Toward Accessible Faith & Flourishing: Reconsidering Greek Intellectualism in Western Christian Theology

Abstract

From its inception, the Western theological tradition exhibits a fascination with and appropriation of ancient Greek philosophy. This conceptual intertwining of philosophy and theology, as exemplified by Augustine and Aquinas, privileges rationality in the “natural order” and in the pursuit of virtue and human flourishing. Despite generative insights at the intersection of disability and theology in other aspects, the “enfolding” tendencies of a conceptual framework inherited from Plato and Aristotle relegate people with intellectual disabilities to the margins of human flourishing. Contemporary theologians vary in the extent of their adoption of these norms and ideals related to the natural order and human rationality. The future of disability theology must engage a “pastoral deconstruction” that questions these deep privileging tenants of the Western intellectual tradition if it is to welcome the richly embodied theological contribution of people with intellectual disabilities.

Keywords:

• Intellectual disability
• moral theology
• ethics
• anthropology

Notes

1 This coincides with Aristotle’s description of man [sic] as “an animal capable of reason” (Stainton, 2001, 453) on the basis of the rational soul, without going so far as to say that human beings are defined by their reason.

2 According to Stainton, “Augustine did not reject earlier classical thought, nor did he diminish the importance of reason in this world. If anything, he adopted the somewhat cruder position on rationality of the later classical period inherited from Cicero and Porphyry … stating on numerous occasions that ‘man is a rational mortal living being’ or, similarly, ‘man is a rational animal’” (Stainton, 2008, p. 488).

3 Brock (2012) reminds us of Christ’s words that a man was born blind “so that the work of God might be displayed” (John 9:3).

4 “A human body is said to be weak when it is disabled or hindered in the execution of its proper action, through some disorder of the body’s parts, so that the humors and members of the human body cease to be subject to its governing and motive power” (ST 1-2.77.3, response as cited in Romero, 2012, p. 101). Also “When a person lacks the good of sight, that person suffers evil – that is to say, the privation of a good that naturally belongs to members of the human species” (Romero, 2012, p. 109).

5 Stainton points to the sixth book of the Nichomachean Ethics to make this point: “We seek something else as that which is good in the strict sense – we seek for the presence of such qualities in another way. For both children and brutes have the natural dispositions to these qualities, but without reason these are evidently hurtful” (2001, p. 1035).

6 This research has now made its way into popular books such as Predictably Irrational by Dan Ariely, You are Not as Smart as You Think You Are by David McRaney, The Happiness Hypothesis by Jonathan Haidt, and Willpower Instinct by Kelly McGonigal, to name a few.

7 In Augustine, moral deliberation and rationality are linked with respect to the object of one’s ethical action as well as in being subject of ethical action. He understands the command “Thou shalt not kill” to be based on the principle of rationality. “When we read ‘Thou shalt not kill’, we are not to take this commandment as applying … to the non-rational animals which fly, swim, walk or crawl, for these do not share the use of reason with us. It is not given to them to have it in common with us; and, for this reason, by the most just ordinance of their Creator, both their life and death are subject to our needs” (Augustine, 1998, p. 33). Note that his observations here are not based on the expression of rationality, but on the rational principle itself which Augustine deems the property of all human beings. Again, we observe the close connection between ethics, virtue, and rationality. In this instance, it forms the basis for ethical action toward a rational creature, rather than as the expression of reason.

Additional information

Funding

This article has been funded by Christian Horizons.