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ABSTRACT
Between 2010 and 2015, the Australian government revised its legal regime for foreign investment in Australian farmland. As part of a broader public debate surrounding what some considered to be the ‘selling out’ of Australian farmland to foreigners, this revision has been a contentious political process revolving around Australia’s ‘national interest’ and a recurring quest for transparency regarding the governmental screening process of foreign investments in Australian land. By examining the governmental debate surrounding the appropriate treatment of land within the country’s legal framework, this paper first reveals the endogenous role of the state in redefining what we term the ‘investability’ of land – the multidimensional elements that shape investment parameters and their assessment by stakeholders. Second, we argue that these debates show a clear reinvigoration of the national significance of land, which in turn challenges Australia’s longstanding political position that being ‘open for business’ is best for its national interests. This paper demonstrates the frictions that emerged as a neoliberal governance model – responding to foreign interests in land – became infused with elements of resource nationalism. We suggest that this conflation of neoliberalism and resource nationalism can be interpreted as a ‘neo-nationalization’ of resources.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors thank Birgit Kemmerling and the two anonymous reviewers for valuable feedback on earlier versions of this paper.
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1 Political and socioeconomic restructuring in Australia within neoliberal core principles of market orientation, competitiveness and ‘enforced individualism’ has been comprehensively documented (e.g., Gray & Lawrence, Citation2001; Pritchard, Citation2005a, Citation2005b; Lawrence, Richards, & Lyons, Citation2013; O’Keeffe, Citation2019). Having said this, the multiple, contradictory and variegated aspects of neoliberal realities should not be ignored (Childs, Citation2016; Brenner, Peck, & Theodore, Citation2010).
2 These Senate Committees are mandated to investigate, evaluate and report on suggested legislative changes (legislation committees) or specific subject matters (references committees) (PoA, Citation2018). An important aspect of the committees is their engagement with the ‘public’ in political decision-making processes. This includes the advertisement of inquiries online, invitation of submissions, holding of public hearings, and publication of reports and additional material on parliament’s website.
3 The threshold amount is indexed annually by the Treasurer. Currently, the ‘substantial interest’ is defined as more than 20%, up from 15% before the revision in 2015. There are various exceptions to these general rules that apply to ‘sensitive businesses’ (e.g., media, telecommunications, transport, and defence and military) or in the context of preferential trade agreements (e.g., with the United States, New Zealand or Chile), resulting in a highly complex system of varying thresholds that depend on investor origin and targeted industry.
4 When the bill was discussed the threshold stood at A$231 million (ELC, Citation2011, p. 14). When the first Investment Act was introduced in 1975, two different thresholds existed, which were both were significantly lower (A$1 million for rural land and A$2 million for general businesses; ELC, Citation2011, pp. 55ff.). The thresholds changed only slightly during the 1980s. They were increased to A$50 million in 1999 and A$100 in 2006. From 2009 on, the thresholds started to be indexed annually.