Securitising Islam, securitising ethnicity: the discourse of Uzbek radicalism in Kyrgyzstan

Abstract

Since independence, Kyrgyzstani leaders have used Islamic identity as a tool for nation-building. While embracing Islam as a marker of Kyrgyz nationhood, however, they have simultaneously sought to limit its role in political life. The resulting discourse draws a sharp dichotomy between “good”, “local” forms of Islam and “bad”, “foreign” manifestations. Unfortunately, the latter, “bad” forms are frequently linked to Kyrgyzstan's largest minority population: ethnic Uzbeks. Drawing on, and adding insights to, the theory of securitisation forwarded by the Copenhagen School of security studies, this article examines how and why religion and ethnicity have become intertwined in Kyrgyzstani discourse.

Keywords:

• Kyrgyzstan
• securitisation
• Islam
• ethnicity
• extremism
• radicalism

Acknowledgements

I thank participants in the Politicologenetmaal workshop on conflict and violence, as well as two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and critiques on earlier drafts of this paper. I also acknowledge the help provided by a number of very capable and dedicated research assistants in Kyrgyzstan. Though, in the interests of security, I cannot provide their names, my research would not have been possible without their skilled assistance, and I am eternally grateful to them.

Funding

Field research in Kyrgyzstan was supported by an International Dissertation Research Fellowship provided by the Social Science Research Council and a Pre-dissertation Travel Grant provided by the Indiana University Office of International Programs and Indiana University Graduate School.

Notes on contributor

Rebekah Tromble is Assistant Professor in the Institute of Political Science at Leiden University, The Netherlands. Her research combines interests in political communication, international relations, and Islamic social movements.

Notes

1. A transcript of the speech President Bush made to the joint session of Congress on 20 September 2001 can be found in the Washington Post's “America at War: Texts and Transcripts Archive,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html

2. Kyrgyz constitute 71%, and Uzbeks 14%, of Kyrgyzstan's total population (5.36 million).

3. My selection of newspaper sources was largely born of necessity. Though I attempted to gather data from Kyrgyz- and Uzbek-language newspapers, the archives to which I gained access were typically very small and incomplete, and in one instance my research assistants and I were actually prevented from gathering data after just a few days because we had begun to “annoy” a librarian with our requests. Reliance on Russian-language newspapers alone is certainly less than ideal – particularly because the data derived from these sources are likely to be biased towards coverage and statements intended for a somewhat more international audience (i.e. using language and tropes drawing on the international War on Terror discourse). However, the addition of data from interviews and secondary sources has allowed me to triangulate my findings and conclude with relative confidence that the newspaper data are not aberrant.

4. Because I am interested in broad discursive trends (and not narrow data relevant to individual news sources), the fact that I was not able to analyse the full population of relevant articles should not be problematic. In fact, it has the added benefit of making discourse analysis techniques more manageable.

5. In fact, concerned about security services obtaining my notes, I did not actually record this information. Instead I identified informants by broad occupation and general location only.

6. Quoted in Lipovsky (1996, 19).

7. Many Central Asian women wear headscarves, but the traditional style wraps around the back of the head and does not typically cover all of one's hair. The hijab is wrapped around the neck and covers one's hair completely.

8. Author's interview, Naryn, Kyrgyzstan, August 2009.

9. Author's interview, Jalal-Abad, Kyrgyzstan, June 2009.

10. Author's interview, Osh, Kyrgyzstan, July 2009.

11. The newspaper data indicate that the Kyrgyzstani discourse of Uzbek radicalism began in earnest with the IMU incursions of August 1999. Though I examined the data for correlations between the intensity of this discourse and other events (such as downturns in political relations between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan), no consistent trends were found.

12. See also: Akbarzadeh (2001); Biard (2010); Baran (2005); Gunn (2003); Haghayeghi (1996); Khalid (2007); Roy (2009); Walker (2003); and Zenn (2012).

13. For a lengthy and oft-cited analysis of the significance of the north/south divide, see Ryabkov (2008).

14. Gardaz (1999) explicitly ties the north/south divide to religious differences.

15. Author's interview, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, April 2009.

16. Ibid., March 2009.

17. Ibid., March 2009.

18. Excluding Turkmenistan.

19. HT's influence is actually quite marginal in the Middle East. Recently it has found more success (at least in terms of acquiring media attention for its activities) in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Western Europe (especially the UK), and Australia.

20. In April 2003, the same newspaper reported on the distribution of HT leaflets in Issyk-Kul, and several reports on HT's activities in the region appeared in both Vecherniy Bishkek and Slovo Kyrgyzstana in the following years.

21. Similar statements can be found in dozens of academic and policy-oriented texts; cf. Baran (2004, 2005); Baran, Starr, and Cornell (2006); Cornell and Specter (2002); ICG (2012); Karagiannis (2005); McGlinchey (2005); Omelicheva (2010); Peyrouse (2007b); Rotar (2012); Siddiqui (2012); and Zenn (2012).

22. This was confirmed for me in interviews with three HT members (two Uzbek, one Kyrgyz; the first interview was conducted in Kara-suu in July 2007, the second in Bishkek in March 2009, and the third in Jalal-abad in July 2009). All noted that HT had first spread mostly among Uzbeks, but each emphasised that the group had made significant inroads with other ethnic groups as well. One Uzbek member explained that “our ideology brings knowledge to everyone. I have invited my Kyrgyz neighbours and even a Russian to learn from this ideology, and they welcomed it.” (Author's interview, Jalal-abad, Kyrgyzstan, July 2009). There are, however, no reliable estimates of HT's current ethnic composition available.

23. Author's interview, Kara-suu, Kyrgyzstan, August 2009.

24. See, for example, Huysmans's work on the political aesthetics of “everydayness”, especially Huysmans (1998).

25. More than four years on, Kyrgyzstanis still remain wary of the potential for violence. A 2013 poll conducted by the Pew Research Center found that 73% of Kyrgyzstani respondents designated conflict between ethnic groups either a “moderately big” or “very big” problem in their country. Compared to its neighbours Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan – where, respectively, 21% and 10% of respondents considered ethnic conflict a significant problem – the contrast is stark.