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Abstract
Almost a decade after its creation, and despite its unequivocal status as a force in Russian party politics, United Russia has received relatively little direct research. For a number of reasons, a comparative approach seems a logical next step, with what may be termed a ‘dominant-party framework’ as an obvious choice to guide further research. While recent literature has focused on United Russia's development in the regions, providing valuable clues as to how dominant parties are formed, this article assesses the ability of the dominant-party framework to elaborate the kind of functions the party performs. This article argues that any exploration of party dominance in Russia that focuses solely on the party system as the unit of analysis misses important differences that exist between dominant parties and risks conflating party system dominance with political system dominance. By engaging with the party as the unit of analysis, in particular party origins, we gain a fuller appreciation of United Russia's brand of ‘weak’ dominance, as well as some of the challenges for comparative research in the future.
Notes
There are numerous studies of ruling parties that deal with the dynamics of dominance (see Pempel Citation1990b for a dedicated edited volume on this subject). The emerging literature on electoral/competitive authoritarianism also synthesises many of these ideas (Levitsky and Way Citation2010).
Magaloni does comment in a footnote that many hegemonic-party autocracies are less prone to elite schisms because they do not replace their presidents as often. The point is that the Mexican PRI controlled all major positions of power in the political system to varying degrees, including presidential office (Magaloni Citation2006, p. 17).
In September 2007, academic and prominent Yabloko member, Andrei Piontkovskii, went on trial for allegedly violating the law on extremism with his book ‘Unloved Country’ that was strongly critical of Vladimir Putin.
The ONF was a useful election tactic, serving at least two purposes. First, it was part of an attempt to broaden United Russia's flagging voter appeal ahead of the December 2011 State Duma election. Second, it was a source of grassroots support for Putin and his 2012 presidential election campaign that also allowed him to distance himself from the party and its poor Duma campaign. For this reason, it is of little surprise that Vladimir Putin's 2012 presidential campaign website (www.Putin2012.ru) contained a direct link only to the ONF website, but not to United Russia's. Overall, the party was conspicuous for its absence during most of Putin's televised campaign in the run up to the presidential election on 4 March.
Members of United Russia's Higher Council represented in presidential administration/government positions include: Aleksandr Beglov (Deputy Chief of Staff in the Presidential Administration); Viktor Ishaev (Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy); Oleg Goverun (Presidential Domestic Policy Directorate); Aleksandr Khloponin (Deputy Prime Minister); Sergei Sobyanin (Deputy Prime Minister); Aleksandr Zhukov (Deputy Prime Minister); Sergei Shoigu (Minister for Civil Defence); Elena Skrynnik (Minister for Agriculture); and Yuri Trutnev (Minister for Natural Resources and the Environment) (Edinaya Rossiya Citation2010).
According to the party statutes (ustav), members of United Russia (Article 5.2) have a range of obligations including adherence to the party statutes which, naturally, do not apply to non-members. Changes were made to party statutes at the party congress in April 2008 (Article 7.1.2), just prior to Putin taking up the post of party leader (Edinaya Rossiya Citation2009b).
Shefter (Citation1994, p. 5) discusses the origins of parties and distinguishes between two types: internally mobilised parties created by politicians who occupy leading positions in the regime; and externally mobilised parties created by politicians who seek to ‘bludgeon their way into the political system by mobilising and organising a mass constituency’. Panebianco (Citation1988, p. 50) identifies the presence or absence of an external sponsor institution as an important part of a party's ‘genetic model’.
