Representative claims and expected gains. Minority council elections and intra-ethnic competition in Serbia

Abstract

This article examines the first direct elections to minority councils in Serbia. It seeks to build hypotheses on the interplay between minority council elections and the overall patterns of intra-ethnic party competition in divided societies. Following an introduction to minority politics in Serbia, the authors analyse the campaign for the Bosniak and the Hungarian minority council. Evidence from field research suggests that minority council elections reflect the situation of intra-ethnic competition and provide an additional arena for ethnic outbidding for new ethnic parties.

Keywords:

• cultural autonomy
• minority councils
• intra-ethnic competition
• Serbia

Acknowledgments

Field research in Serbia was financially supported by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). We thank Christian Blum and two anonymous referees as well as one of the editors for very helpful comments and all interview partners for sharing their time and experience.

Notes

The insights about the diversity of representative claims presented in this article were gained predominantly from interviews with minority elites. The analysis therefore exemplifies only one of the possible manifestations of representative claims voiced during the campaigns for the minority council elections, i.e. the claims brought forward by political elites during interviews (and not, for example, within the minority media). We hope that future research will contribute additional perspectives. Audio recordings and transcripts of all interviews cited in this article are in the authors' possession. The interview guidelines are available upon request. Interviewees gave their consent to having their names published.

It should be noted, however, that the exact nature of these rights remains contested and that the European Union has applied differentiated standards during the past accession of the Central and Eastern European countries (Schwellnus 2005). A detailed discussion of the contested meaning of minority rights in European norms and in Western and Eastern Europe respectively is beyond the scope of this article, but we refer the reader to Deets' (2006) thorough treatment of this topic.

An English translation of the Law on National Councils is provided by the European integration office of the government of the Republic of Serbia and can be found at: http://www.seio.gov.rs/upload/documents/ekspertske%20misije/protection_of_minorities/law_on_national_councils.pdf [Accessed May 14, 2012]. All direct citations from the law draw on this translation.

According to Lijphart (1977), the consociational model of democracy consists of the following characteristics: grand coalition of elites representing all segments of the society; segmental autonomy; mutual veto right enjoyed during the decision-making process by the representatives of each societal segment; proportionality as a principle guaranteeing representation of the groups in the executive, legislative and state administration. With regard to these features, Bosnia and Herzegovina represent the consociational model, although it lacks the basic understanding between the segmental leaders concerning the shape of the state. The system is similar to the federal system of Belgium, where there is territorial and national division (Bieber 1999). Power sharing between the key groups is reflected in the composition of all state institutions as well as in the legislative procedure and judicial review.

In comparison, minorities in Kosovo's political regime have more limited opportunities and therefore the Kosovo political system is consociation-like with many examples of power sharing. For example positive discrimination tools exist, especially in the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo. Power sharing in the executive is guaranteed constitutionally. Adopting a law in the areas of vital interest to ethnic communities requires the consent of a majority of these representatives. The Constitution also guarantees minority participation in the judicial system at all levels.

Amended on the basis of the Framework Agreement of 2001, the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia contains several provisions related to the participation of minorities in state governance. The constitution recognises citizens of ethnic origins other than the Macedonian majority and secures their rights through a minority veto in parliament. Bieber (2008, 13) refers to this as a “minimalist consociational system”. In the case of Macedonia, where executive power sharing is not legally guaranteed, a practical consensus on the need to include Albanians in governing coalitions has, however, formed over the years, rendering the Macedonian power-sharing system more flexible than the Bosnian one.

Minority organisations are defined by the law in the following way: “Any organization, association or political organization that incorporates in its name a designation of one national minority, or whose statute designates it as an organization or an association or a political organization that gathers or acts in the interests of persons belonging to a national minority, shall be considered an organization, association or political organization of a national minority” (Article 101, Law on National Councils).

Author's interview with Maglai Jenő, 6 June 2010, Subotica. The most recent census has been conducted in 2011. At the time of writing, only preliminary results had been published by the Serbian statistical office and these did not contain information on nationality (Republika Srbija – Republic˘ki zavod za statistiku 2011).

Author's interview with Attila Marton, 2 June 2010, Novi Sad.

Sandžak is an old Ottoman term for an administrative unit that is smaller than a province but larger than a municipality.

Out of these, the 19,000 Muslims by nationality are of Slavic origin and identify themselves for various reasons neither as Bosniaks, nor as Sandžaklija (in English: inhabitants of Sandžak), neither as Montenegrin, nor as Serbian Muslims.

Author's interview with Sonja Biserko, 5 May 2010, Belgrade. Two parallel Islamic communities exist in Serbia. The Islamic community of Serbia is headed by Adem Zilkić and has its seat in Belgrade. The Islamic community in Serbia is headed by Muamer Zukorlić, has its seat in Novi Pazar, and is oriented towards Sarajevo. For more details, see Morrison (2008).

Author's interview with Andras Ágoston, 7 June 2010, Temerin.

Author's interview with Esad Džudžević, 6 May 2010, Belgrade, and with Munir Poturak, 4 May 2010, Belgrade.

See Note 12.

Author's interview with Zorán Setyerov, 3 June 2010, Subotica.

Author's interview with Attila Marton, 2 June 2010, Novi Sad.

See Note 14.

Author's interview with Samir Tandir, 17 May 2010, Novi Pazar.

In the first round of the presidential elections of 2008, LDP candidate Cedomir Jovanović received his highest support in the Raška district (8.49% of valid votes), which includes the Bosniak majority municipalities of Novi Pazar and Tutin and in the Zlatibor district (8.19% of valid votes), which includes the Bosniak municipalities of Sjenica, Nova Varoš, Prijepolje and Priboj. His national aggregate result in the first round was 5.34% (Republika Srbija – Republički zavod za statistiku 2008).

Author's interview with Esad Džudžević, 6 May 2010, Belgrade.

See Note 19.

Author's interview with Samir Tandir, 17 May 2010, Novi Pazar.

Author's interview with Márta Horváth Ódry, 10 June 2010, Sombor.

Author's interview with Maglai Jenő, 6 June 2010, Subotica.

See Note 23.

Author's interview with Attila Marton, 2 June 2010, Novi Sad.

Of course, this does not follow by necessity. If democratic principles and the norms of an open society are rooted deeply enough in the behaviour of minority elites, the chances of creating many sources of media presenting different viewpoints and political perspectives may be higher than our conclusions drawn on the basis of minority communities in Serbia would suggest.