Stateness, contested nationhood, and imperilled sovereignty: the effects of (non-western) linkages and leverage on conflicts in Kyrgyzstan

ABSTRACT

The case of Kyrgyzstan, mired in a durable oscillation between abrupt descents into violence and swift returns to stability, represents a useful vantage point to capture the trans-national dimension of post-Soviet conflicts. Drawing on the linkage and leverage framework, this paper investigates the role of external actors in the domestic conflicts that have occurred in the country, focusing especially on the 2010 events in and around the city of Osh. It shows that linkages with international actors have grown more dense and diverse over time, most notably with Russia and, to a lesser but growing degree, China. The paper also finds that non-western leverage has become increasingly consequential in shaping Kyrgyzstan's domestic and foreign policy. This has been both conflict-inducing and -mitigating, and has varied considerably throughout the conflict cycle. Once violence broke out no outside actor showed willingness to become embroiled in the conflict, despite the local authorities’ calls for external intervention. Conflict dynamics have altered both the domestic political landscape and trans-national linkages.

KEYWORDS:

• Kyrgyzstan
• conflict
• China
• Russia
• Osh
• linkage and leverage

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Gwendolyn Sasse for her insightful comments on earlier drafts of the paper and to the journal's reviewers for their valuable feedback.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Matteo Fumagalli is Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations at Central European University, Budapest (Hungary). His research revolves around the study of ethnic conflict in the post-Soviet space, the resource nexus and resource nationalism, and the role of external actors in Central Asia. Recent publications include articles in the Journal of Eurasian Studies, Electoral Studies, Ethnopolitics, and the International Political Science Review.

ORCID

Matteo Fumagalli http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1451-2088

Notes

1. Notable exceptions are Wilkinson's (2010) discussion of how Kyrgyzstan's political actors have localised external norms and Cooley's (2012) analysis of the degree to which great powers have adjusted and adapted to local norms to maintain a presence in the region. George (2009, 81) and Laruelle (2012, 42) briefly mention the role of external actors as context to understand local conflicts and politics.

2. This is not to say that the role of great powers is not examined in reference to the domestic politics of the Central Asian states, but such studies are typically centred on the foreign policy of great powers regional (Laruelle and Peyrouse 2013), the extent to which they adapted to “local rules” of political engagement (Cooley 2012), or the lack of an active diaspora politics or even irredentism from the side of the patron state (Fumagalli 2007b).

3. The Kyrgyz SSR was preceded by a Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Region (a misnomer, as the Kazakh republic was called “Kyrgyz”), established created in 1924 as part of the Russian Soviet Socialist Federative Republic. In 1926 the unit was renamed the Kyrgyz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

4. For a detailed breakdown of US Aid to Kyrgyzstan see USAID (http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/2014/230901.htm).

5. Tsertsvadze and Boonstra provide a useful map and breakdown of EU development assistance to Central Asia (2013, 9). They note that bulk of EU aid has been channelled through the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI, ca. EUR 106m for the 2007–2013 period) and Food Security Programs (ca. EUR 21m for the same time frame) (2013).

6. For more on the 2010 violence, see Matveeva, Savin, and Faizullaev (2012), the Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission (2011), and Freedom House (2012).

7. For a more detailed discussion of the EU strategy and its impact see Council of the European Union (2007, 2015) and Boonstra, Tsertsvadze, and Axyonova (2014).

8. The 2010 constitution significantly reduced the powers of the president, although this retains some influence in foreign policy matters, as also clarified in subsequent legislation (Fumagalli, forthcoming).

Additional information

Funding

The project was supported by the Core University Program for Korean Studies through the Ministry of Education of Republic of Korea and Korean Studies Promotion Service of the Academy of Korean Studies [AKS-2011-OOO-OOOOOOO].