Change Agents for the SOF Enterprise: Design Considerations for SOF Leadership Confronting Complex Environments

Abstract

The military design movement in the past generation has generated much discussion on why, how, and when to apply design thinking in military organizations. Further, there is significant debate on how design and traditional linear planning ought to integrate and compliment within a military enterprise confronting a complex, adaptive environment. Although there are multiple design schools, programs, as well as methodologies available across the U.S. Department of Defense and internationally in other militaries, the lack of research and materials for military senior leaders is of paramount concern. For Special Operations leadership in particular, design requires different consideration when set in the context of SOF unique missions as well as the composition of SOF forces in larger Coalition and Joint activities. This article provides some of the leading design theory tailored specifically for senior military leaders to provide deeper appreciation of how to foster design activities, innovation, and operational planning integration within complex Special Operations contexts.

Keywords:

• military design
• complexity theory
• military sociology
• postmodernism
• operational design
• innovation
• leadership
• creativity

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author would like to thank the following military professionals for reviewing drafts of this article and providing editorial input: Major Frank “Chuck” Rundus (USMC, USSOCOM), Ms. Laura Stenger (Joint Special Operations University), and Dr. Deborah Abbott (Joint Special Operations University).

Notes

^1. Columbus famously died not realizing he had discovered a new continent, despite making the trip multiple times. This is a useful example on how the social construction of reality has tremendous impact upon individuals making sense of uncertainty, particularly when their paradigm’s logic does not correlate with reality.

^2. At the Joint Special Operations University, design faculty enables this cycle by forcing design teams to “wipe the boards” periodically through exercises as well as design inquiries with SOCOM organizations. This process challenges the design team to re-frame, jettison unhelpful concepts, and gain fresh perspective.

^3. The author bases this upon numerous senior leader engagements on design, including discussions with senior military from the Canadian Army, Royal Netherlands Land Warfare Centre, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, and U.S. Special Operations organizations.

^4. Planning guidance ought to use detailed planning language; however, this does not force the design deliverable itself to be formed with planning language. It is up to that SOF leader to articulate planning guidance using planning language after appreciating the design deliverable constructed with what necessary or novel concepts and language that design team required.

^5. The semiotic square is just one of many design heuristic aids available for designers to apply. Design teams should attempt to build “tool boxes” of many different cognitive tools and heuristic aids and experiment frequently with them. No two design inquires should ever follow the same methodologies, sequences, or generate the same deliverables in the same way that repetitive detailed planning processes attempt to be consistent.

^6. This author participated in design education with the Canadian Forces College in 2015–2016 where the semiotic square was implemented. The author is also the Course Director for the USSOCOM Joint Special Operations University for design programs where various classes of students as well as SOCOM design teams conducting design inquiries utilized the semiotic square from 2015 to 2016.