Diffusion and default: a linkage and leverage perspective on the Nagorny Karabakh conflict

ABSTRACT

This article applies the concepts of linkage and leverage to the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. While other post-Soviet conflicts feature cross-border linkages reinforcing the axes of conflict, this study reveals patterns of multi-directional, fragmented and cross-cutting linkages with a wide range of external actors. This pattern has diffused leverage potentials of external actors, accounting for the lack of decisive shifts in the direction of either conflict escalation or resolution, or regime renewal. The resulting linkage/leverage structure has proven stable but hinges on a tension between diffuse international leverage and a collective default among international actors to conflict management rather than resolution.

KEYWORDS:

• Armenia
• Azerbaijan
• Nagorny Karabakh
• democratisation
• linkage
• leverage
• Minsk group

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Laurence Broers is a Research Associate at Centre for Contemporary Central Asia and the Caucasus, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. His recent publications are Resourcing de facto jurisdictions: A theoretical perspective on cases in the South Caucasus (Caucasus Survey, 2015) http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/23761199.2015.1102450 and from “frozen conflict” to enduring rivalry: reassessing the Nagorny Karabakh conflict (Nationalities Papers, 2015) http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00905992.2015.1042852#abstract.

Notes

1. I thank Gwendolyn Sasse and an anonymous reviewer for their many useful comments on earlier drafts of this article.

2. Idan and Shaffer highlight that with the exception of Russia itself, only sea-coast states have joined or sought to join Euro-Atlantic alliances; all the landlocked states have opted for Russia-based alliances or for complementarity in their foreign policies.

3. In 2014 Azerbaijan was the second largest investor in Georgia, investing $302,000,000 in the country and accounting for 24% of FDI (News.Az 2015).

4. In 2002 Brenda Shaffer estimated an ethnically Azerbaijani population of 20 million in Iran (2002, 224); Souleimanov, Pikal, and Kraus (2013, 71) indicate the range of 12-22 million.

5. An IOM study from 2014 estimated on the basis of survey findings that on average up to 35,000 people have left Armenia annually in the period 2007–2013, indicating continuity or a small increase over migration rates in the 2000s (IOM 2014, 17). Official statistics estimate the population decrease due to emigration between census years 2001 and 2011 as 320,000, a likely under-estimation (NSSRA 2014b, 22).

6. Author’s interview with former US co-Chair John ‘Jack’ Maresca, Baku, 10 June 2014.

7. Author's interview with former US co-Chair Carey Cavanaugh, Tbilisi, 3 September 2014.

8. Drawing on organisational theory and writing about great power involvements in Central Asia, Cooley suggests “the presence of several authority figures actually empowers subordinates to shirk their individual commitments to any one patron, weakening the overall control of these objectively more powerful actors” (Cooley 2012, 9).

9. On 24 March 1992, at a meeting of the then Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) called for a Minsk conference to which “Elected and other representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh will be invited to the Conference as interested parties by the Chairman of the Conference after consultation with the States participating at the Conference” (CSCE Council 1992, 14).

10. The original set up of 11 firms was composed as follows: Socar (20%), BP (17.127%), Amoco (17.01%), Lukoil (10%), Pennzoil (9.82%), Unocal (9.52%), Statoil (8.563%), McDermott International (2.45%), Ramco (Scotland, 2.08%), Turkish State Oil Company (1.75%), Delta-Namir (Saudi, 1.68%)

11. Another reason is that there are no Armenian villages in the LOC area; Armenian property and communities can only be targeted where they are present along the de jure boundary in the Tavush/Tovuz area. Azerbaijani villages by contrast are present along both the de jure boundary and the LOC.

12. Author's conversations with USAID and Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe employees, Baku and Washington, December 2014-September 2015.

13. See the official website of the CSSN; http://www.cssn.gov.az/en/xeberler/20130520073931629.html

14. In 2014 Azerbaijan did not align itself with any of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Declarations, while in 2013 it aligned with only seven of 32 CFSP declarations it was invited to support (European Commission 2015, 8)

15. On 10 September the European Parliament adopted Resolution 2840, featuring extensive criticisms of the democracy and human rights situation in Azerbaijan. On 15 September Azerbaijan announced its withdrawal from Euronest, the Eastern Partnership's inter-parliamentary forum. A high-level EU delegation visit to discuss the terms of a new Strategic Framework Agreement was also cancelled. Following PACE Resolution 2062 criticizing Azerbaijan in June, the CoE also announced in October its withdrawal from a working group on human rights aimed at re-establishing dialogue between government and civil society.

16. The AAA, founded by the son of Azerbaijani Minister of Transport Ziya Mammedov, Anar Mammedov, reportedly spent $10 million in lobbying activities in Washington in 2011-2014, recruiting the services of PR firms such as Fabiani & Co, Patton Boggs, Podesta Group Inc., 30 Point Strategies, Renaissance Associates and Global Policy Initiatives (Contact.Az 2015).

17. Author's conversations with US State Department officials, Washington DC. December 2014.

18. The diameter of the Armenian sector of this gas pipeline was originally planned at 1400 millimetres, corresponding to the diameter in the Iranian sector, but this was reduced to 1200 millimetres after reported pressure from Russia to reduce it to 700 mm.

19. Author's interview with EU official, Yerevan, 7 April 2015.

20. Grigoryan cites various polls conducted 2012-2013 with 61%, 64%, 86% and 20% in favour of EEU membership (the latter poll conducted by the Union for Self Determination) (Grigoryan 2014, 104). In 2013 the Caucasus Barometer found that 55% “fully” or “rather” supported Armenia's membership of the EEU (Caucasus Barometer 2013). A sample of 480 young people surveyed by the Vanadzor-based NGO Peace Dialogue in July–September 2014 found that 48.3% of respondents favoured accession to the EEU and 42.9% favoured accession to the EU (Peace Dialogue 2015, 28).

21. As the authors of the Peace Dialogue report Diana Ter-Stepanyan and Edgar Khachatryan note, preferences for the EEU were motivated by economic, security and geopolitical arguments, and even among respondents favouring the EEU, 59.5% believed that Armenian foreign policy was going in the wrong direction.

22. Armenia is for example set to receive only 1.13% of the Eurasian Customs Union revenue.

23. Author's interview with Yerevan civil society activist, 8 April 2014.

24. USAID has reportedly disbursed $31,932,953 in funds to activities of the International Red Cross, Halo Trust, United Methodist Relief and other humanitarian organizations in NK between 1998 and 2010 (ANCA 2010).

25. The Legislative Council of the New South Wales Parliament in Australia passed a similar resolution in 2012.

26. This discussion of Russia's tactics has benefited considerably from discussions with Cory Welt in January 2016, to whom I give thanks.