![Sample our Global Development journals, sign in here to start your access, latest two full volumes FREE to you for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5929/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Global-Development.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
To explain how the Islamic resistance movement Hamas has remained in power in Gaza for nearly two decades, the police state argument, ruling through the use of force, is insufficient. One also needs to look at Hamas’ relation to Gaza’s ubiquitous kinship groups. Gazans’ trust in kinship institutions is deeply rooted, as is confirmed by a survey presented in the article. After seizing power in Gaza in 2007 Hamas approached the kinship sector with the aim of curbing the strong clans and restructure important kinship institutions. Yet, over the years, engaging with the kinship institutions, especially the informal law sector, also had an impact on Hamas itself. The use of informal law and conflict resolution mechanisms thus became a distinctive feature of the “soft” dimension of the Hamas form of rule. The policy has been appealing to the kinship groups and narrowed the cultural distance between the two. The focus on kinship and local culture is relevant for the wider field of rebel governance research, I contend. In order to understand insurgent governments’ success or lack of success in winning civilians’ hearts and minds, how the rulers adjust to local culture must be analysed.
Acknowledgements
The author wants to thank Erling Lorentzen Sogge for useful comments on the article.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1. To participate in the election was, a Hamas official stated, “not a choice between resistance and politics, it was to protect the resistance” (Milton-Edwards & Farrell 2010, 233).
2. Alvaro de Soto, the UN special envoy to Palestine’s «end of mission report» is condemn reading on the lack of recognition of the election outcome. Winning the 2006 legislative elections brought Hamas to power and control over the government structures and institutions of the Palestinian authority. When the elections loser, Fatah, refused to hand them over, supported by the international community, Hamas seized control over Gaza.
3. A state is by definition an entity possessing a permanent population, a defined, territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with the other states (Giridhar, 2006,). This make Hamas government in Gaza a “rebel rule” and an insurgent proto-state, it is a rule by a resistance group that in spite of having gained power through elections lacks international recognition, rather being the target of an international blockade and boycott.
To participate in the election was, a Hamas official stated, “not a choice between resistance and politics, it was to protect the resistance” (Milton-Edwards & Farrell 2010, 233).
4. In the refugee camp Bureij 98% of refugees had, since 1948, not married a “muwatin”, a non-refugee in Gaza. In local narrative it was explained that the muwatinun would never give away their daughters to refugees (Tuastad Citation1997).
5. The production of rockets and weapons was largely condoned by the PA, as part of the military escalation during the intifada according to Lia (Citation2006).
6. The leader of the notorious Salafi-Jihadi group Jayish Al-Islam, Mumtaz Dughmush hailed from the clan. The group was behind the kidnapping of the British BBC journalist Alan Johnston whom they kept for 114 days before he was freed by Hamas. Mumtaz was known in Gaza as a magnet for young outlaws and according to some estimates controlled 2000 armed men from family members and young outlaws (International Crisis Group Citation2007)
7. Interview with NN, Gaza June 2019.
8. Interview NN, Gaza, May 2018.
9. The international community (IC) are funding the Palestinian Authority (PA). Since 2007 the PA has controlled only the West Bank as Hamas seized power in Gaza. The IC, boycotting Hamas, demands that no funds shall be used to pay for employees who work for the Hamas Gaza government. PA employees in Gaza has thus been on a strike since 2007 in order to have their salary from the PA.
10. Fieldwork Gaza 2010, author.
11. Fieldwork Gaza 2010, author.
12. Interview with NN, Gaza, May 2018.
13. The difference between mediation and arbitration is that arbitration include delivering verdicts when no compromise can be found.
14. Interview with NN, Gaza, May 2018.
15. Interview with NN, Gaza, June 2018.
16. Interview with NN, Gaza, May 2018.
17. 22% of refugees compared to 17% of all Gazans having Bedouin origin (N:1014).
18. After UNRWA started erecting refugee camps and registering the refugees in 1949, as good as all UN registered refugees found shelter in the refugee camps (Morris 2004, 549–580, 603). By 1994 the proportion of refugees living in the camps had decreased to 55% (UNRWA Citation1994), and by 2017 to 40% (PCBS Citation2017).