Abstract
This study examines how the dynamic interaction of institutions, interests and ideas has shaped the drug price control policy in China over time. It argues that since the 1980s, the common interests of drug manufacturers, drug wholesalers, hospitals and doctors to seek profits have driven them to collude together, thereby making the drug price control policy ineffective. In order to stop collusion between these parties and reduce drug prices, this study suggests that the government should implement drug price control policy in coordination with other health care reforms. Health care reforms include implementing the zero-markup policy for drugs at hospitals, improving the remuneration system of doctors, improving the transparency and openness of centralized drug procurement system, cracking down on commercial bribery and rooting out malpractice in the pharmaceutical industry and hospitals. This study provides the most updated information about high drug prices and drug price control policy in China.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Sabirina Luk
Sabrina Luk is Associate Professor at the Faculty of Management and Economics, Kunming University of Science and Technology. She was awarded her PhD from the Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham. Her research interests include heath care reforms, public policy analysis, e-government, public administration, institutional analysis and China studies. Dr. Luk is the Highly Commended Award winner of the 2013 Emerald/EFMD Outstanding Doctoral Research Awards in the Healthcare Management category. She is the author of the monograph called “Health Insurance Reforms in Asia” (New York: Routledge, 2014). Her articles appear in Public Administration and Policy, Public Personnel Management, and Government Information Quarterly.