Soft power: what it is, why it’s important, and the conditions for its effective use

Abstract

Soft power has attracted significant attention in scholarly and public debates on foreign affairs in recent years. Notwithstanding this greater attention, the treatment of soft power has developed little beyond ‘soft theory.’ This article addresses this deficiency by offering a more rigorous and systematic analysis of the process of soft power. In addition, it seeks to address two further shortcomings in the treatment of soft power: by explaining how changes in modern world politics have raised the value of soft power and by proposing conditions that encourage decision‐makers to appreciate and effectively employ soft power strategies.

Keywords:

• soft power
• power
• cosmopolitan power
• international politics
• smart power

Acknowledgments

A number of individuals have been helpful in the writing of this article. I would especially like to thank: David Baldwin, Lewis Bateman, Philip Cerny, Michael Cox, Douglas Foyle, Gemma Gallarotti, Richard Grossman, Mark Haugaard, Christian Hogendorn, Robert Jervis, David Kearn, David McBride, Joseph Nye, Nicholas Onuf, Peter Rutland, Gil Skillman, Jack Snyder, Elizabeth Trammell, Alexander Wendt, and an anonymous referee of the Journal of Political Power.

Notes

1. Nye introduced the concept of soft power in ‘Soft Power’ (1990b) and Bound to Lead (1990a) and further applied and developed it in Nye (2002, 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2007). The literature on soft power has grown significantly over the past decade. Especially insightful treatments, both from a supportive and from a critical perspective, can be found in and Gallarotti (2004, 2010a, 2010b), Berenskoetter and Williams (2007), Baldwin (2002), Kurlantzick (2007), Yasushi and McConnell (2008), Lennon (2003), Ferguson (2003), Fraser (2003), and Meade (2004). Also, Johnston’s (2008) work on socialization introduces categories that reflect processes of soft power.

 The idea of ‘smart power’ suggests that a foreign policy based on the combined use of both hard and soft power can yield superior results over one that relies exclusively on one or the other kinds of power. On smart power see, Nossel (2004), Report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies Commission on Smart Power (2007), and Etheridge (2009). Gallarotti’s (2010b) cosmopolitan power represents a theoretical development and historical application of the idea of smart power.

2. In case studies on power seeking that span history and issue areas, Gallarotti (2010a, 2010b) demonstrates that soft power could have significantly enhanced the influence of nations of which leaders were predominantly swayed by the allure of hard power (i.e., victims of a hard power illusion).

3. Like Keohane and Nye (1989), this analysis will not make cumbersome distinctions between realists and neorealists.

4. Gallarotti (2010b) has, however, demonstrated that both the classical and more modern inspirations for contemporary realists (Machiavelli, Hobbes, Thucydides, Carr and Morgenthau), in fact, underscored the important role of soft power in their visions of politics and society.

5. For realists, power also derives from some intangible sources: Waltz’ competence (i.e., leadership, policy, decision‐making). Hence it is not tangibility that determines the principal distinction between soft and hard power. Realists would also embrace the utility of threat or other types of coercive posturing. But ultimately, these intangible measures rely on actual material capabilities to be effective; hence, muscle is the key to power for realists.

6. For an alternative interpretation of Hobbes’ state of nature, one that suggests that Hobbes’ logic underscored the importance of soft power, see Gallarotti (2010b).

7. Of course, a guaranteed response does not guarantee staving off disaster (e.g., your army might lose). But neither does the ownership of insurance always assure full compensation in the case of disaster.

8. In some cases, the endearing qualities may emanate from hard power resources themselves: such as the admiration generated by great economic achievements or an extensive international presence. But the hard power would have to be used according to the liberal principles under girding the process of soft power. This is discussed below.

9. There is no single word that effectively describes the foundation of soft power. I use ‘endearment’ as a term that is most representative. The terms admiration and respect could be used instead, but they insufficiently capture the quality of being liked or esteemed (i.e., you can respect and admire a nation more than you esteem or like it); which are often foundations for soft power. This does not mean that all the actions, qualities, and policies of soft power nations are necessarily endearing. In fact, other nations may dislike a number of qualities, actions and policies of a soft power nation. But the preponderance of such ‘output’ by soft power nations should endear those nations to other nations in some form; however it is distributed among respect, admiration, and esteem. For the purpose of elegance, I strive to use a broadly representative term such as endearment, rather than an extended checklist of terms.

10. While such a vision recalls some of the categories of Weberian charismatic authority, soft power differs significantly from charisma. While soft power generates endearment, these qualities are not necessarily consistent with Weber’s vision of such authority, qua an authority founded on perceptions of possessing ‘extraordinary,’ ‘exceptional,’ or ‘supernatural’ qualities (1978, p. 242).

11. This recalls Lasswell and Kaplan’s (1950, p. 156) process of ‘identification’: where rank and file members of a group adopt the values of their leaders out of respect and admiration. Even realists argue that such an identification process can manifest itself in the emulation of successful military strategies and preferences for certain hard power resources (Waltz 1979).

12. While both Lukes (1974) and Isaac (1987) underscore fundamental differences between their work and that of Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 1963), all three visions of power, in fact, demonstrate an embedded (i.e., meta‐power) social quality in which the direct interaction between bargaining agents is itself conditioned by some greater constellations of social relations.

13. Four faces of power have been identified in the power literature. The first constitutes direct contests between actors, where the outcomes from bargaining are reflective of the relative distribution of power (i.e., the conventional view of power relations). The other three faces of power constitute meta‐power relations. The work on agenda control has been designated as a second face of power. Barnett and Duvall’s (2005) typology of international power conflates much of this second face into their concept of institutional power. The other two faces will be described below. On the four faces of power, see Digeser (1992), Berenskoetter (2007), and Barnett and Duvall (2005).

14. For excellent surveys of the applications of agenda setting, see Mueller (1997, 2003).

15. I this context, I stress the ideas of Lukes as formulated in the first edition of Power: A Radical View (1974). In the second edition, Lukes (2005), as will be noted below, has acknowledged possibilities of power relationships that abate conflicts of interests, and hence are closer to the idea of soft power.

16. Barnett and Duvall’s category of structural power best conforms to this radical conception of meta‐power.

17. Even Dahl’s own conception of power is not necessarily grounded in a conflict of interests. Interestingly, Dahl’s classic work Who Governs? (1961), as influential as it has been, has nonetheless been given insufficient credit as a thorough statement about the faces of power (Polsby 1980).

18. The New International Economic Order (NIEO), as a counter‐hegemonic movement, demonstrated that developing nations are not easily victims of false consciousness (Gosovic and Ruggie 1976).

19. There is also a possible reference to such categories in the first edition, in what Lukes (1974, p. 32) calls ‘rational persuasion.’ Lukes himself is perplexed as to the nature of this category of power. In one respect rational persuasion is adversarial in that it may get an actor to think and do that which he/she would not otherwise do; however, in another respect, it is possible that the acceptance of the persuasive argument derives from a sense of a harmony of interest on the part of the persuaded actor. In any case, Lukes (1974, p. 33) does not elaborate on the significance of this concept for his theory of power, preferring to shuffle it off to a philosophical dustbin as a ‘fundamental (Kantian) antinomy between causality, on one hand, and autonomy and reason, on the other.’

20. Lukes (2005, pp. 84, 85) undertakes a somewhat cursory analysis of power as beneficent in this respect: his analysis falls far short of systematically integrating such forms of power into his overall logic of three‐dimensional power. With respect to this relation between power and conflict of interests in Lukes’ work, Morriss (2006) underscores the continuity of Lukes’ logic across the two editions. He notes that while Lukes acknowledges the possibilities of power in the context of a greater harmony of interests, Lukes’ analytical focus in the second edition of the book is still essentially oriented around power unfolding within an adversarial context. As Morriss (2006, p. 132) notes, Lukes ‘is only looking at power that demeans someone.’

21. On Foucault’s vision of power, see especially Foucault (2000), Digeser (1992), Brass (2000), and Barnett and Duvall (2005).

22. Gallarotti (2010b) demonstrates a number of historical cases in which economic hard power was an important source of emulation.

23. Reflective of this view are national laws that limit the foreign content of media transmissions. On cultural imperialism, see Sklair (1995) and LeFeber (1999).

24. Indeed, critics of soft power underscore a problematic distinction between hard and soft power based on tangibility. See Baldwin (2002) and Meade (2004).

25. Another example of the soft power generated by an extensive military presence would highlight the goodwill promoted by American civil‐military functions abroad: education, political stabilization, provision of public goods, etc.

26. This clarifies what many believe to be an inconsistency in the process of soft power. If, indeed, hard power can generate feelings of respect and admiration, then one is tempted to conclude that individuals such as Hitler, Napoleon, and Genghis Khan could also enjoy soft power owing to the admiration they would receive as a result of marshaling a preponderant military force. And this would be a surprising outcome to people who purport to understand the meaning of soft power. No doubt, a strong military can and has generated respect and admiration, and even endearment for those that benefited from the uses of that military force. But while individuals such as these conquerors did generate much admiration with respect to the power they were able to amass and exercise, they surely compromised that soft power and much more as a result of the way they used it. Surely, few leaders would conceive of such conquerors as role models, especially in the modern world system. Interestingly, Hitler, as a fledgling head of state, enjoyed enormous soft power as a perceived victim of an unfair peace settlement, one which victimized Germany both politically and economically. This soft power was quickly compromised when he set about persecuting Jews in Germany and began his rampage of conquest across Europe (Gallarotti 2010b, p. 140).

27. This is a simple model of soft power. A more elaborate formal model of soft power in the context of cosmopolitan power is presented in Gallarotti (2010b).

28. For simplicity, we assume a one‐dimensional bargaining space, but this depiction of bargaining need not preclude mutual gains under assumptions of soft power, as will be demonstrated below.

29. This should not suggest a conflict of interests in the shifting of national goals as a result of soft power. Adapting the goals of the role‐model nations may, in fact, work better in terms of the objective national interests of the nation that has shifted its goals. Nations adopting the objectives and goals of others should tend to benefit from those adoptions. There will not be a false consciousness at work in the long run as nations can clearly ascertain what is in their best interest. Even so, in the bargaining space, even without false consciousness, some conflict of interests still remains among nations as their points of bliss are not the same. Hence, soft power diminishes conflicts of interests; it does not purge them completely. And this is consistent with the mixed‐game orientation of neoliberal visions that embrace processes of soft power.

30. Karl Deutsch (1966, p. 155) underscored the importance of a ‘net’ conception of power over four decades ago.