Somalia: unable to escape its past? Revisiting the roots of a fractured state and elusive nation

Abstract

The pretext that Somalis have constituted a ‘nation in search of a state’ has been central to many efforts aimed at reconstructing the Somali polity. Yet, by analysing Somali state-making in the formative years from the end of colonialism to the military coup d’état in 1969, this article shows that the Somali socio-political construct has been much less homogenous and united than frequently depicted. Rather, its inception was marked by institutional and identity fragmentation, which civilian governments have failed to overcome. Arguing for the need of ‘bringing the nation back in’ to approaches to state-making, this article argues that Somalia's early state-making project was hampered by the government's inability to build standardized institutions and forge a common identity.

Keywords:

• fragile states
• state formation
• nation building
• nationalism
• Somalia

Notes

1. For a more detailed and comprehensive account of this analytical framework, as well as a more copious critique of the HPOs concept, see Balthasar (forthcoming).

2. Something that Deutsch (1953) might call ‘assimilation’.

3. State-making refers to both phenomena of state-building and nation-building, and in order to refer to both processes of institutional and identity standardization I apply the term of rule standardization.

4. Henceforth, I refer to these entities as ‘British Somaliland’, ‘French Somalia', and ‘Italian Somalia', respectively.

5. In the meantime, the SYL entertained 79 branches outside the capital and was backed by 100 full-time staff and about 300,000 supporters (Samatar 1988).

6. Haud is Somali for ‘south’ (Markakis 1987, 55) and depicts an area south of British Somaliland. The Reserved Areas refer to an area between the north-western part of the Haud and Djibouti. The NUF had been created as a political platform of the SYL and the SNL, the predominant ‘national’ party in British Somaliland. Interestingly, while there is no record of protest by the SNL against the return of the Ogaden to Ethiopia, ‘there was a good deal of it after the return of the Haud’ (Markakis 1987, 56).

7. Interview with SNM veteran and former Somaliland government official; Hargeysa, 30 January 2009; Interview with former Somaliland government minister, Hargeysa, 10 February 2009; Interview with SNM veteran, Hargeysa, 19 July 2011.

8. Interview with SNM veteran, Hargeysa, 19 July 2011.

9. Interview with SNM veteran and Somaliland government senior politician, Hargeysa, 8 July 2011; Interview with SNM veteran, Hargeysa, 19 July 2011.

10. See also Interview with SNM veteran, Hargeysa, 19 July 2011; Interview with SNM veteran and senior politician, Hargeysa, 8 July 2011. Touval (1963) similarly argues that even though the SNL's protests had been expressed in national terms, its objectives were parochial, being prompted by ‘immediate and vital interests in the grazing areas  …  rather than nationalist ideals’ (107).

11. In contrast to the SYL that had been created by the British in order to strengthen the links with the UK, the SNL evolved from the people (Interview with former high-ranking official of the Somali government under Siyad Barre, Hargeysa, 11 July 2011; Interview with SNM veteran, Hargeysa, 19 July 2011). While the SNL was mainly associated with the Isaaq clan-family, the USP enjoyed most support among the Dir and Daarood clan-families.

12. Founded with Italian support on 25 March 1947, this party represented largely members of the Sab communities (Rahenweyne and Digil clans), the Bantu peoples of the inter-riverine region, and some of the local Arab community (Issa-Salwe 1994).

13. After having endorsed the continuation of French control in referendums in 1958 and 1967, French Somaliland became the Republic of Djibouti in 1977, refraining from joining the Somali union, despite historic, ethnic, and cultural linkages.

14. Even in light of the Ogaden War of 1977/1978, it was observed that ‘[s]trong pro-Mogadishu feelings among Oromo were rare’ (Henze 1985, 54) and that ‘Somalis in the Ogaden will alternately use Ethiopian or Somali identities depending on the stakes’ (Hashim 1997).

15. Samatar (1993b, 27). Interview with SNM veteran and former Somaliland government minister, Hargeysa, 10 February 2009; Interview with SNM veteran and Somaliland government senior politician, Hargeysa, 8 July 2011; Interview with SNM veteran and former Somaliland government minister, Hargyesa, 13 July 2011.

16. Interview with SNM veteran, Hargeysa, 19 July 2011.

17. It has to be noted, however, that different parties had taken dissimilar stands regarding the process of unification. While the SNL had advocated a gradual unification that allowed for the Protectorate to narrow the developmental gap with Somalia, the NUF had argued that unification should be postponed. As the public of British Somaliland vigorously endorsed the former position (Interview with SNM veteran and former minister in the government of Somaliland, Hargeysa, 10 February 2009), its leadership ‘passed a resolution calling for immediate independence and union with Somalia’ (Lewis 2002, 162). See also Interview with senior official of the Somaliland Ministry of Interior, Hargeysa, 20 April 2009.

18. Interview with law faculty member of the University of Hargeysa, Hargeysa, 2 April 2009; Interview with law faculty member of the University of Hargeysa, Hargeysa, 22 April 2009.

19. For more details on the permanent Consultative Commission for Integration, see, for example, Cotran (1963).

20. One example of this is provided by Article 8 of Law No. 1 of 17 February 1968, which ‘specifically provided that where there is a conflict between the Italian text and the English text, the latter shall prevail’ (Singh and Said 1973).

21. See also Laitin (1976) who likewise proposes that between 1960 and 1969 ‘different ministries became straps for different clans. What had started out as a putative nation was being torn apart at the seams through clan “tribalism”’ (452).

22. Interview with SNM veteran, Hargeysa, 19 July 2011.

23. Also see Ware (1965), according to whom the SYL advocated the elimination of tribal and communal friction.

24. Yet, the ‘anti-clannism law’ ‘was not generally implemented, for the new regime had no more effective control over tribal areas than had the colonial government’ (Hoben 1988, 206).

25. According to one informant, the political elite also drew on the traditional authorities, because the former were wholly ignorant of the mechanisms of their society, and, thus, in need of working through the traditional system to govern the country (Interview with SNM veteran, Hargeysa, 19 July 2011).

26. Drysdale (1964) concludes that this lack of infrastructure prohibited ‘true national integration’ (165).

27. Interview with senior official of the Somaliland Police Force, Hargeysa, 25 March 2009.

28. It should, however, be noted that colonialism led to rule plurality not only due to the introduction of new rules, but also because it amplified existing ones (see, e.g. Lewis 1982).

29. An article with a more detailed account of this argument is under preparation.