The Compound State and the “Double Project of Modernity”: A Review of the Twentieth Century East Asian History

Abstract

My primary question is whether the idea of a “compound state” can connect well with the formation of the East Asian community. It originally came into being in the process of staging a movement for overcoming the division system on the Korean Peninsula. I then applied it to the broader region of East Asia. It will be critical in the implementation of the “double project of adapting to and overcoming modernity.” More specifically, I reviewed questions posed by three cities—Kinmen (Taiwan), Okinawa (Japan) and Kaesung (the Korean Peninsula) regarding the nation state system. They are good illustrations of cross-border cooperation and efforts for self-transformation made by nation states.

Keywords:

• compound state
• modernity
• Kinmen
• Okinawa
• Kaesung

Notes

¹This paper is based on a presentation given in Korea at the “Modernity and Cities of East Asia: A View from the History of Civilization” Symposium (held on August 24 and 25 in 2010) organized by the Institute of Seoul Studies, the University of Seoul.

²According to Paik Nak-chung (2006, 45–48) who coined the phrase “the shaking division system” in 1998, the June Struggle for Democracy in 1987 was a turning point in sending the division system faltering, culminating in the 2000 June Inter-Korean Summit Meeting which put it into a dismantlement phase leading up to the “end of the division system itself.” Though tension is running particularly high on the Korean Peninsula at present, the fruits of inter-Korean reconciliation are so conspicuous that they are even felt in our daily lives.

³This was first expressed in Baik (1993).

⁴For a more detailed discussion of this genealogy of ideas, refer to Baik (2011).

⁵Various classifications were tried in South Korean intellectual community. For example, Im (2007) developed the classifications of Confucian capitalism discourse, political economic discourse of regional integration, post-modern civilization discourse, and critical regionalism discourse, labeling the Changbi (Creation and criticism) East Asian discourse “critical regionalism.” Park (2008) also classified various versions of the discourse as economic community discourse, regional hegemony discourse, East Asian identity discourse and alternative system discourse, defining the Changbi discourse as alternative system discourse.

⁶The phrase was first used in Baik (2004), and was supplemented with more detail in Baik (2005). Recently an effort to combine inter-disciplinary research and practical experience out in the field has been conceived and is being practiced as a way of “social humanities research.” For social humanities, refer to Y. Baik (2010).

⁷Baik (2009a) and Baik, Sun and Chen (2006) were created in the process.

⁸They include “East Asia as an intellectual experiment,” “a dual peripheral perspective,” “the compound state theory,” “interlocked reform agendas in and out of the nation state,” “communicative universality,” and “glocalogy.”

⁹It is commonly referred to as the “East Asian discourse of the Changbi group,” but this paper is intended to put forth my own arguments. Even so, it is still inherently connected with ideas and theories championed by Choi Won-sik and Paik Nak-chung.

¹⁰There is a political scientist who actively advocates this position. See Lee (2011a, 22).

¹¹This idea was first raised in Paik (1999) and it is gradually spreading into various other areas. See Lee (2009).

¹²Not a few commentaries were offered on my East Asian discourse, out of which I'd like to introduce Ryu Jun-pil's (2010) comments. For overseas criticisms of privileging the Korean Peninsula, see Sun (2009) and Xu (2010).

¹³The discussion about this paragraph was also mentioned in Baik, Pak, and Miyajima (2009), and the descriptions of Japan are mostly based on Ham (2009).

¹⁴One example is Kato (2009). She noted that the Japanese people have always had a chance to make rational choices, but “nevertheless” they chose war because “they were haunted by modern Japanese ‘national’ history since the Meiji Restoration.” In other words, “deep gratification and a sense of accomplishment put restraints on rational final judgment” (Kato 2010, 103).

¹⁵Gang Sang-jung (2002, 163) suggested that Japan should drop its “big state consciousness” as a national strategy and move towards a “non-hegemonic” middle-level state, so it can coexist with other Asian neighbors. His suggestion is exactly consistent with my arguments.

¹⁶The martial law of this period left people seriously traumatized, as described in detail by Sun (2011, 78–79).

¹⁷ Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies, a Taiwanese periodical, published a special issue (no. 74) on the division system theory in June 2009.

¹⁸For one such attempt, see Sun (2011).