Hybrid geopolitics in EU-Russia relations: understanding the persistence of conflict and cooperation

ABSTRACT

The article analyses the way the rise of geopolitics has affected the conflict and cooperation dichotomy in EU-Russia relations. It contends, that the role of geopolitics in the security architecture of the European continent is characterised by continuity, as its pervasive effects have constrained the agency and autonomy of both Russia and the EU.

KEYWORDS:

• Russia
• European Union
• geopolitics
• foreign policy
• cooperation
• conflict

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes on contributors

Cristian Nitoiu is an Associate Fellow at LSE IDEAS, a Lecturer in Diplomacy and International Governance at the Institute for Diplomacy and International Governance, (Loughborough University London). He is also co-Director of the Centre for Foreign Policy and Security Studies (CFPSS).

Florin Pasatoiu is a Lecturer at the University of Craiova, Romania. He is also Director of the Centre for Foreign Policy and Security Studies (CFPSS).

Notes

1 While there are diverging views among the member states regarding Russia, during the last five years the EU has shown a significant degree of unity (among the member states) in relation to policy towards Moscow (Forsberg and Haukkala 2016). The article focuses on the approach taken up by EU's institutions, as supported by the member states. In the midst of the cacophony of views among member states regarding Russia, the scholarship points to the fact that a coherent EU approach towards Moscow can be identified (Rieker and Gjerde 2016).

2 In this article, traditional and classical geopolitics are used interchangeably. In a similar fashion, the term state is used to address the approaches to geopolitics of both countries and international actors (such as the EU).

3 The 2008 Georgian-Russia war can indeed be also be seen as a crisis that highlighted the role of geopolitics in relations between Russia and the EU, but at that time the Union was still bent on exercising ambitious actorness in the neighbourhood and around the world, and in this process ignored the structural geopolitical causes and effects of the war (Nitoiu 2011) – even though some of the new member states like Poland were sounding alarm bells (Baun and Marek 2013).

4 What is noteworthy here is the fact that Russia and the EU have recognised their distinct approaches to neighbourhood, and official documents often include the shared neighbourhood as a key geographical space where their values and interests should intersect and be made manifest (Putin 2009; 2013a; 2013b; European External Action Service 2011; Füle 2014; EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2011). Thus, the post-Soviet space is subject to three distinct region-building strategies from the EU and Russia, all of which place geography at the core: i.e., the EU's eastern neighbourhood that is inclined to pursue European integration, the post-Soviet space which forms [or should form?] the backbone of Russia's Eurasian integration aspirations, or the so-called shared neighbourhood where the EU and Russia achieve complementarity.