People’s will or the central government’s plan? The shape of contemporary Chinese local governance

ABSTRACT

In the wake of 18^th and 19^th CPC Central Committees’ reforms on “social governance,” this paper will explore subsequent developments in local governance in China. This is an appropriate focus because earlier research has largely tended to overlook the different ways that local governments behave in balancing the requirements of upper-level, national government with the needs and will of society. By using interviews and participant observation to examine the case of Xicheng District Beijing, this paper finds that, when local government faces pressure from central government, it tends to downplay consideration of the people’s voice and instead it uses monetary compensation to appease people’s anger at not being listened to. However, when local government is afforded more freedom, it is more likely to try and address people’s needs and demands and reconcile these with central government’s plan, so as to balance the needs of the two. The analysis of the post-2012 reforms identifies three Project Types to illustrate different approaches to local governance. Owing to government’s dominant role, Types One and Two are more akin to what empowerment theory dubs “collaborative betterment.” In contrast, Type Three projects give local communities far greater say in determining policy priorities and implementation methods. For this reason, they broadly resonate with the notion of “collaborative empowerment,” although ultimately government remains a veto-player. A further key finding is that local governance is not only shaped by the central government’s plan, nor the demands of society, but to a significant degree, by the mediating role of local government officials.

KEYWORDS:

• People’s will
• local governance
• social governance
• government’s plan
• China

Notes

¹ The Danwei also exercised significant control on people’s lives. For example, if people want to travel around or to get married, they had to get permission from their Danwei.

² An official document released by the central government on November 15 2013. It concludes achievement summary of former reform and guiding principle of future reform.

³ Qu, “Project System”, 113.

⁴ Zhou, Local Government in Transition, 3.

⁵ Zhou, “Governing China’s Local Officials”, 36.

⁶ Weber,The Protestant Ethic, 5.

⁷ Cao, “Divided Governing System”, 244.

⁸ Zhou, “State Governance Logic”, 5.

⁹ Yu, Governance and Good Governance, 3.

¹⁰ Rhodes, Understanding Governance, 2.

¹¹ Stoker, Public-Private Partnership, 6.

¹² Pan, “Community Administration”, 33.

¹³ Yang, “Community as Governing Unit”, 137.

¹⁴ Xia, “Characteristics of Governance Theory”, 125.

¹⁵ Wu & Yang, “Community Governance”, 25.

¹⁶ Li, Xiao & Huang, “‘Publicity’ Dilemma”, 125.

¹⁷ Xiao, “Negotiating to ‘Public”,104.

¹⁸ Wu & Zhang, “Community empowerment”,125.

¹⁹ Report of the Nineteenth National Congress, October, 18th, 2017.

²⁰ Explained in the title page.

²¹ Also known as migrant worker, but this term was later considered discriminatory and replaced by mobile population.

²² The name of the area is coded to protect residents’ privacy.

²³ Living unit. There are usually three-five danyuan in each building.

²⁴ Physical devices to control access to a parking space.

²⁵ Scott, Seeing Like a State, 20.

²⁶ Himmelman, Transformational collaboration, 20.

Additional information

Funding

This research is supported by the Newton Advanced Fellowship.