![Sample our Area Studies journals, sign in here to start your access, latest two full volumes FREE to you for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5922/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Area-Studies.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
In September 2013, Armenia, after four years of negotiations, declared that it would join the Russian-led Eurasian Customs Union. That caused the interruption of the Association Agreement (AA) talks with the European Union (EU). In contrast with the Ukrainian case, no massive protests followed. This (non)-dynamic is interesting for two reasons: (1) large popular protests took place in Armenia over time; and (2) Brussels is committed to the empowerment of a democratic Armenian civil society. This article argues that this lack of popular reaction is related to the limited incisiveness of the EU at the grassroots level and concludes that, when intervening in the European Neighbourhood, modalities of action and resources must be tailored around the specificity of the case.
Acknowledgements
The author acknowledges Licínia Simão, Lawrence Scott Sheet, Giorgio Comai, and John Doyle for their insightful comments.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Chiara Loda is Marie Curie Early Stage Researcher “Post-Soviet Tensions” ITN Fellow. Her research is about the foreign policy of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. Chiara has spent various months living in and researching the South Caucasian region.
Notes
1. Currently, Freedom House rates Armenia as a “partly-free” country: https://freedomhouse.org/country/armenia.
2. Interview with Anahit Shirinyan, Foreign policy Analyst, Yerevan, 1 July 2015.
3. In the parliamentary election of 2012, Prosperous Armenia obtained 37 seats, ANC 7, and Heritage 5 (European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity. Armenia, http://www.europeanforum.net/country/armenia).
4. All interviews were conducted in English by the author. The following are cited in this article: interview with Mr. Lukas Gasser, Swiss Ambassador in Armenia, Yerevan, 30 June 2014; interview with Anahit Shirinyan, Foreign Policy Analyst, Yerevan, 1 July 2015; interview with female civic activist no. 1, Yerevan, 2 July 2015; interview with female civic activist no. 2, Yerevan, 2 July 2015.
5. The EaP is within the framework of the ENP, but its prerogatives are more extended than in the original ENP formulation. For more information, see: http://www.easternpartnership.org/content/eastern-partnership-glance.
6. As already mentioned, playing a role does not mean to compete for influence with Russia.
7. However, Iran and Turkey have also played a relevant role in the region. For further information, see German (Citation2012).
8. In spite of this definition, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is clearly unstable and open warfare may erupt (de Waal Citation2013). In fact, border skirmishes and commando-style attacks have increased over time (ICG Citation2013, 3).
9. However, France is part of the “Minsk group”. In addition, Brussels gives some contribution by providing support to the Minsk Group and funding various confidence-building and peace-building activities (Paul Citation2013). The “European Partnership for the Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (EPNK)”, is an EU-funded initiative that, since 2010, has made possible meeting and has facilitated dialogue between civil society members, policy-makers and media actors (Eplo Citation2015).
10. This prudent attitude does not only have repercussions on the narrow South Caucasian area, but, on a wider level; it has also conditioned the EU incisiveness in regard to trans-regional processes. Remarkably, the failure to facilitate a rapprochement between Yerevan and Ankara can be seen as a missed opportunity for the EU (Mkrtch︠ia︡n, Huseynov, and Gogolashvili Citation2009).
11. Even if the ENP was launched in 2004, the South Caucasian countries signed individual ENP action plans at the end of 2006. That happened because of Cyprus, enraged at the opening of air traffic between Baku and Northern Cyprus, opposed the admission of Azerbaijan. As a consequence, the inclusion of Armenia and Georgia also was delayed (Popescu and Wilson Citation2009, 20). This episode exemplifies both the complicated bargaining process among EU member states and the European commitment to deal with the South Caucasus as a unitary region.
12. Popescu and Wilson (Citation2011, 5) attribute this expression to an EU official.
13. Notwithstanding the potential attractiveness of the membership perspective, there is no deterministic link between that and democratisation. In fact, given the differences in norms and values between most EaP countries and the EU, the possibility of membership may not have been enough to promote genuine democratisation (Boonstra and Shapovalova Citation2010).
14. On the contrary, the Azerbaijani elite, relying on the national wealth and the EU energy dependence, are much less sensitive to incentives related to economic aid (Franke et al. Citation2010).
15. In 2013, the Azerbaijani defence budget ($3.7 billion) exceeded the whole Armenian national budget ($2.8 billion) (ICG Citation2013, 3).
16. In the Armenian narrative, it is common to refer to Nagorno-Karabakh as liberated territories. Conversely, the Azeri political discourse use the term “occupied territories”. The Azerbaijani position is also backed by the UN Security Council resolutions 822, 853, 874, and 884 (all voted in 1993) and by the 62/243 UN General Assembly resolution (adopted in 2008).
17. It must be pointed out that the society-level preferences do not necessarily match the elites’ ones. Exploring in detail, this aspect goes beyond the scope of this article even though the topic is suitable for further research.
18. The same survey also registers that only less than 30% of the Armenians trust, fully or somehow, the EU.
19. In Armenia, differently from other post-Soviet countries where the new generations are becoming more proficient in English, knowledge of Russian is common among all age groups (The Caucasus Research Resource Centers Citation2013).
20. This decision also stemmed from a debate going on in the pre-independence years. Especially in the 1980s, Armenian intellectuals such as Hambartsum Galstian and Silva Kaputikan expressed their concern about the diminishing importance of the Armenian language in education and public life (Dudwick Citation1997, 479). However, even in Soviet times, the national language was clearly predominant in public life, and children enrolled in Russian schools spoke Armenian in almost every other context (Kurkchiyan Citation2005, 217.)
21. Interview with Lukas Gasser, Swiss Ambassador in Armenia, Yerevan, 30 June 2014.
22. In the previous decade, democratisation was believed to be mainly related to modernisation (Chiodi Citation2007, 16).
23. The Caucasus Research Resource Centers (Citation2013) has surveyed the knowledge of English in Armenia. Even considering exclusively the 18–35 age groups, 45% of respondents declare to not have any knowledge of English. Further research is needed to analyse the links between linguistic competency, social stratification, and (EU-funded) civil activism.
24. Interview with Anahit Shirinyan, Foreign policy Analyst, Yerevan, 1 July 2015; interview with female civic activist, 2 July 2015, Yerevan.
25. Interview with two female young civil activists, 2 July 2015, Yerevan.