Why we do need a concept of power

ABSTRACT

Dowding’s new edition of RCPP includes an original reflection on the task of conceptual analysis, where he argues against the need to provide a formal definition of power. In doing so, he endorses a strong anti-essentialist view on the definition of political concepts and resorts to a reductionist conception of power based on the notion of power-resources. In this article, I investigate the implications of Dowding's position for the understanding of the concept of power and I discuss the relation between power and power-resources. I conclude by providing reasons in favor of conceptual definition and by arguing, pace Dowding, that we need a concept of power.

KEYWORDS:

• Essentially contested concepts
• conceptual analysis
• Dowding
• power-resources
• power to and power over

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 Please note that Carter’s notion of conceptual hierarchy has nothing to do with Sartori’s (1970) notion of ladders of abstraction in concept formation, which implies a classification of the various uses of a concept and is directed at distinguishing empirical concepts at a different level of generality (in terms of an inverse relation between the intension and the extension of a concept).

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Notes on contributors

Pamela Pansardi

Pamela Pansardi, is Assistant Professor in Political Science at the University of Pavia. Her research focuses on the theory of power, gender and politics, EU politics, and methods in text analysis. Her work has appeared or is forthcoming in journals such as European Journal of Political Research, Journal of European Social Policy, Journal of European Integration, Journal of Political Power.