Civic ethics as a normative framework for responsible research and innovation

ABSTRACT

Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) is a term used in Europe to advance in the consideration of societal and ethical dimensions of research and innovation. RRI involves two main challenges: its rationale its practical development. The legitimacy of RRI is based on its ethical foundation. Different ethical traditions, such as procedural ethics, have been identified as underpinning the RRI conceptualizations so far. The objective of this article is to examine the evolution of discursive ethics proposed by J. Habermas and K.O. Apel, and civic ethics as a normative framework for RRI, and to explore their development and feasibility and how they are affected by the tensions that such a paradigmatic change might imply.

KEYWORDS:

• Responsible innovation
• civic ethics
• discourse ethics
• ethical foundation

Introduction

Dilemmas about controlling the outputs of scientific knowledge and innovation were traced back by von Schomberg (2013) and Rip (2014) on Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI). Concern about establishing some ethical limits to scientific experimentation has continued to grow. In the 1970s, K. O. Apel (1973, vol 2:361) made the statement that: ‘the result of science is a challenge for the humankind’ and, as a consequence, moral developments alongside technological developments were essential for the future of society. Also, during the same period, Jonas (1979) declared that the paradise promised by technology had become a threat.

Both warnings were based on recognitions of the growing power of science and technology and that this power implied the risk of destruction for the whole of humanity. Four decades later, these warnings remain valid and even more urgent in the face, especially, of grand challenges (Blok 2014) such as climate change, and innovations such as genetic manipulation, the neurosciences and artificial intelligence, among others. Since the outcomes of science and innovation could have enormous and unprecedented impacts, there is a practical need and urgency for the construction of a post-conventional moral conscience and an institutional system based on universal ethical principles to guide those processes (Apel 1973; Habermas 1983). More recently, in the area of RRI, some scholars have contributed both theoretically and conceptually, to the notion of ethical considerations as part of the research and innovation process and less emphasis in its outcomes (Cuppen, van de Grift, and Pesch 2019).

Attempts to introduce social and ethical considerations into the governance of science and innovation have been evolving since the second half of the twentieth century (Landeweerd et al. 2015; Zwart, Landeweerd, and van Rooij 2014). The term RRI is part of the attempt, particularly in Europe, to integrate these considerations. Several different narratives have emerged around the term (and responsible innovation), constituting a nuanced set of approaches to what, how and by whom science and innovation processes might be guided. Different ontological and axiological assumptions have been identified regarding the inclusion or not under the science and innovation umbrella of the type of innovation (mainly technological innovation) referred to, and the role of non-traditional actors in the governance of science and innovation (Timmermans and Blok 2018). Thus, the conceptual proposals around RRI deal with its practical implications in different ways in order to address three major challenges related to our technological civilization: a risk of potentially catastrophic dimensions; the persistent problem of inequality; and the meaning and value of nature, especially human nature (Jasanoff 2016).

The most immediate issue is how to steer scientific and technological developments (or other types of innovation) towards improving life on earth. The fundamental question is: what should be the key ethical principles orienting science and technology management and assessment? We share Landeweerd and colleagues’ (2015, 19) premise that: ‘For a just approach to governance and technology, we need to define what we owe to each other, and on what basis’. Our article also stresses the importance of the normative foundation for RRI. Legitimation is crucial in normative ethics, which requires us to justify why we propose certain norms, values and actions. As Brand and Blok (2019, 4) point out that some RRI approaches focus on the question of whether and how it is possible to direct technology and innovation towards socially desirable ends, understood as something that is given or achieved through de facto dialogue among the primary stakeholders. Questioning the reasons why some and not other ends are considered or giving voice to certain should not be the strategy in ethics arguments, because otherwise: ‘the dominance of strategic considerations could undermine taking social and ethical aspects seriously’ (Brand and Blok 2019, 17).

The necessity for a solid philosophical foundation for RRI has been emphasized by several authors from different philosophical traditions (Blok 2014, 2018; Pellé 2016; Timmermans and Blok 2018). Such a foundation is essential for RRI legitimacy and social acceptance. Pellé and Reber (2015; Pellé 2016) acknowledged that the discussion on the normative foundation has implications for the governance of RRI. They identified three main responsibility perspectives aligned to the mainstream traditions of moral philosophy – deontology, utilitarianism and Aristotelism (virtues) – and proposed an RRI approach based on virtue ethics. Although we agree on the need for a normative foundation, we agree with Blok (2019) that virtue ethics is a less appropriate to innovation ethics. Also, Timmermans and Blok (2018, 27) provide a rigorous critical hermeneutic analysis of the ontological and axiological assumptions of the four most relevant RRI definitions and conclude that: ‘In addition, the assumed feasibility and the legitimacy of the accounts currently still suffer from a lack underpinning. … It is, therefore, recommended that the assumptions and claims of RI are substantiated further via reasoned argument and empirical evidence’.

In the present paper, we explore the potential of discursive ethics (Habermas 1981; Apel 1973, 1988) as a foundation for RRI and, more specifically, the civic ethics developed by Adela Cortina (1985, 1986, 1990) as a source of normative legitimation. Civic ethics overcomes some of the limitations of the virtue approach (paternalism, a metaphysical conception of ‘good’ and relativism), the utilitarian approach (individualism, materialism/ positivism and output calculation) and the discursive approach (proceduralism and idealism), while retaining a cognitive and universalistic perspective, the idea of strong justice, autonomy and consideration of the emotional dimension of human beings.

Our objective is to contribute to the debate on how RRI can be conceptualized by: 1) exploring how a civic ethics normative foundation, derived from the discourse ethics of Habermas and Apel and proposed by Adela Cortina, could nourish the narrative around the governance of RRI; and 2) reflecting on the implied challenges and tensions regarding the legitimacy and feasibility of the concept. To do this, in what follows we a) discuss how the notion of RRI has evolved; b) explore the dialogical conception of responsibility; and c) investigate the contribution of civic ethics as a normative framework for RRI. We provide a review of the work on discursive ethics and their implications for the RRI framework.

Evolution of the term RRI

Landeweerd et al. (2015) identify three styles to address deficiencies in the governance of science and innovation that appeared gradually in response to specific demands over the last 70 years up to the present. First, a technocratic style focused on risk assessment that would translate the knowledge of scientists and technologist into what should be acceptable or not for normative and regulation. Initial efforts to constrain certain scientific practices were inscribed in hard legislation and international regulation (soft law).

This style of governance led to the drafting of principles, especially in the field of medicine, such as the Nuremberg Code in 1947. Based on the assumptions in the technocratic approach, scientific knowledge is considered neutral, rational and well informed (Landeweerd et al. 2015); parliamentary science advisory offices could respond to this type of governance style. Its deficiencies (Landeweerd et al. 2015) do not imply that they do not play an essential role in the assessment and development of legislation and regulation. Some examples of their current validity are the drafting of the Helsinki Declaration in 2012, the 1997 Oviedo Convention – ‘the only international legally binding instrument on the protection of human rights in the biomedical field’ (Council of Europe 2019), and the recent announcement of the creation of a parliamentary scientific advisory office as a result of a successful grassroots scientist movement ‘Ciencia en el Parlamento’ in Spain (Catanzaro 2018). These strategies have been moderately successful, but have some intrinsic limitations (slow process versus speed of advances; standardization of regulation versus dynamism and particularism of scientific practice) which have led to the development of theoretical proposals that go beyond the ex-post corrective control approach.

Second, the decision makers in the applied ethics governance style include ‘ethical experts from the fields of applied ethics and bioethics as well as socially engaged scientists’ (Landeweerd et al. 2015, 7). Examples of this style are the ELSI – Ethical, Legal and Social Implications and ELSA – Ethical, Legal and Social Aspects approaches which gained relevance in the 1990s in the US and Europe respectively, and whose ‘golden years’ were between 2002 and 2012 (Zwart, Landeweerd, and van Rooij 2014).

The limitations of the first and second styles (normative load and lack of neutrality of technical knowledge and ethical expertise for prescriptive recommendations) led to the emergence of a third governance type, the public participation style (Landeweerd et al. 2015). The public participation style demands further integration of ethical concerns and social dimensions and reinforced legitimacy through democratic exercises in the governance of science and technology, sometimes described post-ELSI approaches (Balmer et al. 2015). Among all these approaches, the one that attracted the most attention in Europe was RRI or responsible innovation depending on the author. Among the several reasons why this term gained such popularity in Europe was its adoption by the European Commission, and its integration as a cross-cutting issue in the EC Horizon 2020 research programme and the various related funded projects (Rip 2016; Burget, Bardone, and Pedaste 2017; Timmermans and Blok 2018).

The diffusion of the term RRI term during the last 10 years in Europe, led to a ‘rapid expansion of the RRI discourse’, which resulted in a ‘proliferation of RRI approaches and projects’ that ‘made it harder to maintain an overview of the discourse’ (Timmermans 2017, 1). It was during 2011–2013 that the more influential definitions of RRI were formulated. One of the earliest came from von Schomberg (2011, 9) and refers to both the process and product dimensions of RRI:

Responsible Research and Innovation is a transparent, interactive process by which societal actors and innovators become mutually responsive to each other with a view on the (ethical) acceptability, sustainability and societal desirability of the innovation process and its marketable products (in order to allow a proper embedding of scientific and technological advances in our society).

The European Commission (2012, 1) proposed an alternative definition: ‘RRI means that societal actors work together during the whole research and innovation process in order to better align both the process and its outcomes, with the values, needs and expectations of European society’, while Stilgoe, Owen, and Macnaghten (2013, 1570), defined it as: ‘Responsible innovation means taking care of the future through collective stewardship of science and innovation in the present’. In the same year, van den Hoven et al. (2013, 3) described RRI as referring:

to the comprehensive approach of proceeding in research and innovation in ways that allow all stakeholders that are involved in the processes of research and innovation at an early stage (A) to obtain relevant knowledge on the consequences of the outcomes of their actions and on the range of options open to them and (B) to effectively evaluate both outcomes and options in terms of societal needs and moral values and (C) to use these considerations (under A and B) as functional requirements for design and development of new research, products and services.

The need to identify differences and similarities among definitions of RRI and their ethical foundations led a stream of work and analyses by various authors. The ethical foundations supporting the different RRI narratives are based on one or a combination of the following philosophical traditions: virtue or teleological ethics, deontologist, utilitarianism or consequentialism, procedural or discourse ethics (Pellé 2016; Burget, Bardone, and Pedaste 2017; Timmermans and Blok 2018). The fact that the dominant narratives do not have common ontological and axiological assumptions (Timmermans and Blok 2018) can be seen as positive and leaves space for other proposals and critical reflection. In Rip's (2016, 3) words, ‘the present interest in the open-ended idea of RRI can be understood as RRI being an occasion for a number of threads of development and of challenges and debates coming together under what is essentially a blanket term’.

Some of the features common to the definitions of RRI proposed so far refer to a combination between the different levels of actor (or stakeholder) involvement in the decision-making processes and consideration of the social and ethical dimensions of the outcomes of research and innovation, including ability to anticipate future impacts (anticipation as an original feature of RRI is discussed in Zwart, Landeweerd, and van Rooij 2014). It is relevant, also, to highlight the different attention given to the procedural and product dimensions of RRI, where the formers has received more analytical attention (Cuppen, van de Grift, and Pesch 2019). The uncertainty around the outcomes from certain research fields has been proposed as a possible reason for this pattern in the RRI literature (Cuppen, van de Grift, and Pesch 2019). The importance given to uncertainty of research outcomes is acknowledged by Thorstensen and Forsberg (2016, 2): ‘How to tackle the inherent uncertainties generated by new technologies is therefore a main motivation for developing RRI approaches, but also a main challenge for RRI approaches in practice’. The active participation of stakeholders in the assessment of technology, projects and products is seen by these authors as a possible way to improve the management of these uncertainties.

The relevance of public participation and the new roles for RRI actors have been considered pivotal to viewing RRI as a social innovation Rip (2014). The most influential definitions of RRI, some of which were included above, include references to public engagement, considering new stakeholders either as input providers or as essential actors in co-construction exercises (Timmermans and Blok 2018).

In the case of integration of the social and ethical dimensions of science and innovation, we believe that there are two elements that should be differentiated. One is why the inclusion of those dimensions should be central to science and innovation policies – which suggests the need to examine the concept’s ethical foundations. We address the question of their inclusion in Section 4. The second is would it could be done. Various proposals have been made about the operationalization of RRI and the challenges facing efforts by the scientific and innovation communities to integrate public participation in the social and ethical dimensions. The European Commission (2012) proposed six key areas of RRI: public engagement, gender equality, science education, open access, ethics and governance. Other have defined dimensions to characterize a responsible system of innovation: anticipation, reflexivity, inclusion, responsiveness (Stilgoe, Owen, and Macnaghten 2013) and openness (Owen and Pansera 2019). Other dimensions of RRI, such as sustainability and care, have been explored (Burget, Bardone, and Pedaste 2017), but in our view, they should be part of the universal moral principles in a post-conventional moral order.

As a result of their analysis of these different definitions and conceptual dimensions of RRI, Burget, Bardone, and Pedaste (2017, 14) conclude that ‘RRI is fundamentally a cluster of ideas for promoting an idea of science governance that is essentially about responsible processes as opposed to processes that are not supervised responsibly’. Describing these ideas as ‘responsible processes’, requires further exploration of how responsibility should be understood in this normative framework. We discuss this in Section 3 where we also propose how civic ethics could contribute to the normative foundations of RRI.

From a utilitarian to a dialogic conception of responsibility

The notion of responsibility is relatively new to philosophy, but has provoked huge controversy and been subject to multiple interpretations (Corlett 2016). In the RRI field, an analysis of the concept of responsibility can be found in Pellé and Reber (2015). The authors state that merely trying to describe responsibility is not enough and does not suggest how it should be practised: ‘moral philosophy provides at least ten or eleven different meanings of the concept, offering a variety of pathways for practical implementation’ (Pellé and Reber 2015, 111). In this section, we try to overcome this limitation by focusing on the philosophical interpretation of the concept of responsibility. This attention to normative foundations is not just an academic exercise, it has an essential impact on RRI governance (Pellé 2016).

Focusing on responsibility in science and technology, Max Weber (1919) delivered a famous speech at Munich University, presenting the concept of the ‘ethics of responsibility’ (Verantwortungsethik) in the context of politic and science (Wissenschaft als beruf). The main idea was that acting ethically involves not only acting according to principles or convictions (Gesinnungsethics) but also taking account of the probable consequences of our actions. The second idea proposed by Weber was that the world is not perfect, not foreseeable and not manageable and that, on many occasions, negative consequences result from good intentions.

Some 60 years later, the idea of responsibility gained centrality with the publication of Hans Jonas’s (1979) book, Das Prinzip Verantwortung (The Responsibility Principle). The book starts from the thesis that ‘the promise of the modern technic has been transformed into a threat’ (Jonas 1979, 1). Due to technology advances, humans have the capacity to change the world and human nature, quite radically and irreversibly which implies huge risk for future generations. Therefore, the Kantian moral imperative: ‘Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end’ (Kant 1785, BA67) should be about the moral imperative of responsibility. The responsibility imperative affirms that: ‘Act in that way that the effects of your actions can be compatibles with the permanence of an authentic human life on Earth’ (Jonas 1979, 36). This concept of responsibility is aimed at ensuring the survival of the species and preservation of human freedom in a technological civilization where the borders between the artificial and the natural have disappeared. Jonas’s responsibility principle starts from an awareness of our vulnerability and the real risk of human extinction. This idea of responsibility for the future should be understood as: ‘independent of whatever idea of law and idea of reciprocity’ (Jonas 1979, 84). The main moral duty, then, is the duty to preserve the existence of humanity, which is a moral imperative.

A few years later, Apel, another German philosopher, also focused on this idea of responsibility for the future, but from a different philosophical perspective. Apel’s (1988) book Diskurs und Verantwortung (Discourse and Responsibility) started from the same conviction of an urgent need for an ethical theory that takes account of the risk that humans could be extinguished as the result of human actions, and that the future of our species is at stake. In Apeĺs words:

the results of the science represent a moral challenge for the humankind … . For the first time in the history of human species has the humankind the task to develop the solidarity responsibility as an indicator for the consequences their actions in a planetary perspective. … this obligation to solidarity responsibility implies an ethics of responsibility. (Apel 1973, 361).

The idea that we are in a situation of paradox which requires a universalistic ethics (to deal with global technological challenges), in parallel with the idea of a rational foundation for this ethics, became even more complex and triggered intellectual efforts to define a universalistic ethics (Apel 1973, 359). As Cortina (1985) points out, Apel stresses the idea that the final objective of responsibility is not assuring human survival, but an authentic human survival, which requires a robust philosophical foundation for the principles of responsibility ethics. In going further than Jonas (1979), Apel considered that it was not sufficient to guarantee the mere material existence of human beings, but that we should consider the idea of human progress and prosperity. To this end, Apel proposed that the conventional idea of responsibility should be overcome with a post-conventional idea of the ethics of responsibility (Kolhberg 1981).

This idea of post-conventional dialogic responsibility supposes overcoming the previously dominant idea of responsibility defended by utilitarianism (Bentham 1780; Mill 1879). The moral philosophy of utilitarianism maintains that a rule is fair if it brings great happiness to the greatest number of people. Based on the idea of the consequences of actions, utilitarianism puts responsibility at the centre of moral philosophy. Of course, utilitarian philosophy is much more complex and has been interpreted in diverse ways (action utilitarianism vs rule utilitarianism), but this moral philosophical tradition conceives responsibility as based on three, somewhat questionable, assumptions: it is possible to foresee, estimate and evaluate the possible consequences of our actions (forward-looking responsibility); concrete actions can be evaluated only ex-post (backward-looking responsibility); utilitarianism criteria are individual, subjective and unquestionable.

These weaknesses of the utilitarian philosophy limit its application to RRI. First, the idea that we can anticipate the consequences of an action or a rule (ex-ante evaluation) does not take account of human epistemic limitations related to foreseeing the future, and does not take account of the unpredictability of complex and dynamic contexts. This forward-looking understanding of responsibility can generate an illusion of control with catastrophic consequences ‘the false sense of security provided by the consequentialist calculation of future impacts’ (Blok 2019, 5). Second, the idea of responsibility related only to ex post evaluation –we can evaluate the concrete consequences of an action– assumes that evaluation adheres to predefined rules and criteria, which assumes that consequences can be clearly identified, measured and evaluated. The idea of backward-looking or negative responsibility is: ‘insufficient when considering innovation (and research) because: (1) it fails to include a normative involvement; (2) it may dilute responsibility; (3) it is understood to be without an agent; and (4) it is restricted to the notion of external accountability’ (Pellé and Reber 2015, 111). Third, the idea that justice is based on personal evaluation of happiness or positive consequences makes interpersonal comparison impossible and opens the way to relativism. The utilitarianism approach assumes that each individual has his or her own private interests and idea of happiness – ideas and aspirations which can be maximized by personal decisions and strategic negotiation. This individualistic perspective ignores the relevance of the social process in the formation of preferences.

To overcome the limitations of this utilitarianism perspective of responsibility, Blok (2017) drawing on Levinas’s philosophy, makes an interesting proposal. Emmanuel Levinas conceived communication as conversation and understood the encounter with the other was the foundation of ethics: ‘The subject of discourse as conversation acknowledges the experience of the other as the very basis of his subjectivity’ (Blok 2014, 181). This experience of the other implies sensitivity towards the other, interactive dialogue, responsiveness to the other’s voice and submission of the self to the other.

Blok’s interpretation of Levinasian ethics has four main characteristics: a) ethics, basically, is responsive to the demands of the other; b) the ethical orientation is found in the confrontation with the singularity of the other; c) the other is accessible through our physical proximity to the other; and d) ‘The face-to-face encounter with the other enables us to take unconditional responsibility for the other’ (Blok 2017, 2). This idea of communication as conversation and the a priori assumption of a concrete physical experience (Leibapriori) (Lebenswelt) as opposed to the abstract rationality assumed in the deontology and utilitarianism views, opens a new perspective on human suffering and helps us to understand the concrete reality and biological conditions that influence peoplés decision making (Conill 2006, 2019). Although these ideas have real implications for the concept of responsibility, we consider discursive ethics as providing the main criteria for responsibility and as more appropriate for a normative foundation of RRI, while integrating Levinasian theory ideas and concepts.

The discursive ethics presented by Karl Otto Apel (1973), Jürgen Habermas (1981) and Adela Cortina (1985, 1986, 1990) states that the process involved in the moral foundation of norms should be participatory discourse among all affected by these norms. This regulative idea or transcendental process for foundation of moral norms has two implications: inclusivity of every person affected and rational dialogue. ‘One moral duty is only justified if it is a consensus after a rational dialogue between all affected’ (Cortina 1985, 166). From the a priori of the community of communication as a regulating principle, two conditions for the real community of communication can be observed: a) all people should be integrated into the dialogue (or no one can be excluded from dialogues which have an effect on the individual); b) we should work to create the conditions for a real rational dialogue (we need to work to achieve and the ideal communication community).

For the discursive ethics approach, responsibility is an essential concept in three senses: as responsibility for the actual conditions of the participants in the discourse (responsibility for the specific context; for the real situation of the people); responsibility for the arguments presented in the discourse (theoretical responsibility; responsibility for your ideas and opinions); and responsibility for the practical consequences of the eventual consensus (consequence responsibility).

Following the philosophical approach of discursive ethics (Apel 1973; Habermas 1981; Cortina 1985, 1986, 1990), the dialogic understanding of responsibility overcomes the limitations of a unidimensional utilitarian approach to responsibility, which considers only consequences (Mill 1879; Bentham 1780) and the virtue ethics approach, which considers only how agents behave (Aristotle 1986; MacIntyre 1981).

The dialogical responsibility we propose as a critical component of RRI, has some essential traits that make it especially suited to the challenges of a sociotechnical civilization and overcomes some of the dominant capitalist ideas in the science-society relationship, that is, paternalism, self-interest and individualism.

• No paternalism. The dialogue between those affected is a legitimate process for deciding what to do in concrete situations. This process dismisses the idea of experts in a superior epistemological situation who make unilateral calculus based on causal logic without considering the opinions of those affected by the decision.

• No self-interest. Dialogical responsibility is aimed at achieving a consensus among those affected by norms and decisions. This approach transcends agreements based on the interests of those with the power to participate in negotiations, which, also, supposes that universal principles, values and common goals are prioritized over particular and private interests. Brand and Blok (2019, 13) acknowledge that: ‘Negotiation is about finding a balance or compromise among different private interests. Deliberation (at least in the classic sense) is meant to go beyond private interests, towards arriving at a shared understanding about public issues, and making argumentatively agreed-on decisions about the common good’.

No individualism. From a philosophical perspective, this dialogic responsibility assumes intersubjectivity and mutual acknowledgement as a basis for decision making and sees rationality as the capacity to deal not just with objects but also with people and to discuss not just means but also ends. Apel (1973, 400) insists in line with Levinas that awareness of being part of a human community, not an isolated subject, is an empirical fact and a logical precondition for reflection on ethics reflection: ‘In the community of argumentation is the reciprocal recognition of all participants as equal discussion partner a presupposition’ (Apel 1973, 400).

Civic ethics as a normative framework for RRI

From discursive ethics to civic ethics

As discussed above, discursive ethics affirms that the legitimacy of moral norms can be based only on rational dialogue in conditions of symmetry among all affected by this norm. Habermas (1983) stated that when we say to someone ‘you must do something’, there must be a good reason for doing so (Habermas 1983), and maintained that the only way to assess reasons is through dialogue between those affected. The factum of reason demands that whoever joins the discourse has assumed de facto that there is the possibility of reaching rational consensus on norm legitimacy.

This programme of discourse ethics has two levels (Zwei-Stufen-Ethik) that are highly relevant for determining responsibility in science and technology (Apel 1988). The first level (level A in Apel’s terminology) is the procedural principle of ultimate foundation that assumes that it is possible to reach a consensus among all potential participants in the discourse (including future generations) following a rational dialogue in conditions of symmetry. The transcendental pragmatic perspective of consensus building is a regulatory idea that guides the political institutionalization of practical discourses. The second level (level B in Apel’s terminology) is the ethics of discourse understood as the ethics of responsibility in a scientific context, where the consciousness of moral duty must consider the utilitarian principles of the consequences of calculation. At the level of practical discourse, we need to consider not only the interests of all concerned but also how to improve knowledge of the expected consequences of grounded norms in concrete contexts with real limitations. The moral norms should apply in real situations, based on two main principles: survival of the speaking subject and those who depend on him or her and development of the material and cultural conditions to allow communicative action in the future. Dialogue cannot be understood only as a procedure for the exchange of subjective interests; it must be conceived as the only possible process for ascertaining correctness of norms.

This discursive approach has attracted two main criticisms related to its idealistic perspective and its unrealizability in specific contexts. Steinmann and Löhr (1994), based on Lorenzen’s (1987) philosophical approach, suggested that the starting point of the dialogue is the experience of conflict and a universal aspiration for peace. The constructivism practised by the Erlangen Schule, the transcendental foundation, is based on the idea of communication as idealistic and unnecessary. Reflections on ethics should start from praxis and should develop for praxis (‘aus der Praxis für die Praxis’). The second relevant criticism refers to the unrealizability of discursive ethics in concrete contexts. It is claimed that it is impossible for all affected persons to participate in a rational dialogue in symmetric conditions (Steinmann and Löhr 1994). These critics do not have a proper understanding of either the difference or the complementarity between ideal speech situation and the real communication community, or the concept of a ‘regulative idea’ or the transcendental normative foundation.

Blok (2014, 178) critiqued Habermaśs discursive ethics theory and his criticisms relevant to the RRI field:

Habermas’ theory of practical discourse also shows a tendency to harmony and alignment (consensus), conceptualizes the differences among stakeholders as a difference within the same, therefore not able to deal with fundamentally different interests and value frames that are at stake in RI processes in order to deal with the grand challenges of our time. (Blok 2014, 178).

In our view, Blok´s interpretation of Habermas’s dialogue as discursive rhetoric, aimed at reducing the differences among participants, can be reviewed. The discursive approach should not be understood as a disagreement and a fight to convince the others, but as the means of achieving a consensus about the correctness of a norm for action based on rational arguments. It should be understood as a regulative idea, for dealing with the foundation of ethical norms and only, indirectly, as providing an orientation for concrete dialogue.

Another critique of Apel’s and Habermas’s discursive ethics is that this perspective is procedural, is ‘too abstract’ and assumes a logic focused reason. It does not take account of the emotional dimension or the influence of the historical context. The programme of civic ethics proposed by Adela Cortina tries to overcome these critiques and incorporate contributions from the hermeneutic tradition (Conill 2006; Irrgang 2007; MacIntyre 1981). Cortina constructs a proposal which takes account of the deontological moment of the normative foundation while, at the same time, incorporating a sense of the ends of human activity, the complexity of the real world and responsibility for the future (Cortina 1997, 2000, 2010, 2014). One of the main limitations of discourse ethics, according to Cortina, is the ignorance of human emotions in moral life. She acknowledges (Cortina 2014, 35) that: ‘Discourse ethics, due to its eagerness to reach the level of intersubjectivity, places in parentheses the emotions, values and virtues that are, however, essential for moral life’. The content of this civic ethics is coherent with a pluralist society with different conceptions of human nature and no predefined telos of humankind, but which, at the same, includes pretensions to universalistic justice. The essential values of civic ethics are: freedom, equality, solidarity, respect and dialogue. These are the nuclear values of a pluralistic society; the minimum to allow peaceful coexistence and human success (Cortina 1994, 1997). Let us see more in detail to what she is referring:

• freedom. This is the first of the values defended by the Enlightenment and one of the most heavily debated since. Three senses of freedom can be distinguished. The first is freedom as participation, where participation means participation in public affairs, and the possibility and capacity to participate in the affairs and decisions that affect us. This is the concept of freedom that Benjamin Constant (1816) called ‘the freedom of the ancients’ . The second is freedom as independence, where freedom is understood as the possibility to lead one’s life without outside interference. This concept of freedom is typical of modernity and is linked closely to individualism and the primacy of private over public life. The third is freedom as autonomy, as proposed by the Enlightenment, which considers that the individual is free if he or she is capable of making his or her own rules;

• equality is the second of the values proclaimed by the French Revolution and, which, over time, has gained meaning. We can distinguish two essential meanings derived from the profound idea that all people are equal in dignity: equality of all citizens before the law which means that all people have the same legal rights and obligations, within an impartial legal system; and equality of opportunity which means that those in need can receive more help from society in order to allow their participation in social life (Van Parijs 1998);

• solidarity, a value derived from the fraternity involved in the French Revolution, which we have inherited and transformed. Solidarity is one of the values most in demand in recent times and most needed to condition human existence. This value can be expressed in two types of personal and social reality. The first is solidarity of the common interest which ‘obliges’ us to cooperate in order to achieve our objective; the second is solidarity of generosity, which means that help is given to those most in need and that this help is motivated by their misfortune which moves the aid giver. It should be noted that solidarity is not the same as tribalism, it does not refer to solidarity only with the members of a certain group. It refers to universal solidarity which takes account of the situations of the most vulnerable people;

• respect is a reformulation of the value of tolerance and has many interpretations (Lozano and Escrich 2017). While tolerance can be the result of impotence, indifference or disinterest (passivity), respect involves an active interest in understanding the projects and ideas of others and helping them to realize them from a moral point of view. Active respect means positive appreciation and commitment;

• dialogue – since Socrates, dialogue has been a means not only of resolving disputes but also of finding truth and increasing knowledge. Dialogue does not involve the mere statement or communication of information; it involves expressing what is believed and taking responsibility for what is spoken. Dialogue refers to a shared search for truth and justice and, as Steinmann and Löhr (1994) state, is the only way to achieve peaceful resolution of conflict.

Implications of civic ethics for RRI

The contribution of civic ethics to RRI governance seems relevant at the levels of its normative foundation and practical realization. The civic ethics proposed by Cortina and built on by authors such as Crocker (2008), has its roots in the ethics of discourse, but presupposes the dismissal of pure proceduralism while avoiding the metaphysical essentialism of some comprehensive doctrines of good. ‘Civil ethics thus constitutes the ethical background of and creates the conditions for social cohesion in morally pluralist societies’ (Cortina 2000, 41).

We are aware of the difficulties involved in realizing the ideal of dialogue in responsible innovation governance, that is, its inherent dynamics (Stilgoe, Owen, and Macnaghten 2013) and the highly competitive business world in which it takes place (Brand and Blok 2019). Stilgoe, Owen and Macnaghten suggest that traditional ethics evaluation was directed to the intentions and consequences of past actions (backward looking responsibility) applied ‘to the products of science and innovation’ (Stilgoe, Owen, and Macnaghten 2013, 1568), while innovation involves the creation of something new and unexpected. We believe that civic ethics could provide a meaningful way to deal with such fundamental unpredictability because it proposes a deliberation process that satisfy the normative legitimation demands and, at the same time, is coherent with the innovation process.

Based on the levels suggested by Apel (1988), we believe that this dialogue perspective is adequate for RRI governance. These two levels have specific practical implications for the governance of science and technology. The first level of transcendental foundation is not just formal and abstract, it also demands ideal conditions for dialogue and concrete dispositions of the participants in that dialogue. As noted above, the ideal conditions for dialogue are a regulative idea that gives an orientation to concrete practical discourses. This regulatory idea has implications at two levels: the conditions for the process of participating in real dialogue and the underlying values which should be activated by those who participate in the dialogue. Inspired by Habermas (1983) and the five essential values of Cortina’s civic ethics, the four basic principles that a practical dialogue about RRI should consider are:

• principle one: inclusion. Everyone has the right to participate in questions that affect his/her life, and nobody should be excluded from the rational discourse ex-ante. This means that the decision-making processes must consider the interests and opinions of everyone affected. Inclusion should be understood in a broad and not a restrictive sense: ‘not only those actors who have a direct stake or interest in the innovation process should have a voice, but also members from the wider public, whose stake might be much more indirect. It is held that when diverse stakeholders and lay people are involved in the innovation’ (Brand and Blok 2019, 6). Although the inclusion principle has practical and strategic advantages (Eizagirre, Rodríguez, and Ibarra 2017), it must be remembered that it is a moral imperative. Inclusion, as a regulatory idea, does not imply that we need to discuss every topic endlessly, but that we must be open to a pluralistic discourse and implies, clearly, that no one should be excluded from the outset. This principle offers the possibility for all those affected to ask as many questions as they deem appropriate and to express their opinions freely;

• principle two: symmetry. Real symmetry is another ideal that has the power to guide real dialogue. Symmetry implies that everyone who participates in a rational dialogue has the knowledge and resources (material and time) and enjoys the conditions to allow appropriate participation. Clearly, it is not possible for everyone to have the same level of knowledge and resources. However, this regulative idea has two relevant implications for RRI governance: it delegitimates highly asymmetrical dialogue and provides the obligation to work to improve the participation conditions to achieve symmetry;

• principle three: no coercion. Absence of coercion and respect for the strength of the best argument, reasoning and sound argument are the main criteria for evaluating ideas and interests and making decisions; neither economics nor political power, nor prestige, nor social background are legitimate sources of privileged consideration. This principle has two concrete implications: the first is the absence of any kind of violence, threat, or intimidation; and the second is that it supposes a revindication of reason and argumentation. The fact that everyone has the right to participate does not mean that every opinion has the same value; opinions and arguments are assessed according to intersubjective rational discourse criteria;

• principle four. publicity and accountability. All arguments, ideas or interests must fulfil the public criteria or public use of reason (Kant 1784; Habermas 1981). This principle has two clear implications for RRI governance: one is that it must be open to external scrutiny and public control, it should not be secret or hidden information; and the other is that the decisions taken should be publicly disclosed. This public information should include not only the conclusions or decisions taken but also the procedure involved and the reasons why the conclusions or decisions were reached.

These normative principles are aligned to the RRI principles in the literature (Burget, Bardone, and Pedaste 2017) and, in particular, are coherent with the vision of RRI proposed by von Schomberg (2013, 2007) and Stilgoe, Owen, and Macnaghten (2013) and their four procedural dimensions of responsible innovation: anticipatory, reflexive, inclusive and responsive. However, we consider that the civic ethics principle offers a strong normative foundation to underpin and reinforce the dimensions presented by Owen and colleagues, and are developed from a descriptive (sociological) perspective.

Conclusions

This article discusses the implications of civic ethics as a normative foundation for RRI. The different narratives around RRI proposed so far present a combination of virtue ethics, utilitarianism, deontologism and procedural ethics foundations. They have in common consideration of public participation and the inclusion of the ethical and social dimensions in scientific and innovation decision-making. Civic ethics allows both features to be integrated in an enriching way and overcomes paternalism, selfishness and individualism and establishes the steering universal moral principles such as freedom, equality, solidarity, respect and dialogue. The inclusion of such principles in the ethical foundation of RRI, would put the focus on the contribution to human progress and prosperity based on legitimation of the post-conventional moral order. Also, its operationalization will need to consider four principles to assure dialogue with different actors and include consideration of future generations: that is, inclusion, symmetry, no coercion, disclosure and accountability.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes on contributors

Félix Lozano is a tenured lecturer of Business Ethics and Social Responsibility at the Polytechnic University of Valencia, PhD in Philosophy from the University of Valencia and associate researcher at the Institute of Innovation and Knowledge Management, Ingenio (CSIC-UPV). He has developed ethics advisory work for various public and private entities (ONCE, Catalan Health Institute, Lleida University, Cartagena Polytechnic University, among others), is a member of the executive committee of the Ethics Foundation for Businesses and Organizations (ÉTNOR) and of the Research Ethics Committee at the Polytechnic University of Valencia.

Irene Monsonís-Payá is a PhD candidate at theInstitute of Innovation and Knowledge Management, Ingenio (CSIC-UPV), Universitat Politécnica de València. In her PhD dissertation, she focuses on processes of production of monitoring and evaluation instruments in the field of Responsible Research and Innovation. Previously, she worked as project manager and research assistant in research and innovation projects dealing with social welfare, inclusion of vulnerable groups, social and health care provision, education and new technologies. Her academic and professional interests include issues in the intersections of sustainability, science, management and education.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Government of Spain through the ‘Agencia Estatal de Investigación' from the ‘Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad' [Grant Numbers CSO2016-76828-R and BES-2017-081141]