Creating participatory expert bodies. How the targeted selection of policy advisers can bridge the epistemic-democratic divide

ABSTRACT

This study explores the room for reconciliation between democratic and epistemic claims to modern policy-making. The key institutional design question it deals with is how to compose arenas of policy advice and consultation in such a way that they are able to generate both reliable, knowledge-based policy solutions and represent the perspectives of those affected – without becoming dysfunctional. After an inclusive re-conceptualisation of ‘participation’ and ‘expertise’, the study compares different group selection mechanisms in terms of their epistemic and democratic merits and makes the case for the ‘targeted selection’ of policy advisors in the phase of policy development. It delineates conditions of creating ‘participatory expert bodies’ that are primarily made up of societal stakeholders from intermediary organisations, who can assume the double role of expert and civil society representative and are supported by researchers, civil servants and lay citizens.

KEYWORDS:

• Expertise
• participation
• targeted selection
• institutional design
• deliberative democracy
• arenas of policy advice and consultation

Notes

1 Expert here refers to the status attributed to someone who is considered more knowledgeable in a certain domain than others. Expertise refers to specialised knowledge that has an advisory, guiding function. See section 1 for more thorough conceptualisations.

2 Public or citizen participation refers to the involvement of those affected by policies into policy-making through referenda, party membership, elections, demonstrations, citizen assemblies etc. Democratic participation qualifies this involvement according to certain criteria of democratic worth (see section 1).

3 The study speaks of arenas or institutions of policy advice, consultation, deliberation and coordination to cover a broad range of institutions in the phase of policy formulation that are external to public administration (i.e. not exclusively staffed with civil servants) and advisory in that they have not been given public authority. In real life politics and depending on composition, political context and purpose, such institutions can carry such variegated names as ‘expert body’, ‘citizen assembly’, ‘civil society panel’, ‘inquiry commission’, ‘advisory council’, ‘stakeholder board’, ‘state committee’, ‘public agency’ etc.

4 This is not to say that the mass public level could be ignored in democracies or that large entities such as the public sphere is devoid of deliberative qualities (see Chambers, 2009).

5 Yet, with adjustments, this analysis can be transferable to similar institutions in other phases of the policy cycle, where both epistemic and democratic input is useful, e.g. collective bargaining committees in the shadow of the law or regulatory and norm-setting committees in the implementation phase.

6 The selection method of voting is thus not considered systematically in this analysis, yet its underlying logic is given some thought in section 3 as a complement to targeted selection.

7 The line between these types of organisations and these types of interests is in fact difficult to draw and the terminology used very often reflects political or moral considerations of the speaker. Yet, from a pluralist democratic standpoint, the pursuit of all interests is legitimate, within constitutional limits.

8 For more elaborate thoughts on the role of interest associations in policy development and in socio-economic reforms, and more detailed institutional solutions, see associative democracy theory (Cohen & Rogers, 1992; Hirst, 1996; Schmitter, 1992).