![Sample our Sports and Leisure journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5949/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Sports-Leisure.jpg"})
Abstract
This paper offers nine concepts that represent the economics of sports as unique from the economics of other industries. These concepts are: (1) the effect of rules to enhance competitive balance, (2) the question of natural monopoly in sports leagues, (3) the unique types of barriers to entry to these monopoly leagues, (4) the assumption of profit-maximization, (5) the relatively large share of mind devoted to sports, (6) what is the product that sports sells, (7) how sports is really just “watching people work” and how that creates the potential for relatively high pay of athletes, (8) pricing, and (9) the special antitrust treatment afforded to sports leagues. It is argued here that sports owners have used their industry’s uniqueness for protection from and to extends their monopoly power and courts and governments have often been manipulated or coalesced. As we enter the second century of the sports industry colliding with the economics of antitrust law and regulation, we may be reaching a recognition that while sports may be peculiar, they are not so alien as to require a hands-off policy approach.
体育的独特经济视角
本文提出了九个概念, 分别阐明了体育经济学是有别于其他产业经济学的一种独特形式。这些概念是：（1）规则对增强竞争平衡的影响, （2）体育联盟中的自然垄断问题, （3）进入这些垄断联盟的独特阻碍类型, （4）利润最大化的假设, （5）对体育相对更多的意识关注, （6）体育产品的销售品类, （7）体育为何仅仅是“看人们干活”以及如何创造潜在的相对高薪运动员, （8）定价, 以及（9）对体育联盟采取的特别反垄断措施。有人认为, 体育事业拥有者利用其行业的独特性来保护并扩大其垄断权力, 法院和政府经常受到操纵或合力其中。当我们进入体育产业的第二个世纪并与反垄断法律和法规的经济学相冲突时, 我们可能会认识到, 尽管体育可能是特殊的, 但并没有陌生到需要采取不干涉政策的地步。
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes on Contributors
Daniel A. Rascher (Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley, U.S.) is Academic Director and Professor in the Sport Management Program at the University of San Francisco, Partner at OSKR, LLC, and President of SportsEconomics, LLC. His research interests include economics, finance, and marketing in the sports industry. Dan is a Research Fellow of NASSM and has also received the Lifetime Achievement Award from the Applied Sport Management Association. He has also consulted on over 150 sports business engagements, including serving as an expert witness in over 30 lawsuits.
Joel G. Maxcy (Ph.D., Washington State University, U.S.) is a Professor and Department Head pf Sport Management, LeBow College of Business Drexel University, Philadelphia, PA. His research interests are Sports Economics, Law and Economics, Antitrust & Regulation, and Labor Relations in Sport. He is in his second term as President of the International Association of Sports Economists (IASE). Professor Maxcy has made numerous public appearances and delivered lectures at national and international conferences and forums on sport policy. He had made numerous media appearances discussing or commenting on business issues in sports.
Andy Schwarz (MBA, Anderson School of Management at UCLA, U.S) is a partner at OSKR and a Co-Founder of the Historical Basketball League. Andy’s academic papers have analyzed secondary ticket markets, law and economics topics, the antitrust questions inherent in NCAA bylaws, and the economics of virtual goods. His work has appeared in in the Oxford Handbook of Sports Economics, College Athletes’ Rights and Well-Being: Critical Perspectives on Policy and Practice, and the Journal of Competition Law & Economics, among others, and he is a frequent contributor to Deadspin.
Notes
1 See Frandsen (2008), Yoshida (2017), Biscaia, Ross, Yoshida, Correia, Rosado, and Maroco (2016) for a discussion of the experiential nature of the sports offering.
2 Lotz (2009, p. 115) notes the importance of sports as a “water cooler” conversation topic and impact on media.
3 The question of whether a media outlet or even commercial business needs to pay for access to the box scores or other game statistics has a lengthy litigation history, with the Constitutional right to free speech and a free press generally winning over a property right in an athlete’s or teams statistics. These cases stretch back one hundred years to 1918, when two newswires fought over whether box scores could be copyrighted, and (in International News Service v. Associated Press) the Supreme Court established that the newsworthiness of baseball scores preempted any copyright claims. Far more recently, the court in CBS Interactive v. NFLPA and NFL Players Incorporated concluded the same held for players statistics for use in fantasy sports products.
4 Derbaix and Decrop (2011) and Funk, Alexandris, and McDonald (2016) discuss the success of fan clubs as engagement tools.
5 That is, water is obviously more valuable to humans than diamonds (just try going a week or two without water and you’ll see), but diamonds are sold at much higher prices because economic value is about more than just intrinsic value.
6 San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey League, 379 F.Supp. 966 (US District Court, Central District of California, 1974). https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/379/966/1377947
8 Prior to the Clayton Act in 1914 there was no formal process by which a merger could be challenged before-the-fact, so had the merger been opposed it would have had to come afterwards.
12 “The longstanding exemption of professional baseball from the antitrust laws…is an established aberration, in the light of the Court's holding that other interstate professional sports are not similarly exempt, but one in which Congress has acquiesced, and that is entitled to the benefit of stare decisis. Removal of the resultant inconsistency at this late date is a matter for legislative, not judicial, resolution.”
16 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984
17 “However this inquiry may come out on remand, we are satisfied that the NBA is sufficiently integrated that its superstation rules may not be condemned without analysis under the full Rule of Reason.” Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball Association, 95 F.3d 593 (US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996) Argued June 4, 1996. Decided Sept. 10, 1996. Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied Oct. 7, 1996.) available at https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/754/1336/2353294/
18 See, Opinion and Order on the NHL’s motion for summary judgment, which was denied in full, with the Court explaining:
While territorial divisions of a market are normally per se violations, the Supreme Court has held that a per se approach is inappropriate in the context of sports broadcasting restrictions due to the necessary interdependence of the teams within a League. On the other hand, the procompetitive benefit of the challenged scheme here is not so obvious that the case can be resolved in favor of defendants in the “‘twinkling of an eye.’” Therefore the rule of reason is the appropriate standard in this case. https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2012cv01817/393220/257/(internal citations omitted)