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ABSTRACT
In the literature on the Europeanisation of political parties and party systems, transnational party cooperation (TPC) is very often treated as a special and unique kind of Europeanisation of national political parties. Researchers emphasise its direct and more institutionalised character. The article investigates the impact of TPC on Croatian political parties, and tries to determine whether this cooperation has led to changes in the programmes and organisation of Croatian parties or furthered de-radicalisation of their stances. The article also explores whether party activists involved in cooperation with Europarties play an important role in the process of Europeanisation of their parent parties.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank the editor and two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments, which helped the author to improve the manuscript.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Dominika Mikucka-Wójtowicz, PhD, is a research assistant at the Faculty of International and Political Studies of the Jagiellonian University. Her research interests focus on the process of democratisation in post-Yugoslav states, especially in Serbia and Croatia, as well as the operation of their party and electoral systems.
Notes
1. In reality, the process of integration of the CEE states was strongly marked by the paternalism of the Western European states, as noted by Judt (Citation2012, 3), for example, who in the mid-1990s wrote that, “When people refer to possible future adherents they now quite simply and unblushingly speak of a country – Slovenia, Poland – joining Europe”.
2. According to Bomberg (Citation2002), the two-dimensionality of the process could also be understood in another way. She argues that on the one hand “European integration shapes domestic parties’ ideology and strategies and organisation”, but on the other hand parties also strive “to shape the trajectory of European integration in ways that suit their own interests” (Citation2002, 32).
3. Kurevija, G. 2013. “Author’s Interview with the International Secretary of HSLS, Goran Kurevija,” Zagreb, November 19.
4. Pukšec, I. 2013. “Author’s Interview with the International Secretary of HSS, Ivana Pukšec,” Zagreb, November 18.
5. As noted by Sowa (Citation2011), CEE states are “trapped in the logic of a constant game of cat and mouse”, which according to Alexander Kiossev led to the phenomenon of “self-colonisation” in these cultures. The characteristic feature of the process behind this controversial-sounding metaphor is that the cultures of these states from the outset acknowledged their own inferiority (cf. Domański Citation2004), adopting a position of “applicants in contacts with Europeans from the core of the EU”, and its result is taking the position of dependent cultures. The natural tendency is therefore for them to accept that the West represents that which is normal and desirable, and their task is to adapt to this model. As Domański emphasises, “development in postsocialist Europe is synonymous with the process of its ‘Europeanisation'”. But the relationship characteristic of colonialism, between direct use of force and compulsion in order to obtain the desired results, is absent. In this case the compulsion is internal, and based on persuasion, not force (Sowa Citation2011, 18, 21; Kiossev Citation1999; Domański Citation2004, 9).
6. HDZ was the governing party 1990–2000 and 2003–2011.
7. See note no. 3.
8. During what later turned out to be the final convention of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) in January 1990, the president of the delegation of Croatian communists, Ivica Račan, decided to leave the session, just after the delegates from Slovenia had pulled out – which ultimately led to the fall of the union. In November 1990, at the SDP founding convention, the so-called historical declaration was adopted, apologising to the victims of the League of Communists of Croatia and determining that those sentenced unjustly were due rehabilitation and compensation (Duka Citation2005, 62; Povijesna deklaracija Citation2000, 152).
9. Leaković, K. 2013. “Author’s Interview with the International Secretary of SDP, Karolina Leaković,” Zagreb, November 20.
10. Ibid.
11. Kovač, M. 2014. “Author’s Interview with the International Secretary of HDZ, Miro Kovač,” Zagreb, October 23.
12. See note no. 4.
13. See note no. 9.
14. In this broadcast – incidentally very controversial in Germany – apart from Chancellor Merkel three other EPP politicians and heads of state also appeared: Luxembourg's Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker, Ireland's Bertie Ahern, and Greece's Kostas Karamanlis.
15. See note no. 11.
16. Vuljanić, N. 2013. “Author’s Interview with Nikola Vuljanić, the MEP from Croatian Labourists – Labour Party (HL),” Zagreb, November 15.
17. See note no. 9.
18. See note no. 9.
19. See note no. 11.
20. In 2012 it changed its name to the ALDE.
21. Blažeković, B. 2013. “Author’s Interview with the International Secretary of HNS – Boris Blažeković,” Zagreb, November 20.
22. See note no. 9.
23. For several years, the SDP has been the only party in the post-Yugoslavian countries to conduct elections of members of party authorities at central level, including direct elections of the president, in accordance with the principle of “One man, one vote”. However, we should point out that in the only elections of a party president to date using this system, the then SDP leader Zoran Milanović stood unopposed.
24. See note no. 3.
25. See note no. 11.
26. See note no. 9.
27. See note no. 11.
28. See note no. 16.
29. The HDZ acquired observer status at the EPP Congress in Lisbon on 16 October 2002, and in April 2004 – i.e. a few months after winning parliamentary elections and returning to power, but before Croatia attained EU candidate country status – its status changed to associate member.
30. See note no. 11.
31. Ibid.
32. It is hardly surprising that Tomislav Karamarko was so resolute in backing Tomašić’s retention of her place on the list, as she had twice played the role of HDZ electoral engine, despite only ever being placed sixth. In the first cycle she received over 64,000, and in the second one 107,000 votes, on each occasion outstripping the number 1 candidates on the HDZ list. Only Tonino Picula from SDP managed a better result – in 2013 he received 112,000, and in 2014 132,000 votes.
33. See note no. 11.
34. Admittedly, this was not only for his cooperation with Picula, but also for opposing the decision to expel former Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor from HDZ.
35. See note no. 11.