Re-thinking hegemonic masculinities in conflict-affected contexts

ABSTRACT

Masculinities in conflict-affected and peacebuilding contexts have generally speaking been under-researched. Much of the existing research focuses relatively narrowly on men and their ‘violences’, especially that of combatants. Conceptually, much of the policy debate has revolved around either men’s ‘innate’ propensity to violence or relatively simplistic uses of frameworks such as hegemonic, military/militarized, or ‘hyper’-masculinities. These discourses have often been reinforced and reproduced without relating them to their respective local historical, political, and socio-economic contexts. In academic circles, the discussion is more advanced and progressive, but this has yet to filter through to on-the-ground work.

Considering the overwhelming role men play in producing and reproducing conflict-related and other forms of violence, a better understanding of the links between masculinities and violence – as well as non-violence – should be central to examining gender, conflict, and peace. Nonetheless, currently a large part of masculinities are side-lined in research, such as those of non-combatants or displaced persons, the associated challenges of ‘thwarted masculinities’, or the positive agency of peacebuilders. Non-heterosexual masculinities also are largely invisible. Based on recent multi-country field research, we aim to highlight some of the under-researched issues revolving around conflict-affected masculinities while also discussing some conceptual challenges arising as a result. Our two key arguments are that the notion of ‘hegemonic masculinities’ in conflict-affected situations needs to be re-examined and re-articulated in more nuanced ways, and that the scope of studying masculinities in these situations needs to be broadened to go beyond merely examining the violences of men.

KEYWORDS:

• Masculinities
• conflict
• peacebuilding

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. We differentiate here between military masculinities (i.e. masculinities inculcated, constructed, and performed in military and military-like institutions) and militarized masculinities (i.e. masculinities which have been actively militarized, through one’s own volition and/or via outside actors). While there is considerable overlap, they are not identical: civilian, right-wing, ‘lone wolf’ assassins often display more militarized forms of masculinities than, for example, the military masculinity of a logistics clerk in a state army.

2. The degree to which ‘hegemonic masculinities’ has gained currency among practitioners working on violent male behaviour was highlighted at a major international symposium on masculinities in New Delhi in 2014 where the term was used by a wide range of presenters interchangeably with violent (and militarized) forms of masculinity in situations as divergent as the Israeli occupation in Palestine; young, urban underclass gang members in El Salvador; or middle-aged, upper-middle-class Bengali men.

3. The research was conducted in Burundi and Colombia in 2013, in Lebanon 2014 and 2015, in Nepal in 2013–2014, and in Uganda in 2012–2013. For the in-depth findings and more detail on the research methodology, see El-Bushra, Naujoks, and Myrttinen (2014), Khattab and Myrttinen (2014; 2016), López and Myrttinen (2014), Myrttinen, Naujoks, and El-Bushra (2014), Myrttinen and Nsengiyumva (2014) and Naujoks and Myrttinen (2014).

4. This assumption has been evident in internationally brokered local ceasefires in Syria, in which women and children have been allowed to leave besieged areas, but not ‘men of military age’. This criterion of separation was also used in the 1995 Srebrenica massacre, in which around 8000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys were killed.

5. Interviews, 2012–2013, Uganda. See also Eriksson Baaz and Stern (2013).

6. For recent examples, see the homophobic undercurrents in the debates about Chelsea Manning in the USA; or the nationalist anti-gay mobilizations in Armenia, Georgia, Greece, and Russia in 2013–2014; and, with slightly different dynamics at play, the recent pushes to introduce religiously motivated anti-LGBTI legislation across different parts of the globe. Conversely, right-wing groups in Northern Europe have also sought to instrumentalize LGBTI rights in their xeno- and Islamophobic narratives.

7. Although there is a tendency for armed state and non-state actors, regardless of their ideology, to instil heteronormative versions of appropriate male and female behaviour, one may also find openness to diverse practices; for example, the first gay marriage in the Philippines organized by the Maoist New People’s Army (see, for example, Alburo 2011; López and Myrttinen 2014).