Russian foreign policy towards the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: prudent geopolitics, incapacity or identity?

ABSTRACT

This article fundamentally re-examines Russia's foreign policy towards the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, trying to explain the sources of its behavior. In particular, it assesses its foreign policy in the light of its strategic interests, material capabilities versus incapacity and identity. A central question is why Russia does not give enough support to a settlement based upon modus vivendi. It argues that whereas Russia does not have the capacity to achieve a final solution to the conflict, it has ample resources to obtain a solution that would release the occupied regions outside Nagorno-Karabakh and leave the status of the territory unresolved for an indefinite future. The article sheds light on the factors undergirding its policy towards the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, arguing for the utility of a different perspective on its commitments. It adds new insights to the existing body of literature on Russia's policies towards Nagorno-Karabakh conflict such as incapacity and identity with implications for a better understanding of broader Russian foreign policy. Moreover, with South Ossetia and Crimea in the spotlight, Russian foreign policy towards the conflict has been viewed through geopolitics and neo-imperialism, but remains little understood.

Notes on contributor

Kavus Abushov is an assistant professor of political science in School of Public and International Affairs, ADA University, Baku, Azerbaijan. He received his PhD in political science from University of Muenster in 2010. He completed his postdoc from MIT, Center for International Studies in 2013. He pursued MA in international relations and economics from Catholic University of Eichstaett in 2003. His research interests include international relations theories and security studies, conflict and peace studies, informal institutions and state-building, Russian foreign policy.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Derzhava here implies a multi-ethnic state that is large and strong enough to defend itself, (See Tsygankov, p. 2)

2. This refers to the concept of “relevant versus relative power” defined by Abushov (2010), which claims that Russia's (relevant power) capabilities and experience in the region create a superiority that is much more relevant to the region rather than the US (relative power), who is globally more powerful than Russia.

3. Although paradigm shift in Russian foreign policy was completed during the tenure of Primakov, this process had started earlier with the departure of liberal Westernism in 1992–1993. As of late 1992 already, Eurasianism had emerged as the most influential ideological factor in Russian foreign policy-making. See Jackson (2003).

4. For demonstration effect, see James Fearon (1998); For theoretic discussion of how secession is linked to the survival of the state, see Duffy Toft (2005).

5. What is meant here under change of the status-quo, is a stage-by-stage plan that would start with the release of a few regions outside NK from occupation.

6. Although Russia claims to be a multi-ethnic and poly-confessional state and has certain laws supporting this, this claim is at odds with the reality in Russian politics and society. Whereas Russia has autonomous republics that enjoy religious autonomy and freedom, Orthodox Christianity has, in the last few years, increasingly been felt as the dominant trend in the identity of the Russia state and politics.

7. See interview by journalist Mikhail Leontyev on Armenia's political crisis in 2018, 03.05.2018 at https://www.kp.ru/daily/26826.5/3865080/

8. See for example interview of Vladimr Jhirinovskiy, “Jhirinovskiy: cherez 10 let RF sozdast soyuz s Turchiey, Iranom, Irakom i Siriyey”, 01.08.2016 available at https://life.ru/t/%D0%B7%D0%B2%D1%83%D0%BA/885235/zhirinovskii_chieriez_10_liet_rf_sozdast_soiuz_s_turtsiiei_iranom_irakom_i_siriiei

9. See for example the televised debate between Vladimr Jhirinovski and Bagdasarov, “Jhirinovski protiv Bagdasarova u Solovieva” 15.12. 2006, Rossiya 1