The “Principal Officials Accountability System”: its underdevelopment as a system of ministerial government

Abstract

The Principal Officials Accountability System (POAS), which was established in 2002 by the then Chief Executive, Tung Chee Hwa, marked the beginning of a Hong Kong-style system of ministerial government. As a major attempt at institutional reform in the postcolonial era, the reform has so far invited more negative than positive appraisals about its impact on public governance. Academic critiques, however, have barely touched on the problem from the perspectives of institutional design and development. Accordingly, this article analyses the institutional characteristics of the POAS as a ministerial system, and how these characteristics have shaped the working relationships between politicians and bureaucrats. The underlying argument is that, after one and a half decades, the POAS remains underdeveloped. This state of underdevelopment is the outcome of institutional change through incremental reforms leading to disjointedness and incoherence. There are worrying signs that under an increasingly authoritarian system, the core values of the civil service are gradually being eroded.

Keywords:

• Hong Kong
• governance
• ministerial system
• civil service
• public accountability
• core values
• political neutrality

Notes

1. For example, the central authorities possess the power to appoint the principal officials that are nominated by the Chief Executive (Article 48, Section 5), thus limiting the autonomy of the latter to decide on key personnel. The post of the Chief Secretary for Administration (named “Administrative Secretary” in the Basic Law), which originated from the colonial political structure as the head of the civil service (and the head of the Government Secretariat), is explicitly retained in the Basic Law and thus cannot be removed. The formation of a real cabinet is also restricted by the fact that it is not part of the political structure in the Basic Law, which has taken the colonial system as reference to retain the Executive Council and designate the Chief Executive-in-Council as the highest decision-making body.

2. This prohibition is prescribed in the Chief Executive Election Ordinance. It is widely understood to reflect the intent of the central government, which is not willing to allow the existence of a ruling party other than the Chinese Communist Party.