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ABSTRACT
Since 2017, China has actively proposed a number of joint development schemes in the South China Sea (SCS), namely with the Philippines and Vietnam. Both economic and strategic incentives lie behind China’s development of these schemes. China’s economic incentives include its domestic demand for energy, “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” construction, Hainan the pilot free trade zone construction, construction of a common market and the future economic integration among the SCS coastal States. China’s strategic incentives include achieving its goal of becoming a leading maritime power, playing its constructive role in maintaining a peaceful and stable SCS, developing good relations with other coastal States, and reducing the intensity of China-U.S. competition in the SCS. China’s policy choices on the SCS joint development are as follows: first, to promote good faith in the SCS; second, to limit unilateral activities in disputed areas; third, to focus on less sensitive areas of the SCS; fourth, to reach joint development arrangements by establishing relevant working mechanism; fifth, to begin the process in areas where there are only two claimants; sixth, to define sea areas for the joint development by seeking consensus; seventh, to discuss the feasibility of setting up a Spratly Resource Management Authority (SRMA) with supranational character.
Notes
1 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “China Adheres to the Position of Settling Through Negotiation.”
2 Xinhua, “China, Vietnam Reach Consensus on Trade.”
3 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation on Oil and Gas Development.”
4 Beckman et al., “Moving Forward on Joint Development,” 312.
5 Miyoshi, “The Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas,” 3; Qi, et al., Cooperative Research Report on Joint Development, 3.
6 CNPC Economics & Technology Research Institute, “2050 World and China Energy Outlook”; Reuters, “China’s Energy Demand to Peak in 2040.”
7 International Energy Agency, “Gas 2018: Analysis and Forecasts to 2023.”
8 See note 6 above.
9 International Energy Agency, “Southeast Asia Energy Outlook 2017,” 11 & 55.
10 Ibid., 55.
11 Li, “Policy Adjustment in Resources Development,” 106; Hainan Daily, “Oil and Gas Resources Development.”
12 Chinese National Development and Reform Commission and State Oceanic Administration, “Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative.”
13 Xinhua, “China Plans to Build Hainan into Pilot Free Trade Zone.”
14 Hu, “Hu Jintao’s Report at 18th CPC National Congress.”
15 Xi, “Xi Jinping’s Report at 19th CPC National Congress.”
16 Chinese Ministry of Natural Resources, “China Marine Economy Statistical Bulletin in 2018.”
17 See note above 15.
18 Xue and Cheng, “China’s Window of Opportunity in the South China Sea.”
19 Qi, “China’s Presence and Challenges in the South China Sea,” 12.
20 British Institute of International Law and Comparative Law, Report on the Obligation of States under Article 74(3) and 83(3), 19.
21 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets the Press.”
22 Xinhua, “Hainan Plan to Build a Pan-South China Sea.”
23 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Joint Statement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China.”
24 Chinese Embassy in the U.S., “Remarks of Ambassador Cui Tiankai at Center for Strategic and International Studies.”
25 Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s argument, See: Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Chinese Foreign Minister and Philippine Foreign Secretary Talk.”
26 International Crisis Group, “Stirring up the South China Sea (IV),” i.
27 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Operation of the HYSY 981 Drilling Rig.”
28 Green, “Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia,” 207.
29 See note 27 above.
30 Green, “Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia,” 223.
31 Ibid., 223.
32 Global Times, “China Redeploys HYSY 981 in South China Sea.”
33 International Crisis Group, “Stirring up the South China Sea (IV),” 8.
34 Hayton, “South China Sea.”
35 See note 2 above.
36 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Chinese Foreign Minister and Philippine Foreign Secretary Talk.”
37 Beckman, et al., “Moving Forward on Joint Development in the South China Sea,” 318.
38 GOV.cn, “China, Vietnam Pledge to Properly Settle.”
39 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “China and Vietnam Held the Twelfth Round Consultation.”
40 Ibid.
41 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “China, Philippines Convene the Fourth Meeting.”
42 See note 3 above.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Xinhua, “China and the Philippines Announced the Establishment.”
48 CNOOC, “CNOOC and Petrovietnam Signed Framework Agreement.”
49 McDorman, “Agreement on the Delimitation of the Territorial Seas,” 3745–3758.
50 Xinhua, “China and DPRK Signed Agreement between the Government.”
51 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Maritime Affairs in the Eyes of the Director-General.”
52 See note 23 above.
53 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “China Adheres to the Position of Settling Through Negotiation.”
54 Reuters, “Philippines Earmarks Two Sites for Possible.”
55 Beckman, “Legal Framework for Joint Development in the South China Sea,” 261.
56 International Crisis Group, “Stirring up the South China Sea (IV),” 17.
57 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Statement of the Government of the People’s Republic of China.”
58 International Crisis Group, “Stirring up the South China Sea (IV),” 25.
59 Valencia, et al., Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea, 206–209.
60 Ibid.
61 Valencia, et al., Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea, 209.
62 Valencia, et al., Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea, 208.
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Huaigao Qi
Huaigao Qi is an Associate Professor of International Relations and Vice Dean of Institute of International Studies at Fudan University.