Presidential dynamics and legislative velocity in Russia, 1994–2007

Abstract

Analysts of Russian politics often refer to the speed of legislative enactment when assessing the decisiveness and democratic accountability of presidential power. This article considers whether speed is a meaningful indicator of institutional dynamics during the presidencies of Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin. Drawing on an original data set of 251 important laws passed in Russia between 1994 and 2007, it examines how patterns of legislative velocity can shed light on the different forms of democratic (minority and coalitional) and authoritarian presidential rule that have existed under the 1993 Constitution.

Keywords:

• authoritarianism
• democratisation
• Putin
• Russia
• Yeltsin
• transition

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank Dave Armstrong, Ben Noble and the reviewers of this journal for their assistance and comments.

Funding

The research was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council [grant number RES-062-23-2892].

Notes on contributor

Paul Chaisty is the University Lecturer in Russian Government at St Antony's College, Oxford University. His publications include Legislative Politics and Economic Power in Russia (Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2006).

Notes

1. For an overview of the evolution of the presidentialism literature, see Elgie (2005).

2. Words in parentheses were added by the author.

3. In May 1999, the Duma came close to the impeachment of Boris Yeltsin.

4. During this period, Russia is classified as “partially democratic” by the Polity IV Index and as “partly free” by the Freedom House Index. See http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm (accessed 1 July 2012); http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world (accessed 20 December 2013).

5. There are two parliamentary sessions each year: autumn and spring.

6. For example, 771 laws were enacted during the third Duma.

7. Survival analysis takes alternative forms, and distributional assumptions differ in the various models. In parametric modelling, which is preferred in this study for its relative ease of interpretation, exponential regression would assume that bills are no more or less likely to be enacted during the period of observation. This assumption is potentially problematic as legislators are more likely to rush to enact laws as elections draw close. Weibull regression does not make such assumptions; it allows for the enactment of bills to increase or decrease over time. These assumptions appear more realistic for parliamentary laws; hence, a Weibull model is used in this analysis.

8. This includes legislation affecting: federal state institutions and agencies; state symbols and monuments; the electoral process, referenda and the status of elected officials; the constitutional rights of Russian citizens; the activities of political, social and religious groups; regional and local government; the judiciary and the judicial system; and the criminal, civil and administrative law.

9. Article 51 of the Duma's standing orders.

10. A dummy variable is used to denote bills that are either legal codes or federal constitutional laws.

11. Federal constitutional laws require two-thirds majorities in both houses of the Federal Assembly, and while they cannot be vetoed by the president, the president's formal power as “guarantor” of the constitution provides the head of state with the potential to obstruct the passage of such bills in other ways. Anecdotal evidence from the early parliaments also suggests that legislators did not have the same political imperative to enact either constitutional laws or legal codes. According to the first deputy chairman of the second Duma, Alexander Shokhin (1997) “the period of their scrutiny remains ill-defined mainly because they lack a concrete initiator and architect. Practice shows that such proposals are realised slowly” (11).

12. A complete set of data was not available for the first Duma.

13. These data are drawn from the Duma's open data portal: http://api.duma.gov.ru/. They include budget bills and the ratification of international treaties. The author wishes to thank Ben Noble for compiling these data.

14. A standard deviation of 338.

15. The level of dissent was calculated as the percentage of deputies from pro-presidential parties who voted against, abstained, or did not vote with the majority of the coalition on the first reading of important bills. According to Thames (2007), the Duma's first reading is the best “pure” measure of the support for a bill before amendments are considered (13).