Understanding the illiberal turn: democratic backsliding in the Czech Republic^*

* (Previous submission was entitled - A side door to backsliding in postcommunist Europe? Concentrating power and subduing democracy in the Czech Republic).

ABSTRACT

Democratic backsliding in Central Europe has so far been most acute in Hungary and Poland, states once considered frontrunners in democratisation. In this paper, we explore to what extent developments in another key frontrunner, the Czech Republic, fit initial patterns of Hungarian/Polish backsliding. Our analysis centres on the populist anti-corruption ANO movement, led by the billionaire Andrej Babiš, which became the largest Czech party in October 2017 after winning parliamentary elections. We find that while ANO has more limited electoral support than illiberal governing parties in Poland and Hungary and lacks a powerful nationalist narrative, common tactics and forms of concentrating power can be identified, albeit with crucial differences of timing and sequencing.

KEYWORDS:

• Democratization
• backsliding
• Czech Republic
• populism
• political parties
• Andrej Babis

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Lenka Buštíková, Béla Greskovits, Tim Haughton, and Solveig Richter for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors

Seán Hanley is Senior Lecturer in Comparative Central and Eastern Europe Politics at UCL. He is author of The New Right in the New Europe: Czech Transformation and Right-Wing Politics (Routledge, 2007).

Milada Anna Vachudova is Associate Professor of Political Science in the Department of Political Science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA. She is the author of Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage and Integration After Communism (OUP 2005).

ORCID

Seán Hanley http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5737-7576

Notes

* (Previous submission was entitled - A side door to backsliding in postcommunist Europe? Concentrating power and subduing democracy in the Czech Republic).

1. The case, which concerned EU subsidies claimed for Babiš’s Stork’s Nest resort, could not proceed without parliament voting to strip him of the immunity from prosecution he (re-)acquired as deputy after being elected in October 2017. Prosecutors allege that Babiš and a group of associates and family members obscured the resort’s real ownership to claim an EU grant intended only for SMEs. “Prosecution of PM Babiš to continue despite his complaint”. Prague Daily Monitor 3 May 2018 http://praguemonitor.com/2018/05/04/prosecution-pm-babi%C5%A1-continue-despite-his-complaint.

2. For example, “Přibáň: Mocenské duo Zeman–Babiš by nás odsunulo na evropskou periferii. [Přibáň: duo of Zeman and Babiš in power will push us to the periphery of Europe]” Novinky.cz, 9 July 2017, https://www.novinky.cz/domaci/442911-priban-mocenske-duo-zeman-babis-by-nas-odsunulo-na-evropskou-periferii.html.

3. Fidesz was carefully preparing constitutional and legal changes in anticipation of its 2010 victory. Kim Lane Scheppele, personal interview, 12 October 2017.

4. On Poland, interview with Jan Kubik, February 2018. This challenges earlier notions that CEE parties lacked the ability – or the incentives – to mobilise at the grassroots, and that civil society is always a bulwark against authoritarianism.

5. The Czech Republic also performed consistently well across V-DEM’s more nuanced (2017) set of democracy indices which cover deliberative, participatory, and egalitarian forms of democracy, as well as on measures of electoral and liberal democracy. Among CEE EU member states, it is usually ranked 1 or 2. However, it lags somewhat behind in the Participatory Civil Society subcomponent, where it usually ranks 4–5.

6. Although rivals during 1990s divided by conventional left-right divisions, Klaus and Zeman moved politically closer from late 1990s, because of a shared hostility to politicians in the liberal centre, overlapping views on the dangers of immigration and multiculturalism and an accommodating stance towards Putin’s Russia.

7. Babiš’s movement was from the start publicly known as ANO2011, but it was formally first established as a civic association, the Dissatisfied Citizens’ Action (Akce nespokojených občanů) in November 2011. This longer, protest-oriented name was, dropped when the movement registered as a political party on 15 May 2012 as ANO2011, with ANO as its registered abbreviation. Babiš had already registered the names Dissatisfied Citizens’ Action, ANO2011 and four other variants as trademarks on 19 October 2011. See Pergler (2014, 132–133, 156 note 125).

8. “Andrej Babiš: Budou tu dvě strany, ČSSD a ANO [Andrej Babiš; There will be two parties here – ČSSD and ANO].” Deník.cz 13 October 2014. Accessed 7 July 2017 http://www.denik.cz/z_domova/andrej-babis-budou-tu-dve-strany-cssd-a-ano-20141013.html and “Vznikli jsme proto, abychom pomohli lidem, nebudeme to měnit [We formed to help people, we’re not going to change that]” [Opening speech by Andrej Babiš to the III ANO congress] Parlamentní Listy.cz, 28 February 2015. Accessed 7 July 2017. http://www.parlamentnilisty.cz/profily/Andrej-Babis-12367/clanek/Vznikli-jsme-proto-abychom-pomohli-lidem-nebudeme-to-menit-38882.

9. For example, in remarks made to the Hungarian ambassador to the Czech Republic. Český žurnál: Matrix AB (TV film), Czech Republic, 2015, dir. Vít Klusák, http://bit.ly/2bdbRbN (accessed August 10, 2016, Remarks at 1:13:37.

10. “Babiš to před volbami zkouší, nemá informace, vadí Romům výrok o Letech [Babiš tries it out before elections, doesn’t have information, Roma annoyed by remark about Lety.” iDnes.cz 2 September 2016. Accessed 7 December 2017. http://zpravy.idnes.cz/romove-babis-koncentracni-tabor-lety-ds7-/domaci.aspx?c=A160902_115045_domaci_jj (accessed 7 July 2017).

11. “Projev Andreje Babiše na celostátním sněmu [Andrej Babiš’s speech at the national congress]”, 25 February 2017. Accessed 7 July 2017. https://www.anobudelip.cz/cs/makame/aktuality/novinky/projev-andreje-babise-na-celostatnim-snemu-33634.shtml.

12. He does not support adopting the Euro, arguing that it would not benefit the Czech economy and that the Eurozone should first be reformed so the Czech Republic would not be liable for costly bailouts of fiscally weaker members.

13. ‘Programové prohlášení vlády [Programme statement of the government], 8 January 2018. https://www.vlada.cz/assets/jednani-vlady/programove-prohlaseni/Programove-prohlaseni-vlady-CR.pdf. The only proposed political reforms were the introduction of postal voting and the abolition of second round run-offs in Senate elections.

14. ‘Referendum by zarazil Senát [Senate would block referendum]’, Novinky.cz, 25 April 2018 https://www.novinky.cz/domaci/470239-referendum-by-zarazil-senat.html.

15. There are still many unresolved questions about whether corrupt party capture in and of itself can subvert democratic representation, the rule of law and the legitimacy of democracy to such an extent that backsliding occurs as Klíma (2015) suggests; also see Hanley (2016).

16. Authors’ calculations. Dollar billionaires were listed for 20 EEA states in Forbes 2016. The Credit Suisse Global Wealth Report provides estimates of national wealth.

17. The sources of investment for this initial privatisation remain unclear (Spurný 2002; Kmenta 2017).

18. However, as trust administrators include close associates and family members, this amounted only to a cosmetic change in the ownership structure of Agrofert (Wagenknecht 2017).

19. “Babiš chystá Občanské fórum proti korupci a hledá lídra [Babiš plans Civic Forum against Corruption and seeks leader].”29 September 2011. Accessed 7 July 2017. http://www.ceskatelevize.cz/ct24/domaci/1241951-babis-chysta-obcanske-forum-proti-korupci-a-hleda-lidra.

20. Czech party law maintains a formal distinction between a political party and a political movement dating from earlier legislation. However, the two are now legally identical for all practical purposes.

21. “Czech lawmakers override veto to curb Finance Minister Babiš’s business,” Reuters, 11 January 2017. Accessed 7 December 2017. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-czech-politics-babis-idUSKBN14V1I5.

22. “Přišli i prospěcháři, uznal Babiš. Ve volbách chce získat pět hejtmanů [Careerists have come too, admits Babiš. He wants to gain five regional governors in elections],” May 7, 2016. Accessed 10 August 2016. http://bit.ly/2bpvfTf and “Babišovu hnutí se denně hlásí 200 zájemců o členství [Babiš’s movement receives 200 membership applications daily],” novinky.cz, 23 August, 2013. Accessed 10 August 2016. http://bit.ly/2b5jFeu.

23. ‘9 laws that will help end corruption’. Accessed 7 December 2017. http://www.rekonstrukcestatu.cz/en.

24. Transparency International released a statement on its website that while “media outlets” were “making the link” between the work of Krnáčová at Transparency International (TI) and her campaign, she had had not had any connection to the organisation since 2007, and TI was in no way involved in her campaign. “TI does not want to be drawn into the election campaign,” Transparency International. Accessed 7 September 2014. http://www.transparency.cz/ti-nechce-byt-vtahovana-do-volebni-kampane/.

25. “Neziskovky jsou pijavice státu, myslí si Zeman [Non-profits are leeches feeding off the state, thinks Zeman]” Echo24, 6 June 2016. Accessed 7 December 2017. https://echo24.cz/a/wFDxx/neziskovky-jsou-pijavice-statu-mysli-si-zeman.

26. “Babiš soptí: K dálnici se dneska vyjádřuje i jezevec. Jednou se z té demokracie poděláme [Babiš fumes: every last dachshund gets to express a view about a motorway. Some day this democracy is going to screw us up],” Parlamentní listy. 11 May 2013. Accessed 7 December 2017. http://www.parlamentnilisty.cz/politika/vlada/Babis-sopti-K-dalnici-se-dneska-vyjadruje-i-jezevec-Jednou-se-z-te-demokracie-podelame-271563.

27. “Havel i Kleslová jsou StB, říká Babiš novináři v nově uniklé nahrávce [Havel and Kleslová were involved with communist secret police Babiš tells journalist in new leaked recording)”. 28 June 2017. Accessed 10 July 2017 https://www.irozhlas.cz/zpravy-domov/havel-i-kleslova-jsou-stb-rika-babis-novinari-v-nove-unikle-nahravce_1706291156_kno. Babiš’s account contains elements of conspiracy theories widely circulating in 1990s.

28. “Zákon měl zatrhnout politické trafiky. Babiš ho neumí napsat. [A law should stop political patronage deals. Babiš does not know how to write it]. ” Aktualne.cz, 17 December 2014. https://zpravy.aktualne.cz/domaci/zakon-mel-zatrhnout-trafiky-politiku-babis-ho-neumi-napsat/r~ef336a3a844111e49f60002590604f2e/?redirected=1511170161.

29. “Nabídku šéfovat ministerstvu průmyslu dostal Pustějovský, favoritem pro zdravotnictví je Vojtěch’ [Pustějovský gets offer to head ministry of industry, Vojtěch favourite for healthcare]” 21 September 2017. Accessed 7 December 2017. http://www.ceskatelevize.cz/ct24/domaci/2309269-nabidku-sefovat-ministerstvu-prumyslu-dostal-pustejovsky-favoritem-pro-zdravotnictvi.

30. ‘Investigativní novináři si stěžují na účelové policejní výslechy, ukazují na Babiše [Investigative journalists complain of being targeted by police questioning – and point to Babiš] Novinky.cz, 6 April 2018 https://www.novinky.cz/domaci/468217-investigativni-novinari-si-stezuji-na-ucelove-policejni-vyslechy-ukazuji-na-babise.html.