Unequal by origin or by necessity? Popular explanations of inequality and their legitimatory implications

Abstract

According to an implicit assumption underlying stratification theory and research, citizens in modern societies are supposed to regard inequality as caused by social factors, and therefore in need of legitimation. Based on qualitative interviews with people from both lower and upper social classes in Germany, the article questions this assumption. From the interviews, I reconstruct two divergent interpretive frames that are used to understand the causes of inequality. While one indeed highlights social origin as a prominent social structural factor and suggests critical normative orientations towards the status quo (‘inequality by origin’), at the same time explanations regarding inequality as an inevitable element of social order exist which suspend legitimatory pressures (‘inevitable inequalities'). Importantly, the two interpretive frames coexist and are used simultaneously within respondents' reasoning; to the extent that this is the case, the critique evoked by the ‘inequality by origin’ interpretation is eventually undermined.

Keywords:

• interpretive frame
• social inequality
• social stratification
• social structure
• stratification beliefs
• qualitative interviewing

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Ricca Edmondson, Sigrun Olafsdottir, Charles Turner and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier versions of this article.

Funding

This work has been supported by a PhD dissertation grant from the Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences (BIGSSS) and further research funding from the University of Bremen, Germany.

Notes

1. Early Christianity, for instance, postulated the equality of all the faithful in and through faith, which was open to everyone (cf. also Rosanvallon, 2013, pp. 27–29).

2. Here one could contend that the supposed changes in the perception of inequality's causes only affected a small educated élite and did not extend into the population as a whole. Even if this argument were true, the idea that inequality has social (as opposed to natural) causes still has to circulate into the wider population – probably steered by an élite – in order for sufficient legitimatory pressure to unfold.

3. The construction of the sample was based on the assumption that respondents from the higher and lower classes – and thus individuals relatively distanced from one another within social space – should have a higher need for legitimising and rationalising their own socio-economic position as well as that of others, as compared to members of the middle classes. Indeed, quantitative analyses based on data from the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS) in 2004 show that skilled and unskilled workers, routine non-manual employees and the unemployed are more likely to respond that they receive less than their ‘just share’ in the overall standard of living than respondents from the service class or self-employed persons. These class differences persist while controlling for socio-demographic variables (analysis not shown here).

4. At the end of each interview, respondents were asked to fill out a short standardised questionnaire collecting socio-demographic information (age, marital status, current or last occupation, occupation of father at the age of 15, etc.), as well as their political orientation (self-placement on a left–right scale) and their subjective social class location. While differences with regard to political orientation existed, these did not vary systematically with respondents' class position. Subjective social class varied more clearly with respondents' class location, albeit with some exceptions.

5. The literature usually distinguishes between individual and structural explanations of inequality. While in the first case inequality is seen to be rooted in people's individual attributes (e.g. effort, ambition), in the latter it is regarded as being caused by social structure (e.g. economic conditions) (van Oorschot & Halman, 2000; Will, 1993). Furthermore, Feagin (1975) has pointed out ‘fatalistic’ explanations which view the cause of, for instance, poverty in non-social factors beyond individual control (e.g. bad luck, fate). Yet, these distinctions are analytical abstractions that are not shared by my interviewees.

6. The interpretation of inequality as inevitable is not exclusively related to inequality in the abstract but is also applied to specific instances of privilege and disadvantage, as will become apparent later on (e.g. when respondents emphasise the importance of personality characteristics for overcoming unemployment).

7. The number in parentheses after each quote refers to the anonymised code number of the interview transcript. Speech pauses are marked by ‘ … ’, cuts from the quotes are marked ‘[ … ]’, insertions by the author are put in brackets ‘[ ]’. For the sake of readability, all quotes have been edited and respondents were given pseudonyms.

8. By contrast, those occupying privileged positions in social structure are ascribed positive attributes – such as goal-orientation, effort, ambition, determination, commitment, flexibility, discipline, or assertiveness – which are viewed as a reason for their privileged position.

9. This contradicts research which shows that personality characteristics are also influenced by people's social structural location (see Kohn, 1977, 1980).

10. The ‘inevitable inequalities' interpretation differs from fatalistic views, as they have been described by Feagin (1975) and others (Wegener & Liebig, 1993), in that it emphasises features inherent to all people (e.g., human nature) while fatalist views refer to external forces beyond individual control.

11. See also Lareau (2002) who describes the parenting style of the upper classes as a form of ‘concerted cultivation’, involving conscious and planned support for their children. The approach followed by parents from the lower classes, by contrast, is described as ‘natural growth’ because less emphasis is put on the strategic promotion of talents.

12. This interpretation is not only expressed by upwardly mobile respondents but shared among the interviewees (cf. 5.1).

13. See also Kluegel and Smith (1986) who find that some of the US citizens surveyed by them draw upon individualist as well as structuralist explanations of inequality. The authors interpret this as a compromise position that acknowledges social structural barriers but at the same time emphasises that these can be overcome through individual effort and ambition (Kluegel & Smith, 1986, pp. 87–88).

14. The fact that there are no gender differences further corroborates the interpretation that differences in respondents' attributions of inequality seem to be related to life-worldly, biographical experience (that is shaped by social structure) rather than group membership as such.