuestario_0_675782823.html.
29 In a recent example (September 2017), the president and vice-president of the Venezuelan Natioal Assembly met president Rajoy in Madrid. See ‘El presidente del Parlamento venezolano busca apoyo en España para que su país no sea una “franquicia cuaba”’, Elmundo.es, 5 September 2017, http://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2017/09/05/59aea40be2704e7a4c8b459b.html.
30 For a classic and succinct explanation of what the multivocality of symbols is, see Victor Turner, ‘Symbols in African Ritual’, Science, 179:4078 (1973), pp. 1100–1105.
31 Paul Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations (Evanstone: Northwest University Press, 1974), pp. 289–290.
32 Abner Cohen, Two-Dimensional Man: An Essay on the Anthropology of Power and Symbolism in Complex Society (University of California Press, 1976).
33 Rebecca E. Klatch, ‘Of Meanings & Masters: Political Symbolism & Symbolic Action’, Polity 21:1 (1988), pp. 137–154, p. 148.
34 For a description of this period and the factors that facilitated the gradual consolidation of the red-and-yellow flag, see Javier Moreno Luzón and Xosé M. Núñez Seixas, Los colores de la patria: símbolos nacionales en la España contemporánea (Tecnos, 2017), pp. 27–84.
35 The Carlistas were anti-liberal traditionalists and monarchic, but supporters of a branch of the Bourbons that was displaced when Isabel II succeeded her father Fernando VII. They spurred rebellions that led to three major armed conflicts throughout the nineteenth century, known as the ‘Carlista wars’.
36 J. Álvarez Junco, ‘El nacionalismo español: las insuficiencias en la acción estatal’, Historia social (2001), pp. 29–51; J. Álvarez Junco, ‘The Formation of Spanish Identity and Its Adaptation to the Age of Nations’, History & Memory, 14:1 (2002), pp. 13–36.
37 J. Moreno-Luzón and X.M. Núñez Seixas, ‘The Flag and the Anthem: The Disputed Official Symbols of Spain’ in Javier Moreno-Luzón and Xosé M. Núñez Seixas (eds) Metaphors of Spain: Representations of Spanish National Identity in the Twentieth-Century (New York: Berghahn, 2017), pp. 33–62.
38 X.M. Núñez, ‘What is Spanish Nationalism Today? From Legitimacy Crisis to Unfulfilled Renovation (1975–2000)’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 24:5 (2001), pp. 719–752, p. 743.
39 Moreno Luzón and Núñez Seixas, Los colores de la patira, op cit, pp. 339–357.
40 This was not exceptional in Europe during those years, when at least some organized labour movements echoed the position of socialist organisations before the Second World War: national flags were often regarded as symbols of dominant bourgoisies, and works displayed in their rallies distinctive flags and banners. For a discussion of this situation in Norway, see P. KolstØ, ‘National Symbols as Signs of Unity and Division’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 29:4 (2006), pp. 676–701 (pp. 690–692).
41 Moreno-Luzón and Núñez Seixas, op. cit., p. 53.
42 In the 1990s, for instance, the PSC, Catalan branch of the PSOE, would go to support the presence of the Spanish flag in the ‘flag wars’ that erupted around the Barcelona Olympic Games of 1992, in which pro-independence forces were pushing their cause and promoting in some cases the exclusive use of the senyera (the Catalan flag). See J. Hargreaves, Freedom for Catalonia?: Catalan Nationalism, Spanish Identity and the Barcelona Olympic Games, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 86–95.
43 Alejandro Quiroga, Goles y banderas: fútbol e identidades nacionales en España (Marcial Pons, 2014), p. 94.
44 J. Hargreaves and M. Garcia Ferrando, ‘Public Opinion, National Integration and National Identity in Spain: The Case of the Barcelona Olympic Games’, Nations and Nationalism, 3:1 (1997), pp. 65–87; Hargreaves, op. cit.
45 For examples of how the republican flag also generates polarizing reactions in the processes surrounding exhumations of civilians killed by Franco’s paramilitaries, see F. Ferrándiz, ‘Exhuming the Defeated: Civil War Mass Graves in 21st Century Spain’, American Ethnologist, 40:1 (2013), pp. 38–54.
46 See ‘Pablo Iglesias tampoco participará en los actos del 12 de octubre de este año’, Eldiario.es, 7 October 2016, http://www.eldiario.es/politica/Pablo-Iglesias-participara-actos-octubre_0_566943667.html.
47 In 2006, Ciudadanos, led by Rivera, obtained less than 90,000 votes (barely a 3% of the regional vote), and in 2017 it was the most voted party, led by Arrimadas, with more than 1,109,732 (over 25% of the valid votes).
48 For instance, Rajoy in the PP’s national congress of 2017, and Sáncehz in the launching of the 2015 electoral campaign). See exemplar images of the former at ‘Rajoy advierte al separatismo: “no es posble negociación alguna”’, Elespañol.com, 12 February 2017; an illustrative image of Sánchez’s case can be found in J. Romero, ‘El PSOE “compite” con Podemos en las urnas … y en el uso de la bandera de España’, Elconfidencial.com, 23 June 2016, www.elconfidencial.com/elecciones-generales/2016-06-23/psoe-bandera-espana-mitin-murcia-pedro-sanchez-26j_1222101/.
49 For instance, the regional leader of the PP in Madrid and president of this region, Cristina Cifuentes, has used her image superimposed onto a Giagantic Spanish flag as presentation image in social media. See images in ‘Cifuentes cambia su imagen en redes sociales para mostrar con orgullo la bandera de España’, OKdiario.com, 27 October 2017, https://okdiario.com/espana/2017/10/27/cristina-cifuentes-cambia-imagen-redes-sociales-mostrar-orgullo-bandera-espana-1457686.
50 For an analysis of the process of change and intensification of Catalan nationalism, see Kathryn Crameri, Good Bye, Spain? The question of independence for Catalonia (Sussex: Academic Press, 2014).
51 See ‘Pablo Iglesias no irá a los actos del 12 de octubre’, Huffingtonpost.es, 7 October 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.es/2016/10/07/pablo-iglesias_n_12385470.html.
52 See examples: http://www.elmundo.es/cataluna/2016/06/17/57644c1fe5fdea843c8b45bf.html.
53 ‘El PP no perdona a Carmena que no haya bandera de España en el Ayuntamiento durante la cabalgata’, Eldiario.es, 5 Janruary 2017, https://www.eldiario.es/rastreador/PP-Carmena-bandera-Espana-ayuntamiento_6_598500168.html.
54 In October 2016, this charge was launched against Carmena by Esperanza Aguirre (also from PP, and a previous president of the region of Madrid) on the grounds that in the City Hall Carmena the Wiphala was being shown. See ‘Aguirre anima a sacar el 12-O la bandera de España en lugar de “hacer cosas raras”’, Eldiario.es, 11 January 2016, https://www.eldiario.es/rastreador/VIDEO-Aguirre-manana-bandera-Espana_6_568403188.html.
55 On the historical background of this period, see Catalina Banko, Las luchas federalistas en Venezuela (Monte Ávila Editores, 1996); Federico Brito Figueroa, Tiempo de Ezequiel Zamora (Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1981).
56 Brian S. McBeth, Dictatorship and Politics: Intrigue, Betrayal, and Survival in Venezuela, 1908–1935 (University of Notre Dame Press, 2008).
57 For a study of symbolic production and the ideological project during the dictatorship, see Lisa Blackmore, Spectacular Modernity: Dictatorship, Space, and Visuality in Venezuela, 1948–1958 (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2017).
58 L.F. Angosto, ‘Pueblos indígenas, guaicaipurismo y socialismo del siglo XXI en Venezuela’, Antropológica, 110 (2008), pp. 9–33; L. Duno-Gottberg, ‘Embodiments and Disembodiments of the Nation, the People, and the State: Disputing Bolívar’s Body, and the Uses of Bolivarianism in Contemporary Venezuela’ in Maureen G. Shanahan and Ana María Reyes (eds) Simón Bolívar: Travels and Transformations of a Cultural Icon (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2016), pp. 230–247.
59 The opposition had boycotted the 2005 elections in an attempt to delegitimize the government.
60 There were two blocs to be voted on in the referendum: (A) included amendments to 33 articles had been proposed by Chavez, and to another 13 by the National Assembly; (B) included amendments to 23 articles proposed by the NA alone. Proposal A was rejected by 50.7% of the valid votes, and B by 51.05%.
61 Á.E. Álvarez, ‘Venezuela: ¿La revolución pierde su encanto?’, Revista de ciencia política (Santiago), 28:1, pp. 405–432. R. Brading, Populism in Venezuela (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012).
62 Aggressions against chavista student leaders in such outfit were reported during that period. M.P. García-Guadilla and A.L. Mallén, ‘El movimiento estudiantil venezolano: narrativas, polarización social y públicos antagónicos’, Cuadernos del CENDES, 27:73 (2012), pp. 71–95, (p. 89).
63 For a discussion of how this strategy of mimesis was employed by Capriles during the 2012 electoral campaign in relation to indigenous symbols, see L.F. Angosto-Ferrandez, ‘Indigenous Peoples, Populist Logics, and Polarization: Understanding the Pivotal Role of Indigeneity in Venezuelan Elections’ in Luis Fernando Angosto-Ferrandez (ed.) Democracy, Revolution, and Geopolitics in Latin America: Venezuela and the International Politics of Discontent (New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 119–146.
64 This distinction among protesters was became quite noticeable. People who during these protests deployed urban guerrilla tactics, a minority but relatively dominant sector of the protests (they established rules and checkpoints in the neighborhoods where they acted), often waved the seven-stars flag, but furthermore used other symbols (such as the Saint George’s cross upon shields) in their displays.
65 See video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z6JGF1d5VNY.
66 In 1939 his body had been brought from Alicante to the Monastery of San Lorenzo del Escorial.
67 It was commissioned by Philip II and finalised in 1584. A crypt in the monastery is used to this date as monarchic pantheon both of the Habsburg and Bourbon dynasties.
68 Boletín Oficial del Estado, 2 April 1940.
69 P. Aguilar, ‘Los lugares de la memoria de la guerra civil. El Valle de los Caídos: la ambigüedad calculada’ in Javier Tusell Gómez et al. (eds) El régimen de Franco (1936–1975). Política y relacaiones exteriores (Madrid: UNED, 1993), pp. 485–498; A. Hepworth, ‘Site of Memory and Dismemory: The Valley of the Fallen in Spain’, Journal of Genocide Research, 16:4 (2014), pp. 463–485; G. Stockey, Valley of the Fallen, the (n)ever Changing Face of General Franco’s Monument (Nottingham: Critical, Cultural and Communications Press, 2013).
70 This could be an underestimate. The Benedictine Abbot of the Basílica has publicly declared that the existing records, managed by the Benedictine themselves, were probably kept artificially down due the mass scale of arrivals and also to avoid social alarm during the period of inhumations. The number of corpses could then be closer to 60,000. See F. Ferrándiz, ‘Guerras sin fin: guía para descifrar el Valle de los Caídos en la España contemporánea1/Lingering Wars: Deciphering the Valley of the Fallen in Contemporary Spain’, Política y sociedad, 48:3 (2011), pp. 481–500 (p. 494).
71 It is the Fundación de la Santa Cruz del Valle de los Caídos. The Benedictine order was made responsible for the maintenance of cult and the direction of studies promoting the ‘social Catholic doctrine’. The decree of creation of this foundation and other official documents associated with the Valle can be found at http://www.memoriahistorica.gob.es/es-es/vallecaidos/Documents/NormativaVALLECAIDOS19401960.pdf.
72 Boletín Oficial del Estado Núm. 310, de 27 de diciembre de 2007. See Law at https://www.boe.es/buscar/pdf/2007/BOE-A-2007-22296-consolidado.pdf.
73 ‘Denuncian al abad del Valle de los Caídos por negarse a exhumar los restos de los hermanos Lapeña’, Nuevatribuna.es, 2 January 2018, http://www.nuevatribuna.es/articulo/sociedad/victimas-franquismo-denuncian-abad-valle-caidos/20180102131536146871.html.
74 F. Ferrándiz and A. Robben, ‘Introduction: the Ethnography of Exhumations’,in Francisco Ferrándiz and Antonius Robben (eds) Necropolitics: mass graves and exhumations in the age of human rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), pp. 1–38; M. Humphrey, ‘Historical Memory, Transition and Democratization in the Iberian Peninsula’, Journal of Iberian and Latin American Research, 22:1 (2016), pp. 96–106.
75 F. Ferrándiz, ‘Guerras sin fin: guía para descifrar el Valle de los Caídos en la España contemporánea’, Política y sociedad, 48:3 (2011), pp. 481–500 (pp. 484–485).
76 In between 2000 and 2003, with Aznar (PP) in government, the foundation received 150,000 euro. See ‘El Gobierno admite que Aznar subvencionó con 40.000 euros al año a la Fundación Franco’, Eldiario.es, 24 May 2017, http://www.eldiario.es/sociedad/Gobierno-admite-subvenciono-Fundacion-Franco_0_647085735.html.
77 A recent mediatic example is the case of well-known humorists and TV animators Gran Wyoming and Dani Mateo.
78 M. Borraz, ‘El gobierno niega que el Valle de los Caídos sea un lugar de exaltación franquista’, Eldiario.es, 18 January 2017, https://www.eldiario.es/sociedad/Gobierno-Valle-Caidos-exaltacion-franquista_0_602990519.html.
79 The proposition was passed with 198 votes in favour, 1 against (a member of the Popular Party who alleged it was a mistake) and 140 abstentions (the addition of ERC votes to those of the PP). The abstention of the Catalan nationalist ERC was due to the rejection of its own proposals to this resolution, which included the demand of a new Memoria Histórica Law and an explicit recognition of political figures persecuted and/or executed by the francoist regime such as that of the ex-president of the Generalitat Lluis Companys.
80 M. Sánchez, ‘Sánchez dice que el traslado de la tumba de Franco será “antes de vacaciones”’, Publico.es, 27 June 2018, https://www.publico.es/politica/sanchez-dice-traslado-tumba-franco-vacaciones.html.
81 Jesús Bastante, ‘El prior del Valle de los Caídos se atrinchera y pone en jaque la exhumación de Franco contra la opinión de la Iglesia’, Eldiario.es, 17 July 2018, https://www.eldiario.es/sociedad/Valle-Caidos-atrinchera-Franco-Iglesia_0_793721392.html.
82 Víctor Ruiz, ‘Las visitas al Valle de los Caídos se disparan un 50% en julio tras el anuncio de Sánchez de la exhumación’, Abc.es, 12 August 2018, https://www.abc.es/espana/abci-visitas-valle-caidos-disparan-50-por-ciento-julio-tras-anuncio-sanchez-exhumacion-201808092221_noticia.html.
83 L.F. Angosto-Ferrandez, ‘The Afterlives of Hugo Chávez as Political Symbol’, Anthropology Today, 32:5 (2016), pp. 8–12.
84 Ibid.
85 See, for instance, ‘Cuartel de la Montaña: lugar clave para la rebellion cívico-militar del 4F’, Telesur.com, 4 February 2014, https://www.telesurtv.net/news/Cuartel-de-la-Montana-Lugar-clave-para-la-Rebelion-Civico-Militar-del-4F-20140204-0014.html; J.M. Luengo, ‘El Cuartel de la Montaña honra la vigencia del comandante Hugo Chávez’, Panorama.com, 2 March 2016, http://www.panorama.com.ve/hugochavez/El-Cuartel-de-la-montana-honra-la-vigencia-del-comandante-Hugo-Chavez-20150720-0099.html.
86 L.F. Angosto-Ferrandez, ‘The Afterlives of Hugo Chávez’, op. cit.