![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
Abstract
This text focuses on the Russian Electoral Commission (EC) and its performance during the Russian parliamentary elections in 2011. The three-step analysis consists of (1) the EC’s role and organisational structure; (2) a description of the complaints over the EC’s performance and (3) a detailed focus on the EC’s decisions on these complaints’ relevance. Quantitative content analysis is used to analyse the original data and a new forensic method is developed to look for potential biases in the EC’s decisions on raised complaints. Evidence indicate loss of professionalism, dependence, and biased behaviour. Therefore the EC lacks its credibility.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the research project of the Department of Political Science FSS MU “Elections, Parties, and Advocacy of Interests II” [code MUNI/A/0846/2013]. I would like to thank Carolien van Ham, Max Bader, Hans Schmeets and Leontine Loeber for their comments. Thanks are also due to two anonymous reviewers for their comments on a draft of this article.
Notes on contributor
Ivan Jarabinský is a PhD candidate at the Department of Political Science at Masaryk University, doing his research on the causes of different quality of elections in Central and Eastern Europe. His research interests include electoral systems, electoral integrity, rational choice theory, and Central and East European politics.
Notes
† The earlier version of this article was presented at 13th Political Science Conference Politicologenetmaal, 12 June 2014, at the University of Maastricht.
1 Election Commission is the name of the electoral management body in Russia.
2 The original demand for free elections later multiplied into a larger number of separate demands.
3 Popova (Citation2006) omits an evaluation of the independence of the Russian EC in her analysis; Lehoucq (Citation2002) explains the quality of elections in Latin America with respect to the independence of electoral authorities and their interactions; Rosas (Citation2010) also focuses solely on the autonomy of EMBs while explaining their impact on citizens’ and elites’ perceptions of the quality of elections; Gazibo (Citation2006) also analyses the capacity of EMBs to enforce their rules; and Hartlyn, McCoy, and Mustillo (Citation2008), in fact, focuses on different conceptions of independence.
4 In some cases, the powers of the TEC may be assumed by the PEC (art. 18.3 of the Federal''nuy Zakon O Vȳborakh Deputatov Gosudarstvennoĭ Dumȳ Federal''nogo Sobraniya Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii – N 51-FZ Citation2005).
5 The re-elected ex-chairman of UR, Vladimir Putin, holds the office of the president; the former president Dmitry Medvedev was also from this party. After being elected president in 2008 with Putin's support, he declared direct continuity with Putin's policies (Stott Citation2008). In the 2012 presidential elections in which Medvedev did not run, the office was again decisively won by Vladimir Putin, making him President of Russia for the third time, with Medvedev receiving the post of chairman of the UR party.
6 By the previously mentioned members of election commissions, we mean those members who the law regards as “a voting member of an Election Commission” (Chlen komissii s pravom reshayushchego golosa); that is, those who personally oversee and conduct the electoral competition. However, political parties may also name a so-called “non-voting member of Election Commission” (Chlen komissii s pravom soveshchatel''nogo golosa), who has narrower powers and are not in fact necessary components of the commission.
7 Jarabinský presents a classification of potential electoral fraud, which includes 21 (+1) categories of fraud. These categories were set according to a synthesis of concepts and approaches by contemporary authors (Schedler Citation2002; Lehoucq Citation2003; Calingaert Citation2006; Birch Citation2008c; Hyde Citation2008; López-Pintor Citation2011; Dočekalová Citation2012) and in view of the actual possibilities for carrying them out in the case of the Russian elections to the State Duma in 2011. He classifies all of the complaints in relation to the potential breaking of domestic laws and/or international standards. Among these possible frauds, he distinguishes between: (1) problems during voter registration; (2) problems in registering parties/candidates; (3) poor work by the media; (4) illegal financing and resources; (5) threatening/violence/coercion/imprisonment of candidates, party officers, voters, or electoral commissioners and officers; (6) illegal work with information (collecting or providing); (7) illegality of election campaigning; (8) other discrimination; (9) allowing/preventing a vote from being cast; (10) “insincerity” of the vote; (11) unequal voting; (12) violation of voting secrecy; (13) inadequate voting conditions/environment; (14) interference by ineligible persons in the work of the EMB; (15) failure to secure ballot boxes; (16) malfeasance in preparing protocols; (17) other complaints against EMBs; (18) failure to apply the election results into practice; (19) poor performance by the organs that decide disputes; (20) suppression of protests, strikes and demonstrations; (21) failure of other relevant organs; and (22) interfering with observers] (Jarabinský Citation2013, 106–107). For more detailed information, see Jarabinský (Citation2013).
8 Contrary to the analysis of complaints, they lack the accuracy of description of potential frauds (surveys, forensic statistical methods based on election results), area coverage (ethnographical methods; analysis of memoirs; civil society reports) or they are unusable (newspaper analysis) in the context of an unfree press (Freedom House Citation2011). For more information about these methods, see: Lehoucq (Citation2003); and Myagkov, Ordeshook, and Shakin (Citation2009).
9 This document declares a total of 4497 complaints filed. It must be added that this is probably a miscalculation, because the document declares 1096 complaints in the Volgograd region alone, while according to the manner of their counting in the document, it contains only around 295 (in other randomly selected areas the sub-counts match up, however). Some of the complaints contain more than one type of accusation, which the author evaluates separately, thus increasing the number and range of complaints analysed (see note 12).
10 Complaints in this document are reported in very short form such as: “Poster situated closer than 50 metres from a polling station.” – coded as “illegality of elections campaigning”; or “Complainer reports that a host of the television debate on which the representatives of political parties “A Just Russia” and the “Right Cause” were present, broadcasted on 11 November 2011 at 11:53 on the “Komi gor” channel, acted intentionally, shortening the time given to “A Just Russia” party and prolonging the time given to “UR” party. The complainer asks to take measures to restore equal conditions of providing free time on the air.” – coded as “poor work by the media”; etc.
11 (1) Narushenie podtverdilos; (2) Narusheniĭ zakonodatel''stva ne ustanovleno; (3) Provoditsya sootvetstvuyushchaya proverka; (4) Nakhoditsya na rassmotrenie v sude; (5) Narushenie chastichno podtverdilos (Tsentral''naya izbiratel''naya komissiya Rossiĭskoĭ Federatsii Citation2012).
12 The data set contains a total of 3831 recorded complaints, of which some are not related to the elections being studied or it is not possible from their formulation to determine what type of alleged fraud it might have been. This may be due to vagueness, or a simple reference to a particular article of the law, but the content of which conceals a larger volume of some kind of fraudulent activity, though it is not clear which the complaint relates to.
13 Not allowing qualified voters to vote, and allowing unqualified voters.
14 When we assume biased decisions, we should evaluate also irrelevant misconducts because they can be potentially evaluated as relevant in this case – see note 12.
15 Because of an insufficient number of complaints, some parties were dropped from the table so that this test could be carried out. These parties were Yabloko (9 complaints), the Right Cause (2), the Patriots of Russia (15) and Will (1). It would be problematic to draw any general conclusions based on such low numbers, and the distribution of so few complaints would in practice go against the conditions for carrying out the test of independence in the contingency tables.
16 In 2012, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia officially changed the name of the party to “Political Party LDPR” (Liberal''no-demokraticheskaya partiya Rossii Citation2012). This text will work with the name at the time of the study.
17 In this case the parties Yabloko (10), the Patriots of Russia (2) and the People's Freedom Party “For Russia without Lawlessness and Corruption” (PARNAS) (1) were dropped from the test for the same reasons as in the previous case.