Political trauma of Uleebalang descendants over past conflict in the city of Lhokseumawe, Aceh

Abstract

The history of social revolution in Aceh is not concluded with the arrests and killings of the prominent figures of the “rebellion” through the people’s judiciary. In the core of it, there existed the confiscation of property and land, the expulsion of families from the region, the forced marriages of Uleebalang widows, and the stripping of royal titles from their names. This article depicts the reality of their community identity in the city of Lhokseumawe, Aceh, Indonesia, aftermath the 1945–1957 Acehnese conflict. Historiographical arguments about the “Cumbok affair” were dominated by elitist views which did not provide equal opportunities for the losing parties in political contestation at the time. This particular study applies an ethnographic method in its research process. Observations, in-depth interviews and document handling were implemented to collect data about the Uleebalang descendants’ decision to avoid politics and to stay aloof in government positions due to past historical trauma. To obtain a more comprehensive data, this study ascertained that the feud between the ulema and the Uleebalangs was caused by a disappointment coming from the ulema when some of the Uleebalangs acknowledged the Dutch sovereignty over Aceh. This prolonged conflict was recently considered one of the social phenomena that escalated a social revolution in Acehnese society. This revolution has caused a social change, where the social status of the Uleebalangs shifted due to the abolishment of the Uleebalangan institution after the bloody incident.

Keywords:

• political trauma
• descendants
• Uleebalang
• crime
• past
• Lhokseumawe, Aceh

PUBLIC INTEREST STATEMENT

The article delves into the aftermath of the 1945–1957 Acehnese conflict, shedding light on the less-explored aspects of social revolution in Aceh, Indonesia. It focuses on the Uleebalang descendants in Lhokseumawe – despite the tragedy occurring in some other regions in Aceh -, revealing their identity and struggles following the historical trauma inflicted upon them. This research aims to promote a more holistic understanding of Aceh’s history. It highlights the impact of political contestation on the losing parties, offering valuable insights into the reasons behind Uleebalangs’ avoidance of politics and government positions. This study elucidates the complexities of historical events and their lasting effects on communities. Understanding the root causes of conflicts and social revolutions can contribute to reconciliation and sustainable peace-building efforts in conflict-affected regions. It also underscores the importance of equitable historical narratives recognizing the diverse experiences of all involved parties, fostering a more inclusive and informed society.

1. Introduction

The narrative of using violence in forming a nation-state has become a “historical necessity.” It occurs everywhere, often in repeated cycles (Abdullahi Abdulfatai Akanmu & Abdullahi Abdulfatai Akanmu, 2020; Therborn, 2021). This setup, which profoundly happened in the 19^th century and magnified throughout the 20^th century is almost always found in every history of nationalism.

The uniqueness of this narrative occurs not only in Indonesia but also in any nation-state. It has created scarred nations filled with people who harbored pain due to the implementation of “official nationalism” driven by the elite, or in Partha Chatterjee’s terms, russification (Chakravarty, 2021; Chatterjee, 2016; Moosvi, 2021; Nigam, 2014). This model of official nationalism has shifted the understanding of nation and patriotism. Meanwhile, the history has become exclusive, elitist, dynastic, and distortive, including the experience in Aceh and its elites in claiming to be Republicans.

The nation-states were born just like the Australian egg, which is consumed by many peoples and cultures. Although colonized nations experience a unique and special history, nationalism “sparks” - one of which was fueled by global capitalism through publishing—is respected by its adherents. The word “believe” is forced to be used because the choice of nationalism, in many ways, is similar to the ritual of belief; it should not be brought up and questioned at all costs.

This article explains the issue that Aceh residents had when implementing nationalism at the outset of Indonesia’s independence (Lombard, 1982; Pluvier, 1982; Reid, 2014). There are accusations regarding groups being illegitimate and not being a member of that nation as well as groups that are more nationalist and have a tendency to dominate an area. The idea of nationalism, which is incorporated into sociopolitical attitudes and movements, had caused disagreement among community groups (Hutchinson & Smith, 1994). What transpired during the discussion of this essay also reveals the attitudes held by various groups of individuals, which ultimately resulted in the Cumbok tragedy in Aceh (Eklöf, 2006).

According to a number of works on the nationalism movement (Anderson et al., 2006; Mount, 2017), the movement at first brought about tragedy for mankind, including civil war. The idea of nationalism—which Renan defines as the “desire to suffer together”—eventually evolves into a campaign to denigrate other groups. In the context of the Cumbok war, there were groups that were later negated as traitors, namely the Uleebalang or Aceh territorial chiefs in Aceh politics. There were also groups considered to have the authority to manage memory politics as a nationalist group (Association of Ulama All Aceh/PUSA). The war did not only spark social revolutionary movement based on Marxism, but also erased the identity politics of the Uleebalangs as a group that had played a political role in Aceh during the Dutch colonial period (Bhabha & Bhabha, 2013; Reid, 2005).

In Jacques Derrida’s view, the conflict in Aceh at the time is perceived as “the destiny of violence,” which is bound to happen and has a cycle. For Derrida, it is not a coincidence that every nation-state is “born and finds itself in a cycle of violence” (Birchok, 2016; Evans, 2021; Kronzonas, 2020). Following that, this was seen as having a legitimate role in creating the ideology of nationalism (Derrida, 2001).

It would be difficult to disprove Derrida’s historical thesis (Evans, 2021). Many nation-states did not initially acknowledge it, but then they were united as a nation whose initial goal was freedom from violence, colonialism, and slavery. Unfortunately, after they pledged and proclaimed themselves as one nation, they instead committed violence against each other.

However, since independence was declared and disseminated, a humanitarian tempest had actually emerged, including in Aceh. One thing that is overlooked in seeing the history of the tempest of nationalism through the moment of Cumbok’s social revolution is the empty narrative of the victims (Fasya et al., 2023; Kurniawati, 2008) as if there existed a stance where victims should simply be eradicated from historical evidence. In contrast, if their stories are preserved in the narrative, the humanitarian and political tempests can be perceived more naturally. Post the conflict, scientific and historical writings insulted the victim group, specifically the Uleebalang, while glorifying the role of the perpetrators, which was PUSA or ulema (Aspinall, 2009; El-Lbrahirny, 2001; Sjamsuddin, 1990, 1999; Sufi,).

It is apparent that the concept of nationalism that Renan indicated as a noble and spiritual bond in nature empirically does not apply. Within the concept of nationalism, there is also what is referred to as nationalism ambivalence. The presence of nationalism will not necessarily end violence and oppression but can even give birth to a new spiral of violence. Nationalism becomes an idea that is thought to bind all people in the kinship of the nation-state when in fact, they are not related. A nation’s narrative is written with blood, and the people live with it. On the other hand, some are sacrificed because they are deemed unnecessary in the project of nationalism (Muhlasul, 2017; Sopacua et al., 2020; Suciati, 2014).

1.1. Literature review

In the context of this research, the story of the Uleebalang families who suffered from a stigma and negative labeling is part of the ambivalence of nationalism. They do not live in their own identity. The real victims are groups who lost the authority to show their subjective interests. They do not have “subject-effects,” so they are considered to be at the lowest strata in society, which in Spivak’s terms is called subaltern Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak in (Emberley, 1996; Gautam et al., 2019; Salfner, 2006).

As a result, the histiography of the “Cumbok affair” was dominated by elitist views, which did not provide equal opportunities for the losing parties of political contestation at the time (Heryati, 2015). They no longer have the power to influence politics (no geo-political determination) nor control over their history. They have become outcasts, silent tribes, or groups that continued to be silenced (silenced centers), such as illiterate farmers, tribal people, or the lowest strata of society in social groups (ibid).

Another issue that will be raised is the impact of historical trauma on the social life of the Uleebalang families, especially for those with direct exposure. Many of them who were defeated in the social revolution became exiles and forced to live in Medan, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, and Penang. They also chose to hide their stories from the public (Rizki & Latif, 2020). Likewise, the conflicted areas in the east coast of Aceh, such as Beureunun, Kota Bakti (Cumbok’s new name), Trieng Gadeng, Meureudu, Samalanga, and others, are still scarred and have stories that should be on record and be placed in the center of new history writing. The goal is to seek the truth of the past and to take a reconciliation approach through historical reconstruction.

The history of social revolution in Aceh was not concluded with the arrests and killings of the prominent figures of the “rebellion” through the people’s judiciary. In the core of it, there existed the confiscation of property and land, the expulsion of families from the region, the forced marriages of Uleebalang widows, and the stripping of royal titles from names. The violence continued when “religious republicans” launched the DI/TII rebellion (21 September 1953–1957) (El-Ibrahimy, 1996; Satriya et al., 2018). Sadly, these grim stories are not recorded in the primary history books. In “Peristiwa” (“Event”) (1965), the author Abdullah Hussain tells a story of an Uleebalang widow who was killed while breaking her fast long after the revolution ended. This means that the momentum of violence that previously occurred is still leaving traces of hatred against the Uleebalang community, resulting in anonymous acts of violence against their families and descendants.

Various cases of violence that occurred both during the social revolution and the aftermath have traumatized the Uleebalang families and their descendants. In addition, history books have unfortunately cornered the Uleebalangs. They are considered a group of traitors to the nation. History books reviewing the “Cumbok revolution” (Heryati, 2015; Satriya et al., 2018) only tell us the background of the incident but never again comprehensively showcasing what happened to the families after the rebellion. Historical documentation has also never recorded Uleebalang’s distress from discrimination and stigmas against them.

Using a postcolonial approach, this research will become another strategy in defending vulnerable communities within Acehnese society, who have already been labeled as Dutch compradors, bourgeoisie, anti-Islamic politics, etc. This research model will encourage narrative defense strategy efforts for other communities that are vulnerable and have lost their voices in Aceh to show their identity independently, such as the Chinese community, Javanese transmigrants, “Cuak family” or traitor community, Sufism community, etc., either through the politics of rewriting history, publication of other histories of events, or reconstructing oral histories from minority communities and victims (Lewis, 2021; Maldonado-Santiago et al., 2022).

This reality is indeed fascinating to be studied, especially in an effort to analyze the root causes of the political trauma of the Uleebalang descendants for past incident in the City of Lhokseumawe. The findings of this study are hoped to serve as lessons for conflict and political cases that occurred in Indonesia.

2. Materials and methods

This research is an ethnographic study, where the author traces the participatory-observation towards villagers grieving from the Uleebalang massacre, property confiscation, and forced marriages. The exiled area was chosen, later becoming the residence of the Uleebalang descendants.

This research was conducted in 2022 in the city of Lhokseumawe, Aceh Province, Indonesia. Observations, in-depth interviews and document handling were implemented to collect data about the Uleebalang descendants’ past in avoiding politics and staying aloof from government positions due to past historical trauma. A series of direct observation was conducted involving the researchers to live in with the subjects, so they can hone the anthropological sense about the trauma the subjects experienced (Bhattacherjee, 2012; Krause, 2021; Seligmann & Estes, 2020). In-depth panel interviews were also conducted with three informants from Uleebalang descent, two informants from Uleebalang elders, one representative of a political figure, and an academician to assess any information overlooked by the observation method to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of the past. This set of data is then classified, arranged in patterns, organized, interpreted, and being concluded. Documents related to the massacre were also used as secondary data to enrich and strengthen the findings.

The initial site selected for this research is Lhokseumawe. As a result of the tragedy that started on 22 October 1945, there are “other bloody cities” in Aceh, including Sigli, Beureuenun, Trienggadeng, Meureudu, Idi, Langsa, and Kualasimpang. These cities will be the subject of more in-depth and extensive research in the future as well as those went on exile to Medan (North Sumatra), Jakarta, Malaysia and Singapore

The collected data was then analyzed interactively using the model that (Bhattacherjee, 2012; Miles et al., 2014) Firstly, data condensation which involves the process of selecting, focusing, abstracting, and synchronizing field notes. Secondly, data display which requires organizing the data as a continuation of data condensation process. Finally, conclusion drawing and verification where inferences from the interpretation of the data were made to seek meanings behind it all.

3. Results and discussions

Ethnohistorically, revisiting the Cumbok incident that occurred at the beginning of the Independence would suggest us to look into the political situation at the time, when the Dutch carried out devide at impera policy. The Uleebalangs were persuaded to side with the Dutch, triggering a conflict between the clergy (“ulema”) and the Uleebalangs. This tension sparked the Cumbok incident, which occurred in Luhak Pidie and reached its peak in early 1946.

It was a gruesome time for Aceh, leaving many emotional and physical scars. The adults chose to side with the Dutch because they were given special privileges, turning them into capitalists in their own land. On this basis, the commoners and the ulema came together to fight the Uleebalangs as they were considered traitors to the nation and the Republic of Indonesia. Unfortunately, innocent children also became the victims. This has shaped a hypothesis that there was a political trauma experienced by the Uleebalangs. Nowadays, the Uleebalangs are almost non-existent or rarely involved in governmental arrangements and politics. Some of them even choose not to wear the “Teuku” or “Cut” titles on their names.

According to C. Snouck Hurgronje in “The Achehnese,” which later translated to “Aceh in the Eyes of the Colonialists” by (Cowan, 1981; Hayani, 2018; Satriya et al., 2019; Voorhoeve, 1952), “Uleebalang” is defined as those who are highly regarded in their respective nations and are the heads of areas of excellence. They are called kings (in the Acehnese language, it means head of their respective regions, both literally and figuratively). He also states that the term ”Uleebalang” means Commander of the Army, which was bestowed upon at the time of the most powerful Syahbandar. This Syahbandar intended to supervise them while allowing them to lead the soldiers in each of their territories. In parallel, he also was seeking the supreme power. However, this effort was not always fruitful because some Uleebalangs acted as regional rulers, judges and army commanders in their respective regions and did not acknowledge a higher authority.

According to (El-Ibrahimy, 1996), apart from being the army commander, an Uleebalang was also entrusted with the task of heading the nanggroe (“country”) by the Sultan of Aceh. When the Dutch came to power, they called the nanggroe as “landschap.” In practice, they were perceived as sort of a “sultan” or “little king.” The Uleebalangs usually bear the titles of Teuku (for men) and Cut (for women). In the Mukim government, they were called Uleebalang, while in Sagoe (Sagi), they were called Peutua.

The Cumbok Affair was indeed a social revolution in Aceh. When differences became profane, the massacre started. The civil war was filled with anger depicting hatred. Violent destruction and opportunistic theft occurred frequently. It occurred in early 1946, centered in Pidie. The peak of this event was caused by a misunderstanding between the clergy and the Uleebalang nobles regarding the proclamation of Indonesian independence. Both parties had their own leaders and commanders: the Uleebalang group was led by Teuku Keumangan and its commander Teuku Daud Cumbok (the Uleebalang Kenegerian Cumbok), while the clergy group was led by Daud Bereueh and his commander Husin Al-Mujahid.

3.1. Uleebalang descendants were not involved in practical politics

History mentions that the Uleebalangs had strategic leadership roles in Aceh. They became the head of an autonomous government. The Uleebalangs took both roles of leading the region and becoming customary law holders. Their power is enormous because all the areas under their control had broad autonomy.

Hurgronje’s notes clearly explain and divide the Acehnese elite into three groups: the sultans, Uleebalangs and the ulemas. These three elements then dominated to balance the political, economic, and socio-cultural roles of the people of Aceh. To accelerate traditional life in the social dynamics of the Acehnese people, the roles of the Uleebalang and the sultan are very urgent, whereas the ulema emerged as a pillar that supports and fights for the religious life of the people. Then, a distortion appeared in the social dynamics due to the conflict between the Uleebalangs and the clergy. Even though the Uleebalang is in power, the position of the clergy is no less important in the management of people’s lives, especially in managing religious values.

There were claims that the Uleebalangs were more compromising towards Dutch policies, while the clergy opposed and took over the leadership of the resistance against the Dutch. The clergy role then grew increasingly prominent and received support in Acehnese society. The protracted conflict filled with various dynamics had later changed the pattern of retaliation movements, where the previously all-united force had turned into an internal conflict between the ulema and the Uleebalangs.

The feud between the ulema and the Uleebalang reached its peak and was critical after the news of Japan’s defeat. The bloodshed between the people did not halt when the Cumbok affair ended. It instead became the hallmark of a more horrific episode. The massacre of the Uleebalang families in Pidie created a shockwave to the Uleebalangs living in other places unaffected by the Cumbok war. On the other side, the PUSA (Aceh Ulema Association) leaders were left baffled because they could not control their youth who were increasingly furious to eliminate all Uleebalangs. As the result, many Uleebalangs have endured a prolong trauma to this day from directly witnessing the threat to their families. Cut Asnawiyah, a woman born on 7 January 1946, is among the many whose family members became the victim of the occurrence in Simpang Ulim, East Aceh. Her father was Teuku Muda Husein bin Teuku Muda Yusuf bin Teuku Muda Malem, the son of the first North Aceh Regent and her mother came from Banda Aceh and was related to Teuku Nyak Arif. Her father was intercepted after getting off the train and was taken to the Seuneudon area, where there was news that he had been executed. His body was found in a swamp after 44 days.

The deep trauma caused by these various events with numerous sensitive memories has discouraged the families to tell the gruesome stories to their children and grandchildren, leaving them uninformed of the chronology of the massacre. This was acknowledged by Cut Asnawiyah, who did not talk much about her father’s murder in fear of the anti Uleebalang group existence. In fact, most Uleebalang families do not want the massacre that occurred decades ago to be resurfaced to the public.

Bias claims against the Uleebalang families have also made their descendants choose not to be practically involved in politics, both regionally and nationally. Many Uleebalang families are isolating themselves and staying away from political contestation. This might be one of their ways to avoid a recurring trauma, where the claims are considered very contradictory and discrediting the Uleebalang families especially about the alignment with the former colonial power. Despite all the emotional damage, Cut Asnawiyah never holds a grudge against the person who killed her father.

During the DI/TII period, I was still very young, around seven years old. After all, we are an educated family, so we do not hold any grudges about that particular incident as we believe our father has been granted heaven anyway.

On the one hand, the lack of involvement from the Uleebalang descendants in the political arena in Lhokseumawe and Aceh is sourced from their perception of public distrust towards them. It is mainly caused by the stereotyping at play that the descendants of the Uleebalang are considered affiliated with the colonialists or, even claimed as Dutch stooges. Only a small number of the descendants who dare to try dismissing these polemics and they embrace themselves to enter politics. The rest of the Uleebalang families have succeeded in becoming entrepreneurs or have opted to be self-employed.

As the people’s history of Aceh unveils, the Uleebalang actually has a lineage of leaders. They received direct power from the Sultan and they ruled the nanggroë. When they assumed office as Uleebalangs in their area, their appointment had to be authorized by the Sultan of Aceh. This appointment letter is called Sarakata, which is stamped with the Kingdom of Aceh’s official Cap Sikureung stamp.

3.2. The prerogative view among the people regarding the Cumbok war

Many argue that the Cumbok Affair has changed the social order of the Acehnese people and it is considered a social revolution. Disputes between the ulema and the Uleebalangs are also considered a social phenomenon, especially with the aforementioned conflict being inseparable part of the social dynamics for the people.

The conflict resolution between the ulema and the Uleebalang itself seems impossible to be done peacefully. In the recent years, it has become a prolonged and an open conflict, which has succeeded in undermining the power of the Uleebalangs in Aceh. To some extent, this phenomena is even considered a group cleansing targeted at Uleebalang families.

As a result of the Cumbok affair, there was a change in the social order in Acehnese society, where the Uleebalang institution was abolished. The next generation of Uleebalangs are concerned and have chosen not to become part of the dynamics of politics in Aceh, especially in Lhokseumawe City. When in fact, the Uleebalang descendants have the lineage of qualified leadership spirit.

Even with knowing this heritage, many Uleebalang families are still avoiding politics in Aceh. Very few Uleebalang families showcase themselves as capable political figures. They even bury the story of the past by not investigating or demanding justice for it, which they know it was very detrimental and has caused a very long traumatic experience. There is a concern that if their past is given a spotlight, it will raise new problematic issues. As disclosed by Teuku Sofianus, the Cumbok war is an old conflict. If it resurfaces, it will bring about new controversies even though he knew that the tragedy had something to do with the power struggle carried out by the PUSA which sacrificed the Uleebalang group (Sjamsuddin, 1990).

Ironically, history becomes blurred with the crimes done by the perpetrators who were the rulers of the past. As a result, revealing the truth becomes a much more complicated process. It is challenging to determine the perpetrator of past murders. According to Sofianus, the actual trauma is minimal because there is an understanding among Uleebalangs that this problem or grudge does not need to continue. “For us, the Cumbok tragedy is a dark history that should not be reopened. Many ambiguities occurred, including those committed by the perpetrators of the conflict at that time.’

Sofianus mentions that an Uleebalang family, Teuku Bintara Pineung, actually raised Abu Beureueh, the person who was leading the clergy group in the war. Abu Beureueh and the perpetrators of the massacre also married Uleebalang women, such as Husein Al Mujahid’s wife, who is a descendant of the Pocut’s family. He added that it was very unfair if a leader of the PUSA military forces who were involved in the massacre of the Uleebalang family was proposed to be recognized as a national hero. “How could the perpetrators of past crimes be appointed heroes,” he said. Although he did not experience deep trauma from the Cumbok War tragedy, his family had experienced losses from this incident. His family had to migrate to North Sumatra to escape. The family-owned land was also seizured to become Kompi B in Lhokseumawe. So, according to him, there is no benefit for the Cumbok case to be exposed to the public because that will mean opposing the government. For instance, they have not received any compensation from the confiscation of assets done in the name of the nation. Sofianus argues that based on the history, it is not Abu Beureueh who deserves to become Military Governor, but instead Teuku Nyak Arif.

“This conflict has been going on for a long time, and if it continues it will create new problems. The Cumbok tragedy was related to the PUSA’s power struggle, thus sacrificing the Uleebalang group. Then also, history becomes increasingly blurred because of the destruction carried out by these rulers of the past. As a result, the reconstruction process becomes more difficult when we want to revisit it. We are starting to find it difficult to determine the perpetrator for the past murders.”

3.3. Academicians’ present day perspective in viewing the cumbok affair

Academicians consider the Cumbok war as another social phenomenon that can indeed occur as part of the social dynamics. It is based on the presence of individual and group interests that wish to show their existence to strengthen their influences in the society. The Uleebalangs and the ulema in Aceh possess strong influential powers, to the point where it raises political claims that they wish to dominate each other and expand their influences by fighting over public trust. If we look at a series of events during the Cumbok war that spread widely and, in the process of it, eliminated the influence of the Uleebalangs, it is clear that there were political interests to dominate against one party. The religious clergy and the Uleebalangs who are more dominating in their leadership are more inclined to perform this.

According to M. Nazaruddin, it was predicted that the political governance in Aceh during the Dutch, Japanese, and post independence was very vulnerable and the Cumbok war was quite inevitable. The Dutch was able to counter any political movements against them through their immaculate method of using local institutions for their benefits. They pursued the Uleebalang leaders to be their intermediaries and pushed their will to create a divide between the Uleebalang and the ulema. They implemented politics of pacification to face the Acehnese people.

This pacification policy changed the social dynamics of the people, with many nobles then started to cooperate with the Dutch. The influence of the pacification politics played by the Dutch had invited many Acehnese nobles to sign the korte versklaring - affirming them to submit to the Dutch. This brought about a polarization in the attitude of the people against the invaders, and Aceh was later conquered by the Dutch.

The divide in the society in going against the Dutch was also part of Dutch strategy. For a substantial amount of time, they observed and analyzed the characteristics of the people that were once in full solidarity to fight the oppressor. At the time, the nation had presumed that Acehnese were the only region in which the Dutch failed to conquer.

The complexity of the conflict in Aceh started when the tension between Uleebalang and ulema heightened. The ulema had carried out a reformed movement to improve the court bureaucracy run by the Uleebalangs. The other party considered this move would endanger their position, resulting in feelings of mutual suspicion. The heat worsened when devide et impera politics took place, where some Uleebalangs signed the korte verkalring recognizing the Dutch sovereignty over Aceh which led the ulema to declare the Uleebalang as traitors to the nation.

This dispute took a toll after the establishment of PUSA in 1939, in which the Uleebalang elicited a strong reaction because its existence could endanger their position in the society. The conflict that existed since the Dutch colonial period continued until the Japanese occupation in the form of political warfare. When one party’s reputation increases, it was a threat to the other party. This conflict reached its peak in the Cumbok war that occurred in 1945 (Eklöf, 2006).

4. Conclusions

The feud between the ulema and the Uleebalang was caused by ulema’s disappointment when some of the Uleebalangs acknowledged the Dutch sovereignty over Aceh. Since then, the Uleebalangs were proclaimed as Dutch minions. This conflict intensified after the establishment of Aceh Ulema Association (PUSA) in 1939. On the other hand, the chaos between the two most influential groups was also part of power struggle which resulted in eradication of Uleebalang descendants.

The conflict between the ulema and the Uleebalangs was recently considered one of the social phenomena that escalated a social revolution in Acehnese society. This social revolution has caused a social change, where the status of the Uleebalang shifted due to the abolishment of the Uleebalangan institution after the bloody incident. Moreover, the Uleebalang families experienced an extended trauma and any stories regarding the dark events were tightly concealed from the Uleebalang generation.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to convey gratitude to all the parties who have contributed to this article. This article is written based on PNBP research findings in 2022 conducted in the city of Lhokseumawe, Aceh. This research was funded by Institute for Research and Community Service (LPPM) of Universitas Malikussaleh which provided the facilities needed in performing this research.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Teuku Kemal Fasya

Teuku Kemal Fasya, an Anthropology lecturer at Universitas Malikussaleh, Aceh, is a prolific researcher and author with a focus on post-colonial studies, ecological anthropology, and more. With over 800 articles and numerous books, he's a prominent figure in Indonesian media and academia.

Robert Sibarani

Robert Sibarani, a professor in anthropolinguistics, boasts a significant H-Index, being recognized as one of the World's Most Influential Scientists.

Budi Agustono

Budi Agustono, a History Professor at the University of North Sumatra, specializes in Indonesian history and is the Head of the Center for Cultural and Ethnic Studies.

Muryanto Amin

Muryanto Amin, the Chancellor of USU, has a diverse background as a political science lecturer and dean.

Rizki Yunanda

Rizki Yunanda, a Permanent Lecturer at Universitas Malikussaleh, contributes to anthropology and sociology research, notably in Aceh. His involvement in various research projects and published works underscores his commitment to academia.