ABSTRACT
It is commonly believed that some rebel and terrorist groups are apt to fund their operations through human trafficking and the illicit trade in exploited labor. Recently, groups like Boko Haram have committed large-scale kidnappings while the Islamic State has sought to recruit Western women via the Internet with each group having been accused of both sexual exploitation of victims and profiting from their sale. Other groups like the Lord’s Resistance Army of Uganda and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone kidnapped and trafficked youths to replenish their ranks with child soldiers. Yet, these cases represent only a fraction of those that could in fact be tested for this link. By examining the effects of trafficking on the duration and outcome of intrastate conflict, this paper finds that states who are better at addressing the crime of trafficking, are more likely to experience a shorter conflict. While there is no evidence that trafficking can tip the scales of conflict one way or the other, it is likely that trafficking can at the very least sustain a rebel group materially.
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Acknowledgments
The author wishes to thank the editors and reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions in the preparation of this draft.
Notes
1 The Fear of “White Slavery” in the early twentieth century produced frameworks on trafficking, but in a more narrow, overtly racial and gendered sense (Lindquist & Piper, Citation2007, p. 144).
2 This variable replaces the shadow economy measure as the two measures correlate at approximately 70%.
3 The original measure of relative rebel strength had to be dropped due to collinearity and is replaced with a WDI (Citation2015) measure of a state’s military expenditure.
4 The dummy variable for democracy had to be dropped in two models and the dummy for a strong rebel group in one as they acted as a perfect predictor in these models.