In Defense of Journalistic Paternalism

ABSTRACT

This essay introduces paternalism—a concept widely discussed in political philosophy and applied ethics—into media ethics, given that the concept is frequently mentioned but rarely explicated. The purpose of the essay is to defend paternalism as a normatively positive concept. The essay defines paternalism, outlines normative objections to paternalism grounded in autonomy and rationality, and applies the concept of paternalism to journalism. Theoretical connections to virtue ethics and implications for the practice of journalism are also discussed.

Acknowledgments

The author gratefully acknowledges the constructive and challenging feedback provided by the anonymous reviewers and editor. He also acknowledges Sigal Ben-Porath, Stephanie Craft, Gerald Dworkin, Kalle Grill, Elizabeth Blanks Hindman, Henrik Örnebring, and Tim P. Vos, who provided thoughtful feedback and advice at various stages of the manuscript.

Notes

1. This, of course, has gendered implications, as it locates familial authority specifically in the father. I intend no such implications by my use of the concept, which is born out of convenience and clarity, given that it is the established term in the literature. To be clear, there is no connection present, suggested, or desired between “paternalism” and “patriarchalism.” These concerns are summarized by Kleinig (1984): “This is not merely because it locates de jure familial authority in the father, but also because it obscures the de facto (though unrecognized and unrewarded) childrearing authority that generally resides in the mother. Perhaps we should… speak instead of ‘maternalism’… But there is more to be said for talking of ‘parentalism,’ an option taken up by one or two writers, and toward which I am attracted. I have chosen nevertheless to bow to convention, not through some desire to perpetuate the sexist environment from which it comes, but for reasons of convenience. The general sense of the traditional term remains clear, some of the confusion caused by a terminological switch is avoided, and given the generally derogatory associations that the term has for most users, its continued use is not likely to advance the cause of sexism” (p. xiii).

2. None of the above is to afford some kind of superhuman privilege to journalists and claim they are immune from bounded rationality while everyday citizens are not. Journalists, however, have role-derived responsibilities that the ordinary citizen does not, training that the ordinary citizen does not, and access to various forms of capital (economic, social, political, cultural) that the ordinary citizen does not. Moreover, the concern of this body of work is on the reception, rather than transmission, side of the communication dynamic.