Donbas: the post-Soviet conflict that changed Europe

ABSTRACT

Without negating geopolitics, the developments in the breakaway entities of Donbas post-cessation of active war; and the fate of the dominant policy options for resolving the conflict need to be understood to explain the missing piece in the puzzle of Russia's choice for war in 2022. These territories were unable to evolve into viable socio-economic and political entities. The conflict never ended, and was spiralling by 2021; corruption was rampant; while professionalising the ‘self-defence forces' was an uphill task. Deindustrialising trends and food insecurity prompted population flight and left the areas dependant on Russian support. Ukrainian government continued with military hostilities and an economic blockade, denuding support for Ukrainian unity. These factors together with COVID movement restrictions pushed the population along an irredentist pathway: seeking integration with Russia. In the light of these changes, the dominant policy options that had previously been conceived as potential solutions fared differently. The idea that Donbas would become the viable example of Russian World failed. The option of re-joining a ‘reformed Ukraine’ failed because Ukraine moved in different direction, also pursuing security agenda considered hostile by Russia. Eventually, recognition and incorporation into Russia appeared as the only prospect left, and triggered a policy pivot.

KEYWORDS:

• Conflict in Donbas
• Ukraine
• Russia
• war
• Minsk Agreements
• breakaway entities

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 The author would like to thank Norwegian Defence University College for support and Dr. Tom Roth, and Profs. Richard Sakwa and Simon Hallsworth for their comments in preparation of the article.

2 Sixteen interviews were conducted in October–November 2021, face-to-face or on Zoom. The respondents were educated elite members. Two interviewees were based in NGCAs, four originated from the territories but were interviewed in Moscow, two were international interlocutors and the rest were Russian political analysists, scholars and journalists. Two out of sixteen respondents were female.

3 Cited in ‘Demografii͡a Novorossii: skolʹko li͡udeĭ zhivët v L/DNR i chto ozhidatʹ dalʹshe’ [Novorossiya’s Demography: how many people live in L/DNR and what to expect next], 6 August 2021, E-News, https://e-news.su/v-novorossii/391711-demografija-novorossii-skolko-ljudej-zhivet-v-l-dnr-i-chto-ozhidat-dalshe.html. In reality less as it is not possible to deduct those registered in the territories who are in migration in Russia or work elsewhere in Ukraine.

4 Research & Branding Group polling December 2013, 12 February 2014. http://reporter-ua.com/2014/02/12/81-zhiteley-vostoka-ukrainy-ne-podderzhivaet-sobytiya-na-maydane-i-zahvat.

5 ‘Minsk agreements’ are three documents from September 2014 (the Minsk Protocol and the Minsk Memorandum) and February 2015 (the Package of Measures on the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements), signed by Russia, Ukraine and representatives of the NGCAs, under the auspices of the four heads of state or government of the ‘Normandy Format’ (Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine). The agreements serve as the basis for talks within the OSCE TCG and its four thematic working groups.

6 Ilya Topchiy, ‘Donbass protiv Ukrainy: kto pobedit?’ [Donbas versus Ukraine: who will win?], Expert Magazine, no. 39, July 2021, https://expert.ru/expert/2021/39/donbass-protiv-ukrainy-kto-pobedit/ https://expert.ru/expert/2021/39/donbass-protiv-ukrainy-kto-pobedit/, July 2021.

7 Topchiy, Expert Magazine.

8 Topchiy, Expert Magazine.

9 Anton Demidov. ‘V LNR nazvali chislo zhertv konflikta v Donbasse’ [LNR unveiled casualty figures in Donbas]. 12 October 2021, Gazeta.ru, https://www.gazeta.ru/army/news/2021/10/12/16674763.shtml. Total casualty figures for 14 April 2014–31 December 2021 see at ‘Conflict-related civilian casualties in Ukraine’, UN OHCHR, January 2022, https://ukraine.un.org/sites/default/files/2022-02/Conflict-related%20civilian%20casualties%20as%20of%2031%20December%202021%20%28rev%2027%20January%202022%29%20corr%20EN_0.pdf.

10 Dmitrii Durnev, Valerii Shiryaev, ‘«Tochki-U» i drugie zveri. Ni Kiev, ni Donet͡sk ne khoti͡at vozvrashchenii͡a voĭny, no propagandisty delai͡ut ee pochti neizbezhnoĭ’ [“Tochki-U” and other beasts. Neither Kyiv, nor Donetsk want a return to war, but propagandists make it almost inevitable]. Novaya Gazeta, no. 33, 29 March 2021, https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2021/03/27/tochki-u-i-drugie-zveri.

11 Kirill Krivosheev, Vladimir Soloviev, ‘Donbass stanovitsi͡a bespilotnoĭ zonoĭ. Ukraina udarno prodemonstrirovala plody voennoĭ druzhby s Turt͡sieĭ’ [Donbas becomes a pilotless zone. Ukraine strikingly demonstrated fruits of military friendship with Turkey], Kommersant, 27 October 2021, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5051898.

12 Author’s interview with a Luhansk resident, November 2021 (via Zoom).

13 Author’s interview with Pavel Kanygin, Novaya Gazeta correspondent, October 2021.

14 Author’s interview with Alexei Tokarev, researcher, Moscow, October 2021.

15 Author’s interview with DD, Moscow, October 2021.

16 ‘GRU’ stands for the Main Intelligence Department of the Russian Ministry of Defence and ‘FSB’ – for the Federal Security Service.

17 Kuratory (curators) were supervisors and mentors that were sent from Russia to the NGCAs to oversee the operations of offices and departments, supervise implementation of policies, offer technical advice and monitor financial expenditure.

18 DD interview, Moscow, 2021.

19 Author’s interview with Yevgenii Kopat’ko, sociologist, Moscow, October 2021.

20 Author’s interview with Alexander Chalenko, journalist, Moscow, October 2021.

21 Tokarev interview.

22 The trend in the rest of Ukraine was the same: turnout at local elections in 2020 was 36 per cent, with the lowest turnout in eastern and southern Ukraine – in Donetsk region, 31.67 per cent, Mykolayiv (32.02 per cent), Kharkiv (32.33 per cent) and Kherson (32.39 per cent) regions, in ‘Central Election Commission reports voter turnout at 2020 local elections’, 26 October 2020, https://112.international/politics/central-election-commission-reports-voter-turnout-at-2020-local-elections-55914.html.

23 Konstantin Skorkin, ‘Ob’edini͡aĭ i vlastvuĭ. Kak ustroeny i kuda dvizhutsi͡a rezhimy DNR i LNR’ [Unite and rule. How DNR and LNR are organised and where they are going], Carnegie Moscow Center, March 2021, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/84020.

24 Anton Demidov, ‘Glava LNR ob’i͡asnil otkaz ot idei ob’edinenii͡a respubliki s DNR’ [Head of LNR explained rejection of an idea of merger of the republic with DNR], Izvestiya interview, October 2021.

25 Author’s interview with an international practitioner, November 2021.

26 DD interview.

27 Kopat’ko, Chalenko interviews.

28 Luhansk respondent interview.

29 Author’s interview with AR, from Donetsk, October 2021, by Zoom.

30 Luhansk respondent interview.

31 DD interview.

32 Luhansk respondent interview.

33 Author’s interview with a Moscow political scientist, October 2021.

34 Konstantin Skorkin, ‘Vzi͡atye na balans. Zachem Moskva smenila khozi͡aina predprii͡atiĭ Donbassa’ [Taken on balance. Why Moscow changed master of Donbas enterprises], Carnegie Commentary, 24 June 2021, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/84806.

35 ‘Zolotye ORDLO’ [Golden NGCAs], Novosti Donbassa, 30 June 2021, https://novosti.dn.ua/article/7821-za-7-let-pri-dnr-poyavilis-svoi-oligarhi-rasskazyvaem-kto-oni#.

36 Skorkin, ‘Taken on Balance’.

37 Kopat’ko interview.

38 ‘Russian Presidential Decree on Humanitarian Assistance to the NGCAs residents’, 15 November 2021, http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202111150030.

39 AR interview 2021.

40 Lenta.ru, 28 January 2021, https://lenta.ru/news/2021/01/28/rus/.

41 DD interview, Moscow, 2021. Reportedly, one of Pushilin’s aides wrote a book ten years ago, in which he developed this doctrine, and later advised Pushilin to apply it.

42 Kopat’ko interview.

43 AR, Yevgenii Kopat’ko interviews, October 2021.

44 The author interviewed two Ukrainian sociologists originally from Donbas who conducted opinion polls in the NGCAs. The author was familiar with their previous work and considered it reliable; however, the actual poll figures were not shared and only mentioned in face-to-face interviews, Moscow, October 2021.

45 Interview with a sociologist involved in surveys in NGCAs, October 2021.

46 Chalenko interview.

47 Cumulative quotes, Donetsk and Luhansk interview respondents.

48 Kopat’ko interview.

49 Kopat’ko interview.

50 Luhansk respondent interview.

51 Author’s interview with international respondent, November 2021 (via Zoom).

52 AR interview.

53 Cited by Skorkin in ‘Unite and Rule.’

54 AR interview.

55 AR interview.

56 Kopat’ko interview.

57 AR interview.

58 Tokarev interview.

59 Chalenko interview.

60 Kanygin interview.

61 Luhansk respondent interview.

62 Interview of Volodymyr Zelensky to Dom TV channel, 5 August 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_v3cLAL48d0.

63 ‘Zelensky's presidential electoral rating slides to 22.1% – poll’, Interfax, 3 February 2021, https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/70990/.

64 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-conflict-jccc-idUSKBN1EE1X2. Interlocutors explained that the Ukrainian side requested all members to submit their biometric data. Since the Russian law prohibited its military officers to do so, they withdrew.

65 DD interview, Moscow, 2021.

66 International respondent interview.

67 Kanygin interview.

68 DD interview.

69 Author’s interview with Moscow political scientist.

70 Katya Bonch-Osmolovskaya, Artyom Schennikov, Antonina Asanova, ‘“Muzhiki chutʹ vypili — i davaĭ babakhnem” Kto i kak upravli͡aet voĭnoĭ v Donbasse semʹ let spusti͡a’ [Guys got a bit to drink – and off they go shooting.’ Who and how manages the war in Donbas seven year after’]. Novaya Gazeta, no. 96, 30 August 2021, https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2021/08/24/muzhiki-chut-vypili-i-davai-babakhnem.

71 Author’s interview with international respondent.

72 Vladimir Putin took part in a plenary session of XVIII meeting of Valdai Discussion Club, Russia’s President website, 21 October 2021, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66975.

73 Ilya Shapovalov, interview with Alexander Khodakovsky ‘Rossii nuzhna vsi͡a Ukraina’ [Russia needs all of Ukraine] Literaturnaya Gazeta, 5 May 2021, https://lgz.ru/article/18-6783-05-05-2021/aleksandr-khodakovskiy-rossii-nuzhna-vsya-ukraina; ‘Khodakovsky declared himself as opposing the DNR leadership’ Novaya Gazeta, 19 February 2016, https://novayagazeta.ru/news/2016/02/19/118868-hodakovskiy-ob-yavil-o-perehode-v-oppozitsiyu-glave-dnr; Dmitrii Kirillov, ‘V DNR ischezai͡ut starozhily “russkoĭ vesny”’ [Veterans of the Russian Spring disappear in Donbas], Gazeta.ru, 17 April 2016, https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2016/04/17_a_8179493.shtml, Darya Kozlova, ‘Patrioty deli͡at Donbass’ [Patriots divide Donbas], Novaya Gazeta, 28 May 2021, https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2021/05/28/patrioty-deliat-donbass.

74 Vladislav Surkov was a Russian politician of considerable influence. He served as the First Deputy Head of the Russian Presidential Executive Office from 1999 to 2011, was viewed as the main official ideologist, was later appointed as the Russian Deputy Prime Minister and since 2013 was the Presidential Aide responsible for the relations with Ukraine. On the roles and responsibility during ‘Surkov period’, see Alexei Chesnakov, ‘Nelʹzi͡a igratʹ s Ukrainoĭ v poddavki’ [No losing game with Ukraine], Current Affairs Commentary by Centre for Current Politics, 21 August 2019, https://actualcomment.ru/chesnakov-nelzya-igrat-s-ukrainoy-v-poddavki-1908210956.html.

75 Chesnakov, ‘No losing game’.

76 Author’s interview with Moscow political scientist, 2021.

77 Vladimir Dergachoff, Andrey Pertsev, ‘Proizvedenie Pelevina v avtorskoĭ traktovke Surkova. Vladislav Surkov ukhodit iz politiki. Pochemu ego rabota v Donbasse provalilasʹ?’ [Pelevin’s masterpiece in Surkov’s creative interpretation. Vladislav Surkov leaves politics. Why did his work fail?], Meduza, 25 January 2020 https://meduza.io/feature/2020/01/25/proizvedenie-pelevina-v-avtorskoy-traktovke-surkova.

78 Dmitrii Kozak announced that the events that Moscow will interpret as a Srebrenica equivalent, could be used as an excuse for a military intervention, in ‘Kozak zai͡avil o gotovnosti Rossii vstatʹ na zashchitu zhiteleĭ Donbassa’ [Kozak announced Russia’s resolve to stand up to defence of Donbas inhabitants], Vedomosti, 8 April 2021, https://www.vedomosti.ru/society/news/2021/04/08/865169-kozak-zayavil-o-gotovnosti-rossii-vstat-na-zaschitu-zhitelei-donbassa.

79 Konstantin Skorkin, ‘Golos Donbassa. K chemu privedet uchastie DNR-LNR v rossiĭskikh vyborakh’ [What would be the consequences of DNR and LNR participation in Russian elections], Carnegie Commentary, 23 August 2021, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/85183.

80 Е.М. Scherbakova, ‘Migrat͡sii͡a v Rossii, predvaritelʹnye itogi 2021 goda’ [Migration in Russia, preliminary results of 2021], Demoskop Weekly, no. 895–896, 2022, http://demoscope.ru/weekly/2021/0895/barom01.php.

81 Statistics by the Russian Ministry of Interior, 7 February 2022, cited by SNEG, https://sntat.ru/news/migraciya-za-2021-god-vyxodcy-iz-kakix-stran-polucili-grazdanstvo-rf-i-razreseniya-na-rabotu-5834518.

82 Ivan Rozinsky, ‘Kak prini͡atʹ bolʹshe migrantov s Ukrainy. Borʹba za li͡udeĭ vmesto borʹby za geopoliticheskui͡u orientat͡sii͡u Ukrainy’ [How to receive more migrants from Ukraine. Struggle for people instead of a struggle for geopolitical orientation of Ukraine], Vedomosti, 27 September 2020, https://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2020/09/27/841321-bolshe-migrantov.

83 The figure was unveiled by MP Vodolatsky at the State Duma hearing on ‘DNR’ and ‘LNR’ recognition, in ‘V Gosdume nazvali kolichestvo zhiteleĭ DNR i LNR s rossiĭskimi pasportami’ [State Duma stated the totals of DNR and LNR residents with Russian passports], RIA Novosti, 15 December 2021.

84 Chalenko interview, Moscow.

85 For examination of Minsk process from the Russian perspective see ‘Beskonechnyĭ Tupik. Sostoi͡anie I Perspektivy Prot͡sessa Politicheskogo Uregulirovanii͡a Konflikta Mezhdu Ukrainoĭ I Respublikami Donbassa. K Pervoĭ Godovshchine Minskikh Soglasheniĭ’ [An Endless Dead End. The State and Prospects of the Process of Political Settlement of the Conflict between Ukraine and the Republics of Donbass. On the First Anniversary of the Minsk Agreements]. (2016). Analytical Report. Moscow: Centre for Current Politics, 11 February.

86 Ilya Barabanov, ‘Avtory popravok, ochevidno, stavili pered soboĭ t͡selʹ sostavitʹ dokument maksimalʹno priemlemyĭ dli͡a Kieva’ [The authors of the amendments, obviously, set themselves the goal of drawing up a document as acceptable as possible for Kiev]. Kommersant, 9 June 2015, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2744603.

87 Razumkov Centre Sociological Service, December 2015, poll conducted among 2000 respondents in Ukraine apart from Crimea and NGCAs.

88 Yelisaveta Antonova, ‘Chto Proiskhodit V Donbasse Seĭchas. V Donbasse — obostrenie, a Ukraina govorit, chto bolʹshe ne khochet vesti peregovory v Minske. Ėto eshche odin priznak budushchego konflikta?’ [What happens today in Donbas. In Donbas – tensions rise, while Ukraine says that it does not want to conduct negotiations in Minsk. Is it yet another sign of impeding conflict?], Meduza, 7 April 2021, https://meduza.io/feature/2021/04/07/v-donbasse-obostrenie-a-ukraina-govorit-chto-bolshe-ne-hochet-vesti-peregovory-v-minske-eto-esche-odin-priznak-buduschego-konflikta

89 Tikhon Goncharov, ‘Ne sdatʹ Donbass, no vernutʹ Ukrainu’ [Not give away Donbas, but return Ukraine], Russian Institute of Strategic Studies, 21 July 2020, https://riss.ru/article/5136/.

90 Skorkin, ‘Unite and Rule’.

91 Goncharov in ‘Not give away’ cites Petr Akopov who develops this argument.

92 Author’s interview with Alexander Guschin, expert, Moscow, November 2021.

93 Viktor Medvedchuk was a Ukrainian politician, lawyer and businessman. Between 2002 and 2005, Medvedchuk served as chief of staff of Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma. He was a member of political council of the Opposition Platform — For Life party which stood for closer relations with Russia and was elected as a Member of Ukrainian Parliament in 2019.

94 In November 2021, only 6.4 per cen respondents were prepared to vote for him, according to the Rating sociological poll, reported in ‘Zelenskiĭ za osenʹ poteri͡al okolo desi͡ati prot͡sentov reĭtinga’ [Zelensky lost about 10% of his ratings in autumn], RIA Novosti, 11 November 2021, https://ria.ru/20211111/zelenskiy-1758593061.html.

95 Author’s interview with Moscow political expert, October 2021.

96 Author’s interview with an international practitioner, 2021.

97 Tokarev interview.

98 Author’s interview with Vladimir Jarikhin, deputy director of CIS Institute, October 2021.

99 Dmitrii Trenin, Mikhail Pogrebinsky, ‘Sosedstvo ili bratstvo. Pogrebinskiĭ i Trenin o pereot͡senke blizosti Rossii i Ukrainy’ [Neighbourhood or Fraternity. Pogrebinsky and Trenin on closeness between Russia and Ukraine], Carnegie Commentary, 5 October 2021, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/85479.

100 Dmitrii Medvedev, ‘Pochemu bessmyslenny kontakty s nyneshnim ukrainskim rukovodstvom. Pi͡atʹ korotkikh polemicheskikh tezisov’ [Why contacts with the current Ukrainian leadership do not make sense. Five short polemic theses], Kommersant. 11 October 2021, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5028300#id2123757.

101 DD interview.

102 Alexander Chernykh, ‘My zashchishcheny teperʹ Rossieĭ, vot i vse itogi’ [We are now protected by Russia, these are the end results], Kommersant, 23 February 2022, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5229355.

103 Vladimir Jarikhin, author’s interview, 25 October 2021.