If terrorism and insurgency are the “weapons of the weak,” why do they sometimes win?

Abstract

It has been argued that terrorism and insurgency are weapons of the weak. It is thus surprising that there are clear instances where the weaker actor, adopting such tactics, has emerged victorious. This paper identifies three arguments put forth in the current literature to explain this phenomenon. First Mack’s interest asymmetry thesis, second Arreguin-Toft’s strategic interaction approach, and finally the role of external support as identified by Record. This paper however proposes that while all of these are true in certain circumstances, single factor explanations are rarely useful when considering conflict outcomes. Rather, the literature has a predisposed bias toward the stronger actor. The literature presupposes that wars should be won by the stronger actor, and that consequently the fight is lost by the power with the most material capability, not won by the weaker side. This paper argues however that the focus on material capabilities is misguided, and does not offer any true predictive accuracy. Rather it is the most adapted actor that wins wars. In this telling the “weaker actor” was never weak at all.

Keywords:

• terrorism
• insurgency
• conflict outcomes
• strategy
• interest asymmetry
• Iraq
• Vietnam
• Algeria

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Barclay Bram Shoemaker

Barclay Bram Shoemaker is reading for an MSci in International Relations and Global Issues at the University of Nottingham.