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ABSTRACT
Background
The central model of Japan’s North Korea policy has been maintained consistently despite repeated changes in the government from the Liberal Democratic Party to the Democratic Party and back again.Purpose: This paper summarizes Japan’s policy concerning North Korea after the Cold War, examines the structure of this policy, and, based on this structure, analyzes Japan’s current policy regarding North Korea. The analysis then turns to the future.Main Argument: Normalizing relations between Japan and North Korea may be the primary goal of Japan’s policy, but the following four motives can also be identified. First, for Japan, the normalization of relations with North Korea is significant as a remaining postwar process. The second motive involves responses to security issues. Third, there is the issue of the safety of Japanese lives. Fourth, Japan’s economic opportunities in North Korea must be considered. Japan has sought ties with North Korea with these four motives, which will remain unchanged in the future. However, Japan does not aim to normalize relations with North Korea without restrictions, and Japan’s policy concerning North Korea is bound by the following three factors. The first factor is the international environment. Second, Japan–North Korea relations are constrained by the attitude of South Korea. Third, Japan’s domestic politics also determine Japan’s North Korea policy.Conclusion: While the four motives will remain the same for Japan, these three factors determine Japan’s attitude toward North Korea, all three of which are pushing for Japan to negotiate with North Korea. He central model of Japan’s North Korea policy has been maintained consistently despite repeated changes in the government from the Liberal Democratic Party to the Democratic Party and back again. This paper summarizes Japan’s policy concerning North Korea after the Cold War, examines the structure of this policy, and, based on this structure, analyzes Japan’s current policy regarding North Korea. The analysis then turns to the future. Normalizing relations between Japan and North Korea may be the primary goal of Japan’s policy, but the following four motives can also be identified. First, for Japan, the normalization of relations with North Korea is significant as a remaining postwar process. The second motive involves responses to security issues. Third, there is the issue of the safety of Japanese lives. Fourth, Japan’s economic opportunities in North Korea must be considered. Japan has sought ties with North Korea with these four motives, which will remain unchanged in the future. However, Japan does not aim to normalize relations with North Korea without restrictions, and Japan’s policy concerning North Korea is bound by the following three factors. The first factor is the international environment. Second, Japan–North Korea relations are constrained by the attitude of South Korea. Third, Japan’s domestic politics also determine Japan’s North Korea policy. While the four motives will remain the same for Japan, these three factors determine Japan’s attitude toward North Korea, all three of which are pushing for Japan to negotiate with North Korea.
Notes
1 Takasaki, Kensho Niccho Kosho, 18.
2 “Japan–North Korean Relations,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, last modified November 20 2015, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/relation.html.
3 Former Ambassador Tetsuya Endo, who led the Japanese delegation in the negotiation to normalize the Japan–North Korea relations, has cited two unsolved issues in the postwar process: the conclusion of the Japan–Russia Peace Treaty upon the resolution of the Northern Territories issue and the normalization of the relationship with North Korea. Tetsuya Endo, “Nicchokankei no Tembo: Kokkou Seijouka Kosho wo Chushinni (The prospect for the Japan–North Korea relationship: Focusing on the negotiation to normalize the relationship)” https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jaesjb/50/6/50_346/_article/-char/ja/.
4 The General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryon) was opposed to the normalization of Japan’s relationship with South Korea, as it insisted on the legitimacy of North Korea. With the normalization of the Japan–South Korea relations, the Japanese government started to work on terminating the agreement on the repatriation of Koreans from Japan with the Korean Red Cross of 1959, and the agreement expired in 1967. It is fair to say that the major reason the Chongryon was opposed to the normalization of the Japan–South Korea relationship was the difficulty in continuing the repatriation scheme as a result. For more details, see Yoshiaki Kikuchi, Kita Chosen Kikoku Jigyou no Kenkyu: Reisenka no “Iminteki Kikan” to Niccho Nikkan Kankei (A Study on the Repatriation to North Korea: “The Migrants” Return’ and Japan–North Korea and Japan-South Korea Relations under Cold War), (2020, Akashi-Shoten), 402–407.
5 “Prime Minister Sato speaking to the Special Committee on Japan-Republic of Korean Relations Treaty at House of Councillors,” National Diet of Japan, December 26 1965, https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/#/detail?minId=105014958X00519651126.
6 For example, Article 2 of the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration between Prime Minister Koizumi and Chairman Kim Jong-Il of the DPRK Defense Commission states: 2. The Japanese side regards, in a spirit of humility, the facts of history that Japan caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of Korea through its colonial rule in the past, and expressed deep remorse and heartfelt apology. https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/pmv0209/pyongyang.html.
7 Yasuhiro Nakasone “Policy Statement at the 102nd Session of the Diet,” http://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/pm/19850125.SWJ.html.
8 “Official site of Shinzo Abe: ‘Constitutional Reform,” https://www.s-abe.or.jp/policy/consutitution_policy.
9 As for the so-called Taepodong I of 1998, see 149–151, 180–190 of my Kita Chosen: Henbou wo Tsudugeru Dokusai Kokka (North Korea: Ever Changing Dictatorship), Chukoshinsho, 2013. In fact, with reference to Japanese national security, the ballistic missile Nodong that was test launched on May 29 1993 and was said to be operationally deployed afterward, should have constituted a more direct threat. However, Taepondong, which flew over the Japanese archipelago, gave a larger shock to Japanese national security. ‘Kita Chosen Misairu Jikken ni Kogi, Kokkai Ketsugi wo Yato ni Dashin, Jimin Hoshin (Protest against North Korea’s missile test, Calling for the opposition’s co-operation in passing a resolution at the Diet, the LDP’s plan,” Asahi Shimbun, September 1 1998.
10 For details on this situation, see Hiraiwa, “Kita Chosen ni okeru Kaku Misairu Kaihatsu Mondai no Genjo to Tenbo,” 40–47.
11 For example, China’s response to the US–South Korea deployment of THAAD is evidence that the question of security certificates in the region is a wider-area issue that goes beyond the Korean Peninsula, i.e., Hajime Takeda, “THAAD Haibi ‘Chugoku no Anzenhosho Shingai senu’ Kankoku Daitoryo” [The President of ROK: Deployment of THAAD “never threaten China’s security”], Asahi Shimbun, December 12 2017. https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASKDD2BV9KDDUHBI002.html..
12 See “Abductions of Japanese Citizens by North Korean,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, last modified December 28 2018, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/abduction/index.html.
13 The Headquarters for the Abduction Issue consists of all ministers of state, with the prime minister serving as chief and the minister in charge of the abduction issue, the chief cabinet secretary, and the minister of foreign affairs. To change the abduction issue from a bilateral problem between Japan and North Korea into a problem facing the international community, the Japanese government has positioned the abduction issue as a human rights issue and has communicated this to the wider world. For example, the Headquarters for the Abduction Issue carries out various educational programs for Japanese people, and since 2006, they have designated December 10th to 16th as the Education on North Korean Violation of Human Rights Week to communicate the seriousness of the abduction issue to the international community by holding an international symposium. Furthermore, from 2008 until the end of 2019, the Headquarters have hosted the “national assembly to discuss the abduction issue” for 64 times at the local level to educate Japanese people. See the website of Headquarters for the Abduction Issue, Government of Japan, https://www.rachi.go.jp/en/index.html..
14 In 1963, Mr. Takeshi Terakoshi, who was 13 years old at that time, went missing after going fishing with his uncle. In 1987, a letter from his uncle was received, stating that he was alive in North Korea. In Japan, it was suspected that he was abducted by North Korea, but Mr. Terakoshi denied that he was abducted, stating that he had been rescued by a North Korean fishing vessel. Consequently, he was not included in the list of abductees recognized by the Japanese government. For more details, see “Questions on abductee recognition of Mr. Shoji Terakoshi, Mr. Sotoo Terakoshi, and Mr. Takeshi Terakoshi” submitted by Shingo Nishimura, House of Representatives Question No 155 at the 186th Session (submitted on October 26th, 2007).
15 In November 1983, the reefer Daijuhachi Fujisanmaru, which was engaged with trade between Japan and North Korea, was handed over to the Japan Coast Guard. For further details, please refer to Nishimura, Kita Chosen Yokuryu.
16 Mimura, Gendai Chosen Keizai: Zasetsu to Saisei he no Ayumi, 114.
17 North Korea was simultaneously aiming to build relationships with South Korea, Japan, and the US at the end of the Cold War, but as the nuclear issue became intractable, it ended negotiations with Japan and South Korea. Furthermore, it declared its withdrawal from the NPT on March 12 1993 and concentrated on negotiations with the US only. For more details, see Yoichi Funabashi, The Peninsula Question: The Second Nuclear Crisis in the Korean Peninsula, Asahi Shimbun-sha, 2006.
18 Kokubun et al., Nicchu Kankeishi, 124–126.
19 Kimiya, “Pakuchonhi Seiken no Tai Kyousanken Gaiko: 1970nedai wo Chushin ni,” 5.
20 South Korea’s attitudes to North Korea differ significantly whether the conservatives or liberals are in power. The conservative government puts emphasis on security co-operation with Japan and the US, believing that deterrents against North Korea are necessary. On the other hand, the liberal government places emphasis on the relationship with North Korea based on ethnic similarities. Consequently, South Korea’s wishes for Japan’s actions regarding North Korea differ significantly based on whether South Korea’s governing party is conservative or liberal. “Kankoku ni okeru Seikenkotai to Taigaikankei: Kita Chosen Seisaku wo Jiku tosuru Taigaikankei no Henka (Change in government and foreign policy of South Korea: Changes in foreign policy focusing on policies towards North Korea),” December 2010, Journal of International Security, Vol. 38 No. 3, Japan Association for International Security, pp. 8–26.
21 For further details, see Suzuki, “Kita Chosen no Tainichi Seisaku,” 50–75.
22 Article 4 of the Declaration states, “we do not oppose our friendly countries are engaged with trade as far as non-military goods are concerned,” though Article 6 states “we are prepared to co-operate when North Korea improves relationship with our friendly countries such as Japan and the US.” http://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/JPKR/19880707.O1J.html.
23 For the role of the Socialist Party in the commencement of the negotiations on the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and Korea, see Shin, Ilbon ui Daebukjeongchaeg 1945-1992nyeon, 201–264.
24 Kim, “Niccho Kosho ni okeru Nihon Gaikou no Henka,” 6–8. Since the resignation of the Murayama government in 1996, the Socialist Party’s influence on Japan–North Korea relations has decreased. In particular, as North Korea established a relationship with the Liberal Democratic Party, the governing party, the importance of the Socialist Party to North Korea also decreased. The Socialist Party later divided, and when the abduction issue came to light, Takako Doi, the leader of the Social Democratic Party, one of the successors of the Socialist Party, offered an explanation that as North Korea insisted “there was no abduction,” it was unable to pursue the matter sufficiently and apologized. Still, the Socialist Party’s attitudes to North Korea came under fierce criticism. “Rachimondai Shamin ‘Yutokankei’ Ashikase, Kita Chosen no Shucho Unomi (The Abduction Issue: the Social Democratic Party shackled by the ‘friendly party relationship’: blind acceptance of North Korea’s statements),” Yomiuri Shimbun, October 8 2002.
25 “Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, September 17 2002, See https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/pmv0209/pyongyang.html.
26 Wada, “Rachi Mondai to Niccho Kokkou Seijoka,” 193–197.
27 Funabashi, Za Penishura Kuesuchon, 145–211.
29 “Section 3: Issues surrounding North Korea; 1. Japan’s basic policy concerning North Korea,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Diplomatic Bluebook 2004.
30 Hiraiwa, “Kita Chosen Kakumondai to Rokusha Kyougi,” 25–42.
32 “Kita Chosen Rachihigaisha no Kazoku Gonin Kikoku (Five family members of the North Korean abductees returned to Japan),” Asahi Shimbun. May 23 2004.
33 33“Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, September 19 2005, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/6party/joint0509.html.
34 At the fifth session of the six-party talks, North Korea submitted a full declaration of all nuclear programs and disabled all existing nuclear facilities, increasing its scale to six tons of heavy oil, and on the agreement to provide economic, energy, and humanitarian assistance, the two-step government stated that “Japan will not participate until the progress of Japan-Korea relations, including the abduction issue, has been resolved.” See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Dai 5 kai Rokusha Kaigo Dai 3 sesshon no Gaiyou” [The Overview of the Third session of the Fifth Round of the Six-party Talks], February 2 2007, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/6party/action0702.html.
35 Matt Spetalnick, and Anna Yukhananov, “North Korea tests Obama’s ‘strategic patience’.”.
36 Hiraiwa, “Kita Chosen ha Ima Nani wo Kangaeteiru ka?” 220–222.
37 “The Bilateral Talk between Japan and North Korea (Overview),” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, May 30 2014 https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/a_o/na/kp/page4_000494.html.
38 https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kp/page4e_000377.html.
39 “Kita Chosen ‘Rachichosa wo Chushi’ Seisai ni Hanpatsu, Tokubetsui Kaitai wo Sengen (North Korea acting against the “suspension of the abduction research” sanction, declaring the resolution of the special committee),” Asahi Shimbun, February 13 2016.
40 Tosaki, “Changes in the North Korean Nuclear Problem and Japan’s Deterrence System,” http://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/research/H28_Korean_Peninsula/13-tosaki.pdf.
41 Radiopress, Kita Chosen Seisaku Doko, 5–12.
42 Hiraiwa, “Kita Chosen no ‘Shisei Henka’ wa dokomade Honmono ka?”, 96–103.
43 As Japan does not have the ability to pursue physical coercive force against North Korea, the “pressure” it can apply to North Korea mainly consists of economic sanctions. Also, as physical coercive force is tested within the framework of collaboration with the US, it is dependent on the US policy toward North Korea. Despite these restrictions, Japan is actively working to verify whether the the sanctions based on the UN resolutions have precisely been carried out. For more detail, see Furukawa, Kita Chosen: Kaku no Shikingen.
44 “Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Seventy-Second Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, September 20 2017, https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/unp_a/page4e_000674.html.
45 “G7 Sharurubowa Samitto Shusseki ni tsuite no Naigai Kishakaiken” [Press Conference on G7 Charlevoix Summit Attendance], Prime Minister’s Office of Japan, June 9 2018,.
46 “Address by Prime Minister Abe at the Seventy-Third Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, September 25 2018,https://japan.kantei.go.jp/98_abe/statement/201809/_00005.html.
47 The families of the abductees have always wanted to change North Korea’s attitudes by means of “pressure.” However, as North Korea has suspended the re-investigation based on the Stockholm Agreement, and because the dissolution of the investigation committee has led to the suspension of Japan–North Korea negotiation as well as the aging of family members of the abductees, they now seek a dialogue with North Korea as “the rescue mission in the new phase” seeking an early resolution since September 2016. http://www.sukuukai.jp/mailnews/item_5775.html.
49 “Kita Chosen Hinan Ketsugi, Teiansezu; Seifu, Rachikosho Misue Tankan (Not proposing the condemnation of North Korea, the government has changed its course with a view to the abduction negotiation),” Asahi Shimbun, March 13 2019.
50 “Kita Chosen he Atsuryoku, Hyogen Sakujo; Rachidakai Neraika, Gaikoseisho (The expression, ‘pressure on North Korea’ deleted; seeking a breakthrough in abduction? Diplomatic Blue Paper),” Asahi Shimbun, April 19 2019.
51 “Abeshusho “Mujoken de Nicchokaigi”: Haikei ni Kyoko na Nichibeikankei (“’Unconditional Japan–North Korea Talk’ Prime Minister Abe: Strong Japan-US relations in the background),” Sankei Shimbun, May 2 2019.
52 “Address by Prime Minister Abe at the Seventy-Fourth Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, September 24 2019,
53 “Kita Chosen Taishi ga Abeshusho Hinan (North Korean Ambassador criticizing Prime Minister Abe),” Mainichi Shimbun, November 8 2019.
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Shunji Hiraiwa
Shunji Hiraiwa is a professor in the Faculty of Policy Studies at Nanzan University, which is located in Nagoya, Japan. Having graduated from Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Tokyo, he received his Ph.D. in law from the Graduate School of Law at Keio University, Tokyo. Before joining the faculty at Nanzan University, he was a Research Fellow at the Japanese Embassy in Beijing. He was also a visiting scholar at MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia.