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Abstract
Fukuyama’s emphasis on state-building as an underestimated component of political development is very insightful and timely; but to argue that the dynastic China had an impersonal modern state is questionable. This article argues that the dynastic state in China in general was ultra-personal despite its seemingly ‘impersonal’ means. Likewise, political decay in China mostly took a route different from the ‘elite capture’ pattern, which is the core of Fukuyama’s understanding of political decay. Historically speaking, political decay in China happened more because of the overstretching of central power rather than the erosion of disintegrating elites. This article also examines contemporary China through this framework of political order and decay, suggesting that unique features of the contemporary society might help China escape from the historical cycle.
Notes
Disclosure statement
The author reports no conflicts of interest. The author alone is responsible for the content and writing of this article.
Notes on Contributor
Yu Liu is an associate professor at the Department of Politics of Tsinghua University. Her research interests include comparative democratization, Chinese Revolution, Chinese politics, and American politics. She has published in China Quarterly, Modern China, Washington Quarterly, Foreign Affairs (with a pseudonym), and a range of Chinese academic journals. Her political column collections Details of Democracy (2009) and Stage of Ideas (2013) are among bestsellers in China.
Notes
1 In a quite unusual manner, the trial of Bo Xilai took the form of live broadcasting, which left a detailed record of what he said. See: http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/8198/368442/index.html
2 Weber, 1951. Chapter 2. Weber repeatedly labels the Chinese state in history “oriental patrimonialism,” as opposed to feudalism in the West. Fukuyama disagrees with Max Weber on this regard, but it seems to me that Weber captures the nature of state in China more accurately.
3 Zhang, 2016. What’s particularly interesting is that the ratio of jin shi, the scholars who achieved candidacy in the highest imperial examinations, against those “who committed suicide for their dynasties” was not lower at the end of Yuan, compared to the dynasties dominated by the ethnic Han.
4 For example, in the sense that the exam takers should be good at writing articles according to certain formats and certain political criteria. The format and criteria might not be desirable from a modern view, but to excel in a competition with hundreds of thousands participants, one needs to be very hardworking and their intelligence needs to stand out.
5 The italics font is added by the author of this paper. The original text in Chinese is “天下英雄尽入吾彀中”.
6 Fukuyama, 2015.
7 Zhao, 2002.
8 Qin, 2006.
9 Qin, 1994.
10 Ibid.
11 Qin Hui has long argued this, refuting the romantically portrayed “self-rule” system in rural China. See Qin, 1999. A new book in 2015 brought together a great deal of evidence from the Qing archives to show that the state effectively penetrated down to the rural level, lending support to Qin’s argument. See Hu, 2015.
12 Cao, 2001, 831–832.
13 Qin, 1999. Qin argues that the “self rule” by the gentry class in rural China has been greatly exaggerated, just as the Confucian part of Chinese culture was exaggerated. In reality, Legalism dominated most dynasties with a thin coat of Confucian discourse, and the gentry class or the lineage “self-rule” was relatively weak. As a result, a “pseudo-modernization” appeared in Chinese history, in which individuals seemed to have escaped the “tyranny of cousins.” In reality they just fell from small, plural, and contained tyrannies to a unified tyranny of the state. Therefore, Qin argues that, while modernization in the West often required the alliance between the kings and the lower class to crack open the aristocratic dominance, in China the alliance needs to be between the lower class and the social elites to shake the state power.
14 See Fukuyama, 2012. Chs 15 and 25 of the book, respectively, analyze the decline of the Ottoman Empire and medieval Hungary, arguing that the increasingly patrimonial elites weakened and disintegrated the central power.
15 See Fei, 2008, chapter 4.
16 Gandhi and Prezworski emphasized the role of “nominally democratic” institutions, such as legislature as a mechanism to incorporate potential opposition forces. Similarly, the CCP in China also skillfully uses the People’s Congress system and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference system to co-opt social elites although the cooptation mechanisms go far beyond the two institutions. See, Gandhi and Prezworski, 2007.
17 Bell (2015) particularly focuses on the issue of political recruitment, arguing that the recruitment of top officials in China operates according to the principle of meritocracy, which is different from, and better than, the “one person, one vote” system in the West. However, just as Andrew Nathan (2015) criticized in his book review of The China Model, Bell tends to compare the “ideal” of meritocracy with the “reality” of “one person, one vote,” thus drawing problematic conclusions.
18 Boix (2011) categorized the international order into three types: democratic order, neutral order, and antidemocratic order, arguing that they have played a key role in fostering democracies or dictatorships around the world. The “democratic order” means an international system in which “democratic hegemons” have dominating power. Kagan (2013) made a similar argument, arguing that the role of America has been a key to explain the spread of democracy after the World War II.
19 The Sun Zhigang case refers to a 2003 incident in which a migrant worker, Sun Zhigang, died from physical abuse when detained under the Custody and Repatriation system. The case helped to end the Custody and Repatriation system after generating public outrage.
20 The Ren Jianyu case refers to a 2011 incident. A new college graduate, Ren Jianyu, accused of inciting subversion of state power, was arrested and sent to a labor camp for his speech online. The arrest was widely criticized. Although he himself was not acquitted, the public attention it generated helped to end the Labor Camp system in 2013.
21 Among the toppled officials, six can be said to be “national leaders.” Bo Xilai, Zhou Yongkang, Guo Boxiong, and Xu Caihou were Political Bureau members. Ling Jihua was the secretariat of the CCP Central Committee, and Su Rong was the Vice Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, both of which were also generally seen as national leadership positions. More names of the “big tigers” can be found in the following link: http://baike.baidu.com/view/14139682.htm
22 Fukuyama, 2015.
23 Pinker (2012) used systematic data to demonstrate that a dramatic cultural revolution took place in the West after the WWII, with the rights of minorities, women, children, gays, and animals gained ascendency both in discourse and in reality. Pinker’s illustration of this process helps us reflect culture’s evolutionary nature and the notion of “the West” as a dynamic rather than static concept.
24 Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Welzel, 2012.