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ABSTRACT
This article examines the neglected category of functional actor in securitisation processes. I argue that functional actors are a useful analytical category only if such actors are functionally distinct from other actors. A close analysis of Security: A New Framework for Analysis reveals that this is not the case; the majority of the functions such actors have are covered by other actors. The exception is that they may contest securitisation; yet in securitisation studies this function has become associated not with functional actors but with audiences. I show that when the audience is conceived in line with its meaning in common usage (i.e. as the addressee of speech (acts)) only specific actors (most notably, referent objects who are promised protection via securitising moves) can object to securitisation, and only on securitisations (ostensibly) intended to save them. Given that actors other than referent objects/threateners regularly object to securitisation, I go on to locate the ability to veto/endorse securitisation on behalf of others with functional actors. The remainder of the article distils functional actors into different categories/roles. I show that scholars too are functional actors; ergo they do not need likeminded audiences to stage critical interventions.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Thierry Balzacq, Barry Buzan, Ian Paterson, Roxanna Sjöstedt and Timothy Potenz for their excellent and superbly helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. Special thanks to Gareth Perham Jonas for copyediting the piece and for his insightful feedback, as well as to Adam Quinn and Jonathan Parry for some last minute assistance. Finally, my thanks to the reviewers for their very instructive feedback and to the editors of CsOS, especially David Mutimer, for allowing me the time and space to submit a final version.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. Some scholars explicitly identify functional actors as part of their empirical research. Vuori Citation2011b focuses on the media in this capacity, others (Sjöstedt Citation2011; Vultee Citation2011) clearly mean functional actors when they write about the media, but – to my knowledge – no theoretical/conceptual work that probes this category exists.
2. Person or persons at the source of the threat. Traditionally this might have been called aggressor, however, not all threats are agent-intended. Climate change for example is agent-caused but not intended (cf. Floyd Citation2019b, 394).
3. In the UK the phrase ‘on behalf of’ encompasses both doing something for another person’s benefit or interest, as well as acting as a representative of another. In the US the former is often referred to as ‘in behalf of’ and only the latter as ‘on behalf of’ (cf. Soanes Citation2000, 87). I have decided to stick with the UK’s ‘on behalf of’ here. I use it to mean that functional actors object or endorse securitisation for the sake of other people/groups/entities (notably, referent objects and putative threateners). Moreover, while it is possible that functional actors object on behalf of others with the intention to primarily help or benefit themselves, the objection will almost certainly need to draw on the security equation in question (e.g. by stating that x is not really threatened).
4. A justification is provided for this imbalance on page 42 of SANFFA. Moreover, in their analysis of the societal sector the CS writes ‘[…] the media is an important actor that contributes significantly to the definition of situations. Who are the parties to conflicts; what are the conflicts about? With its attraction to simple stories, the media will often tell the news in terms of “us” versus “them” or, in the case of foreign news, of “Serbs” and “Muslims”. When ethnic or religious categories are established as the interpretative instruments for understanding a situation, the media has often played a role in this’ (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde Citation1998, 124). This raises the following question: is – for the CS – the media a functional or securitising actor? In my view this statement leaves it unclear. In support of the fact that the media is a functional actor here is the fact that it ‘significantly influences decisions in the field of security’ (cf. Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde Citation1998, 36); against and thus for the status of securitising actor (or – in some cases – securitising requester), stand the fact that by invoking ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dynamics the media ‘calls for security on behalf of the referent’ (ibid, 36).
5. Here in the widest sense, thus a strategy of aggression also is aimed at providing security, if by expansion and domination.
6. The CS argue: ‘Securitization is not fulfilled only by the breaking of rules (which can take many forms) nor solely by existential threats (which can lead to nothing) but by cases of existential threats that legitimize the breaking of rules. Still, we have a problem of size and significance. Many actions can take this form on a small scale […] a successful securitization thus has three components (or steps): existential threats, emergency action, and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules’. (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde Citation1998: 25–26, emphases added). Extrapolating from this we can say that securitisation is successful when countermeasures are adopted, while securitisation exists when an issue/object/entity has been framed as a security issue by a securitising actor (cf. Floyd Citation2016). For many securitisation scholars, the latter includes that the threat narrative has been ‘accepted’ by a relevant audience.
7. As I argue below threateners are one type of audience of securitising moves, as such they can object to securitisation.
8. Not literally once, as this point is restated a couple of times throughout.
9. It is not necessary that both audiences are present in all securitisations. In securitisations of natural disasters, for example, there is no threatener.
10. I return to the issue of legitimation later on.
11. In the same way as audiences can terminate, for instance, public lectures by walking-out.
12. To be clear, other issues influence securitisation. For example, regardless of whether they speak their view on securitisation an arms industry important for exports and balance of payments can become an important factor in securitisation. This raises the question as to whether functional actors need to be active in the way I propose. I think that they do, because while the arms industry can gain the status of actor, unless they vocally endorse or veto securitisation they do not realise that agency. In plain English, factors are not (functional) actors.
13. This is evident also from the categories of lead and support actors in the environmental sector (cf. above and Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde Citation1998, 78).
14. Alas, in liberal democracies the right to free speech is in danger of becoming a right only on paper. Especially where the securitisation of identity (by numerous disparate groups) is concerned, many sections of society (including public intellectuals, academics, but also public sector employees) are no longer fully able to voice objections (cf. Fukuyama Citation2018; Haidt Citation2017).
15. Note that some scholars deny the possibility of requesting desecuritization as any linkage between security and an issue recreates securitisation (Behnke Citation2006, 65). More recently a similar point has been advanced by Oren and Solomon (Citation2015) who argue that audiences have accepted securitising moves when they chant slogans/logics contained within such moves, regardless of whether they believe in them. For more detail on who can and indeed should desecuritize see (Floyd Citation2019a, 184–189).
16. Actors marked with a star are vital to a fuller understanding of securitisation processes; however, not all of these actors will necessarily feature in each and every securitisation.
17. Please note The Independent, The Financial Times, The Times and many others feature almost exclusively stories condemning Trump’s decision. I do not list them here because they are not editorials. But see for example: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-44324565.
18. Note here that the number of factors influencing securitisation in more or less free societies may well be no different (cf. FN12 above).
19. This also enables me to give yet further examples of functional actors within a limited word count.
20. Given that parliament – in matters of national security – is not the referent object of securitisation, I hold that parliament is not the audience but instead a functional actor in the same securitisation process. However, considering that parliamentarians represent the general public – who may well be the referent object of securitisation – I acknowledge that the border between the two actors can be fluid (here, parallels with the media abound). Importantly, however, and as the discussion shows, the categorisation as either audience or functional actor does not alter the fact that they can object to securitisation processes.
21. It is important here not to overstate this power. Research has shown that in times of emergency, all branches of government tend to pull together and everyone – at the point of the emergence of the threat – is already on the side of securitisation (see Evangelista Citation2008; De Londras Citation2011; Neal Citation2013; Jarvis and Legrand Citation2016). In other words, few will have to be convinced of the need for securitisation. Up for debate (especially since the 2003 Iraq war), is rather the nature of the precise security measures to be used (note that this further explains the increasingly popular view (in securitisation studies) that audiences have to consent to the nature of the emergency measures).
22. Hence also the widespread view of that the audience acts to (de-)legitimatise securitisation (cf. above). This comes out strongly in debates on humanitarian intervention, thus intervention is generally considered legitimate only when those to be rescued have consented to being rescued by means of war (cf. Pattison Citation2010, see also Parry (Citation2017) on the role of consent in other-defence).
23. This includes audiences as referent objects of securitisation, who as argued above can succeed in vetoing securitisation.
24. Of course this knowledge is not always objective (cf. Villumsen Berling Citation2011), as with (de-)legitimaters who – as argued above – bar one exception are not technically in the position to (de-)legitimise, what matters is that epistemic communities are perceived to bring scientific and hence objective knowledge to the table.
25. This also applies in cases where they are threateners.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Rita Floyd
Rita Floyd (PhD) is a Senior Lecturer in Conflict and Security at the University of Birmingham, UK. Her work on securitisation and environmental security has appeared in a number of peer-reviewed journals. Her 2019 book The Morality of Security: A theory of Just Securitization (CUP) examines when securitisation is morally permissible. Dr Floyd is currently working on a follow-up monograph. Provisionally entitled The Duty to secure: From just to mandatory securitization, her current project examines whether actors have a moral obligation to securitise, to whom and on what issues.