Why the EU got the Ukrainian crisis wrong

Abstract

EU policy has achieved minimal gains during the Ukrainian crisis. Whilst economic sanctions and diplomatic efforts exerted pressure on the Kremlin, they also reinforced Moscow's security narrative and perception that the EU is anti-Russian. The EU failed to seriously engage with Russia's initial concerns and formulate an appropriately robust policy response. This underscores the EU's limitations as a soft power actor when facing a security challenge. In contrast, Russia has capitalized on the antagonistic relationship with the EU. Control of the media and the inherent appeal of the project to build a strong Russia helps support Moscow's position in its relations with the EU and its ongoing drive to modernize the military and strengthen non‐Western institutions. Faced with this challenge, the EU must develop a coherent set of policies for its relations with Russia and the states within the post‐Soviet space. Moreover, the crisis has demonstrated the need for the EU to re‐examine its security priorities and capacity.

Keywords:

• EU
• Ukraine
• Russia
• security

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Anke Schmidt-Felzmann and Gordon Ramsay for their comments on an earlier version of this paper.

Notes

1. The recoding was alleged to have been intercepted and leaked by Russia (Miller, 2014). The audio was posted on YouTube.

2. Bildt was succeeded by Margot Wallström (2014, 3 October).

3. Hague was succeeded by Phillip Hammond (2014, 14 July).

4. Twitter@dnrpress; vkontaktevk.com/club322360 (2015, 3 February).

5. Posts using these hashtags can be found on social media, e.g. http://instagram.com/savechildrenfromfascism.