The Islamic State’s tribal policies in Syria and Iraq

ABSTRACT

The surprising ability of the jihadist organisation “the Islamic State” to capture and hold large territories in Syria and Iraq raises important questions regarding rebel governance in civil wars. One understudied aspect in the growing literature on rebel rule is insurgents’ relations to kinship organisations. This article offers a detailed empirical exploration of ISIS’ tribal policies in the mid-2010s. It argues that ISIS’ relative success in maintaining control over tribal areas in Syria and Iraq and preventing a tribal-based uprising is due to three main factors. First, ISIS pursued well-calibrated carrot-and-stick policies vis-à-vis the tribes, which divided tribal constituencies and undermined their ability to mobilise effectively. Secondly, the politico-military situation in both Iraq and Syria contributed to deprive the Sunni-Arab tribes from trustworthy military allies and sources of external support, which forced them instead to lie low and accept ISIS rule, while waiting for ISIS to be defeated by their enemies. Thirdly, inter- and intra-tribal divisions had allowed ISIS to penetrate most tribes thereby reducing the tribe’s ability to act as cohesive and effective socio-political and military units. By comparing tribal groups and jihadist insurgents, the article also speaks to the theoretical debate on extremist advantages in civil war.

KEYWORDS:

• Iraq
• Syria
• rebel rule
• jihadism
• Islamic state
• tribe

Acknowledgements

I am grateful for valuable and insightful comments from Dag Tuastad, Erling Sogge Lorentzen, Truls Hallberg-Tønnessen, Pinar Tank, Michael Weddegjerde Skjelderup, Vidar Benjamin Skretting and the two anonymous TWT reviewers. A special thank goes to Khaled Zaza, who worked as my research assistant for this project.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. The first two interviews were conducted in Erbil by the author in October 2019, while the remaining five by a Lebanese research assistant in and outside of Mosul in the spring and fall of 2021. The interviewees were recruited via snowballing sampling, building on the author’s contact network and that of his research assistant. Informed consent was obtained from all interviewees, and they were advised of the nature of the research and the intended use of interview material. Full anonymity was provided even though participants did not request this explicitly.

2. See e.g. “ولاءات وعباءات بأوجه متعددة. عشائر سوريا. هل جفت روابط الدم بين أبناء العمومة؟.” Orient TV, 8 January 2021. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x4KUl8_pHYY (Accessed 17 April 2021).

3. See e.g. “The announcement of the Islamic State.” Kyle Orton’s Blog, 18 March 2008. https://kyleorton.co.uk/2018/03/18/the-announcement-of-the-islamic-state-in-2006/#more-5260; and

“لمن أراد معرفة الحق موثَّقًا بالأدلة بعيدًا عن الكلام المُرسَلِ وترديدِ الشائعاتِ وإثارةِ الشبهاتِ.” @anonymous · 1 August 2014 https://justpaste.it/ggoq

4. The “Sons of Iraq”-militias reportedly had more than 91,000 personnel under contract in 2008, according to U.S. Army Gen. David H Petraeus’ testimony to Congress, April 8 and 9, 2008.

5. The group adopted the name “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria/Sham” in 2013 and the name “Islamic State” in 2014.

6. In fact, the perception was so common that the al-Nusra Front was commonly referred to as the Jabhat Al Bu Kamal (al-Jabha means Front in Arabic). (Interview with F. 2021).

7. See e.g. “مصدر: داعش يجبر عشائر الموصل على مبايعته رغما عن انفهم” Al-Sumaria News, 5 July 2014. https://tinyurl.com/2nrth2ss; and “ذوبان العشيرة في بوتقة ‘داعش”, almodon, 2015, https://tinyurl.com/39yfvvda

8. Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani. الرائد_لا_يكذب_أهله الكلمة الصوتية @anonymous, 8 January 2014. https://justpaste.it/e103

9. Also known as Deir al-Zor, Deir ez-Zor, Deir Ezzor.

10. “دير الزور: الشروط التي أخلّ بها التنظيم وأغضبت ثوار العشائر.” OrientNet 31 July 2014. https://orient-news.net/ar/news_show/80243.

11. Estimates of victims vary, with some media reports putting the figure as high as 500. See e.g. (International Business Times 2015) and (Wolf 2015).

12. Al-Dawla al-Islamiyya – Furat, “Taghtiya musawwara: tawbat al-‘asharat min ‘ashirat Al-Bu Nimr wa al-Sahawat fi madinat Hudaytha.” 15 January 2015; and (International Business Times 2015).

13. According to Charles Lister cited in Dettmer (2016).

14. See e.g. “الملتقى العشائري الخامس / بيعة عشيرة البوبطوش” @anonymous, 23 June 2014, https://justpaste.it/BuBatoush

15. ISIS appears to have limited amnesties to those who seek repentance “before they are captured”. See AlHayat Media Centre (2014).

16. ISIS Media Office of Ninawa Province, “al-Basha’ir fi Nasrat al-‘Asha’ir.” (Dated Hamada al-Akhira 1437). File name bssha2er2. Downloaded via archive.org.

17. “دور القبائل العربية في محاربة تنظيم “الدولة الإسلامية” alsouria.net 6 June 2016. https://tinyurl.com/tduycp8w (Accessed 15 April 2021).

18. During her fieldwork in Iraq, Bobseine (2019) interviewed an official in the Iraqi Ministry of Interior who oversaw “tribal genealogical documentation”, and whose biggest problem was conflicts between tribal shaykhs who were “fighting over lineage claims and not resolving case disputes themselves.” (Interview cited in Bobseine 2019).

Additional information

Funding

This study was supported by a grant from The Research Council of Norway. Grant no. 263017. Project title: “Rebel Governance in the Middle East: The role of kinship groups in the sociopolitical organization of insurgent proto-states”. https://prosjektbanken.forskningsradet.no/project/FORISS/263017

Notes on contributors

Brynjar Lia

Brynjar Lia is a professor of Middle East Studies at the Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages at the University of Oslo. He has published extensively on Islamist and jihadist movements over the past two decades and is the author of several books on these topics.