Who won? Power and factional balance in China after the 18th Congress of the CCP

Abstract

The 18th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) brought several changes at the top leadership. A fifth generation of rulers rose to power and the new Central Committee underwent a profound reshuffle of relations between its internal factions. This paper seeks to clarify the extent to which the power balance within the Chinese political elite has changed since the 18th Congress, and the actual strength of the main factions of the CCP. The results of the research show that the analyses which emphasise the return to the centre of political arena of Jiang Zemin and his faction – the Shanghai gang – are partly overstated. Quite to the contrary, elements of continuity with the previous Chinese leadership’s line-up tend to prevail over elements of novelty.

Keywords:

• power
• factionalism
• CCP
• elite politics
• 18th Congress

Notes

1. See also Fewsmith (2008).

2. Cfr. Dogan and Higley (1998).

3. This is a good example of Carl Friedrich’s rule of anticipated reactions (Friedrich 1963).

4. On the strongly hierarchical nature of Chinese power structure during the first decade of the Communist regime, see also Goldstein (1991).

5. On this point, see the analysis of Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz of the two faces of power (Bachrach and Baratz 1963). On the different ‘faces of power’, see also Steven Lukes (1986). The alleged breaking of the ‘prudential rule’ of self-restraint, can help to explain Mao’s harsh reaction to Peng Dehuai’s mild critique of Great Leap Forward policies at Lushan conference in 1959 (Teiwes 1993, Chap. 9).

6. See Bo (2007). A similar view is that of Zhao (1992), who speaks of ‘horizontal authoritarianism’. Kenneth Lieberthal and Lampton (1992) use the concept of ‘fragmented authoritarianism’, but the meaning is the same.

7. On the concept of power basis, see Lasswell and Kaplan (1950).

8. On this point see also Nelson Polsby and his critique of the analysis of power distribution based on the study of social stratification (Polsby 1964).

9. For the identification of the current Chinese factions, see Li (2008, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2012d); Bo (2007, 2010).

10. These figures are rough estimates, but their consistency with analogous figures for the 17th CC makes them sufficiently reliable.

11. Because of factional overlap, some people are in multiple groupings.

12. See Bo (2007), Chap. 5.

13. See Li (2008); Bo (2010); Miller (2013).

14. Li Cheng considers the Princelings and Shanghai gang to be the two main pillars of an ‘elitist’ coalition inside the CCP, as opposed to a ‘populist’ coalition based mostly on people from the Tuanpai (Li 2005, 2008, 2012e). Other analysts are less certain of the intimacy between the two factions. See TheEpochTimes, ‘New Party Leadership Moves in on Strongholds of Old Faction’, 11 January 2013. http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/china-news/new-party-leadership-moves-in-on-strongholds-of-old-faction-333691.html.

15. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-10/18/c_13563059.htm.

16. TheEpochTimes, ‘New Party Leadership Moves in on Strongholds of Old Faction’, 11 January 2013. http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/china-news/new-party-leadership-moves-in-on-strongholds-of-old-faction-333691.html.

17. TheEpochTimes, ‘New Party Leadership Moves in on Strongholds of Old Faction’, 11 January 2013. http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/china-news/new-party-leadership-moves-in-on-strongholds-of-old-faction-333691.html.

18. The results of the Third Plenum of the 18th CC of the CCP (November 2013) partially contradict this statement. The creation of the National Security Committee and the Committee on Comprehensive Deepening of Reforms seems to consolidate Xi Jinping’s steering power (http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D = 41,933&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D = 25&cHash = c97424fda6de2f64e09ee0e2456c6bb3).

19. As Dahl writes: ‘Suppose we wish to compare the power of two different individuals. We have at least five factors that might be included in a comparison: (1) differences in the basis of their power, (2) differences in means of employing the basis, (3) differences in the scope of their power, i.e. in type of response evoked, (4) differences in the number of comparable respondents, and (5) differences in the change in probabilities … it is important to make clear that analysis of the first two items does not, strictly speaking, provide us with a comparison of the power of two or more actors, except insofar as it permit us to make inferences about the last three items’ (Dahl 1957, pp. 205–206).