Standing on the edge of a precipice? Italy in the weeks before the referendum

As we went to press, the campaign for the constitutional referendum set for 4 December was in full swing and the bitterness of the exchanges between the opposing camps was revealing of what is at stake. If the ‘Yes’ side wins, then Italy’s legislative arrangements will be revolutionized with an end to perfect bicameralism; an end to the Senate’s authority to compel the resignation of governments by passing votes of no-confidence, and an end to its direct election. Supporters argue that alongside the changes introduced by the so-called Italicum and the attempts to give priority, in the parliamentary timetable, to bills essential for the realisation of the Government’s programme, a reformed Senate will considerably increase the quality of Italian governance by strengthening the executive and increasing the speed of national-level policy-making. Prime Minister, Matteo Renzi, obviously hopes that the changes will enable him to extend his reputation, beyond the ranks of his current supporters, as an efficient and effective policy-maker (even though the reputation is only partly deserved as Capano and Pritoni explain in their contribution to this issue). However, he has to contend with a ‘No’ camp which with equal vehemence argues that, if anything, the reforms will bring a decline in the efficiency and effectiveness of policy-making because – for example – the distribution of legislative powers between the two chambers will be complex and when uncertainties as to their relative powers arise, these will have to be sorted out by their presidents and could even lead to litigation before the Constitutional Court (Pasquino and Capussela 2016). In areas where the chambers will continue to enjoy equal powers, partisan differences in their composition may create difficulties. In areas where the Senate’s formal powers are to be limited, the expression of dissent may in certain circumstances nevertheless enable it to continue to wield considerable political power.

The outcome, according to the opinion polls, remained highly uncertain as we went to press, and so, consequently, did the Prime Minister’s future. Although he had attempted to back away from earlier assertions that he would resign if the vote went against him, given that he had invested so much in the outcome it was difficult to see how he could survive a referendum defeat. The opposition, meanwhile, was framing the contest as a vote of no confidence in the Government as a whole.

So the stakes are very high both as far as the institutional geography of the Republic is concerned and as far as the fortunes of the major political actors are concerned. And needless to say, if there were to be a change of government then the chances are that there would be significant implications for a range of domestic and foreign-policy issues (including the ones discussed by Riccardo Armillei and by Matteo Colombo and Arturo Varvelli in this issue). The conduct of foreign policy in particular might reasonably be expected to be significantly affected even if the ‘Yes’ camp wins and there is no change of government: one of the fears of the opponents of the constitutional reform proposals, especially those on the left, is that the effect of the reforms will be to reduce the power, in the political system, of veto players; and as Robert Putnam pointed out some years ago (1988) the absence of domestic veto players tends to weaken the hand of a state’s representatives when negotiating in the international arena.

Much, in terms of the likely referendum outcome, seemed to depend on the turnout and on which way the significant proportion of those undecided eventually came down. This is an issue to which the piece by Stefano Camatarri and Mariano Cavataio on the role of leaders as cognitive shortcuts is directly relevant as pollsters were suggesting that to the extent that the debate in the weeks immediately prior to the vote were dominated by discussion of the reforms themselves then things would look brighter for the ‘Yes’ camp; to the extent that they were dominated by a discussion of the Government and Matteo Renzi, then the ‘No’ camp would probably be given a boost.

In the two previous constitutional referenda – those of 2001 and 2006 – the position favoured by the centre left was endorsed by the voters in both cases – largely, one suspects, because of the superior organization of the centre left on the ground, in the localities, and therefore its greater capacity to mobilize voters on a not-very-salient issue. The difference between now and the two past instances is that the centre left is divided. That Renzi was opposed by much of the left in and beyond his own party was an especially ominous warning sign for the Prime Minister; for as Marco Morini, in his contribution reminds us, supporters of the left are disproportionately made up of urban dwellers, the better educated and intellectuals – those, in other words, most likely to act as opinion leaders.

Looking beyond Italy, the outcome is likely to have significant repercussions at European level. At the time of writing, Renzi was busy trying to mend his fences with his internal opponents by agreeing to discussions on amendments to the Italicum. But as currently formulated, the law – the continued existence of which is heavily dependent on the referendum outcome (as well as the outcome of a legal challenge currently before the Constitutional Court) – considerably favours the governing aspirations of the Eurosceptical Five-star Movement (notwithstanding the current difficulties of Virginia Raggi, the mayor of Rome). This is because it provides for run-off ballots and because, as the local elections in June confirmed, the Movement does extraordinarily well in such ballots. A no vote, on the other hand, could – thanks to the political uncertainty that would ensue – provoke some volatility in the financial markets with all that might imply for the stability of the Eurozone, not to mention Italy’s banking crisis. And last but by no means least, the referendum’s aftermath whatever the outcome might conceivably provide the impetus for the further growth of populism and anti-political sentiments, in accordance with two projected scenarios. According to the one, a victory for the ‘No’ camp would be framed as a Brexit-style popular ‘revolt against the establishment’ which would spill over to votes in other countries such as the 2017 presidential election in France and thus to the broader European project. According to the other, a victory for the ‘Yes’ camp will lead to the implementation of reforms that significantly weaken political accountability (Pasquino and Capussela 2016) with the risk of lowering public confidence in the country’s political institutions and raising levels of popular discontent.

As ever therefore one feels that we are living in interesting times when contemplating Italian politics, though in the present conjuncture the times seem not only interesting but also ones giving plenty of reasons for anxiety.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.