“Veni, vidi, …  vici?” EU performance and two faces of conditionality towards Ukraine

ABSTRACT

Concluding an Association Agreement (AA) has been a major incentive of EU conditionality towards Ukraine and most other Eastern Partnership countries. Contrary to what was intended and expected, Ukrainian government under the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych refused to conclude the AA and, in the course of the subsequent countrywide mass uprising, turned into a more authoritarian version of itself. To explore EU performance, in this case, the article analyses EU conditionality towards Ukraine in 2010–2014. If conditionality is conceptualised as intergovernmental bargaining, then EU policy failed because the conditions were not met by Yanukovych. However, if conditionality is conceptualised as a tool of societal mobilisation and differential empowerment of domestic actors, then EU policy succeeded because the desired outcome was achieved, albeit through an unexpected course of events. This second face of conditionality is essential to understanding EU performance and anticipating effects of EU policies in the neighbourhood.

KEYWORDS:

• European Union
• Europeanisation
• Ukraine
• conditionality
• democratisation

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors

Dr Olga Burlyuk works as Assistant Professor at the Centre for EU Studies, Department of Political Sciences, Ghent University (Belgium). Her latest publications include: Burlyuk, O. (2016). “Inescapable partners: The European Union and the Council of Europe as Rule of Law Promoters in Ukraine.” In European Engagement Under Review: Exporting Values, Rules, and Practices to the Post-Soviet Space, edited by V. Axyonova, 177–202. Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag. Van Elsuwege, P. and O. Burlyuk. 2016. “Exporting the Rule of Law to the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood: Reconciling Coherence and Differentiation.” In The European Neighbourhood Policy – Values and Principles, edited by S. Poli, 167–182. London: Routledge. Burlyuk, O. 2015. “Variation in EU External Policies as a Virtue: EU Rule of Law Promotion in the Neighbourhood.” Journal of Common Market Studies 53 (3): 509–523. Burlyuk, O. 2015. “The Introduction and Consolidation of the Rule of Law in Ukraine: Domestic Hindrances at the Level of the Demand for Law.” Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 7 (1): 1–25.

Dr Natalia Shapovalova has obtained her Ph.D. from the University of Warwick, with a dissertation on Advocacy & Interest Group Influence in EU Foreign Policy. She is currently an independent researcher based in Ukraine. Her recent publications include: Shapovalova, N. 2014. “The Role of Crimea in Ukraine-Russia Relations.” In The Maidan Uprising, Separatism and Foreign Intervention: Ukraine’s complex transition, edited by K. Bachmann and I. Lyubashenko, 227–265. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. Shapovalova, N. and R. Youngs 2014. “The Changing Nature of EU Support to Civil Society.” In Civil Society and Democracy Promotion, edited by T. Beichelt, I. Hahn, F. Schimmelfennig, and S. Worschech, 86–109. Palgrave Macmillan.

List of formal interviews

1. EU foreign policy analyst, Brussels, 13 May 2014.

2. Senior EEAS official, Brussels, 25 June 2014.

3. EU official based at EU Delegation in Ukraine, Brussels, 25 November 2014.

4. EU official, Support Group for Ukraine, Brussels, 30 January 2015.

5. Senior Ukrainian official, Department of European Integration, Ministry of Justice, Kyiv, 16 February 2015.

6. Ukrainian official, Department of the EU, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kyiv, 17 February 2015.

7. Ukrainian political analyst, Kyiv, 18 February 2015.

8. EU official, EU Delegation to Ukraine, Kyiv, 25 February 2015.

9. Ukrainian political analyst, Kyiv, 27 February 2015.

10. EU official, formerly based at the EU Delegation to Ukraine, Brussels, 25 March 2015.

11. Senior EU official, Support Group for Ukraine, formerly based at the EU Delegation to Ukraine, Brussels, 31 March 2015.

12. Ukrainian diplomat, Mission of Ukraine to the EU, Brussels, 31 March 2015.

13. EEAS official, formerly based at the EU Delegation to Ukraine, Brussels, 20 April 2015.

14. Senior EEAS official, formerly based at the EU Delegation to Ukraine, Brussels, 5 May 2015.

Notes

1 By 21–10% points in various polls (GFK Ukraine 2013 and Razumkov Centre 2013b, accordingly).

2 See, for example, Yanukovych’s address to Ukraine’s Parliament on 3 September 2013; Ukrainska Pravda (2013).

3 According to a poll conducted by the Razumkov Centre (2013b, 126), in April 2013, Ukrainians expected the AA to have a positive impact on economic performance of Ukraine (52% of respondents), democracy (52%), education, science and technology (51%), roads, infrastructure and municipal services development (50%), quality of goods (47%), effectiveness of public authorities (41%), income level (40%), decreasing corruption (38%), employment (37%) and environment (36%).

4 The EU supported the establishment of network-type institutions within the EaP, including Civil Society Forum, Business Forum and the Conference of Regional and Local Authorities that promote horizontal cooperation between non-state actors in the EaP countries and the EU. Ukrainian universities, education institutions and NGOs participated in education, research, youth and culture programmes open to the ENP countries (European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2014, 22–23). The EU also promoted people-to-people contacts through gradual visa facilitation: in 2013, the number of Schengen visas issued to Ukrainians reached 1.5 million (Lovitt 2015, 92). Among EaP countries, only Moldova scored higher than Ukraine on people-to-people contacts between the EU and the EaP countries (see Kvashuk, Solonenko, and Ursu 2014; Lovitt 2015).

5 The poll conducted on 7–8 December at the Independence Square revealed the most widespread reasons which made people come to the Maidan: brutal beating of demonstrators at the Maidan on the night of 30 November 2013 (70%), Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the AA with the EU (53.5%) and desire to change life in Ukraine (50%). The demand of signing the AA with Ukraine received the support of 71% of the protesters. To compare, only more immediate political claims feature higher: the release of arrested participants of the Maidan and cessation of repressions (82%), the resignation of the government (80%), and the resignation of Viktor Yanukovych and conduction of pre-term presidential elections (75%). See DIF & KIIS (2013).