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ABSTRACT
The emergence of China as a major power has been accompanied by an unprecedented level of external activism, concretized in several regional and transcontinental projects among which the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is the most comprehensive one.
This article aims to assess the contribution of previous foreign policy initiatives to the BRI, and to evaluate potential implications for Chinese strategic autonomy. It argues that while the Chinese-led initiative based on increasing interdependence and connectivity has a high potential to contribute to common development and regional integration, it also presents some destabilizing risks. The cooperation patterns promoted within the BRI strengthen Chinese strategic autonomy by enhancing its key positions along networks of capital and infrastructure around the world, foster asymmetric partnerships, maximize its influence and consolidate its control over land routes from Central Asia to Europe and the SLOC beyond the South China Sea.
In discussing the implications raised by these aspects the article contends that in the long term, the BRI offers China significant opportunities to shape geo-economic landscape and the security architecture.
Notes
1 Garlick, The impact of China’s Belt and Road Initiative; Xing, Mapping China’s One Belt, One road initiative.
2 Zhou and Esteban, “Beyond balancing: China’s approach towards the Belt and Road Initiative”; Aoyama, “One Belt, One Road”: China’s New Global Strategy”; Rolland, “China’s Vision.”.
3 Mayer, “China’s Rise as Eurasian Power: The Revival of the Silk Road and Its Consequences”; Callahan, “China’s ‘Asia Dream’: The Belt Road Initiative and the New Regional Order”.
4 Clarke, “The Belt and Road Initiative: Exploring Beijing’s Motivations and Challenges for Its New Silk Road”; McKinsey&Co. “China’s One Belt, One Road: Will it Reshape Global Trade”.
5 Vangeli, “A Framework for the Study of the One Belt One Road Initiative as a Medium of Principle Diffusion”; Mierzejewski and Kowalski, China’s Selective Identities: State, Ideology and Culture.
6 Moore, “Racing to integrate, or Cooperating to Compete?”.
7 Holslag, The Silk Road Trap: How China’s Trade Ambitions Challenge Europe; Mastro, “The stealth superpower: how China hid its global ambitions”; Ferchen et.al., “Evaluating Latin America’s Commodity Dependence on China”.
8 Xing, Mapping China’s One Belt, One road initiative.
9 Simon Shen, “How China’s Belt and Road Compares to Marshall Plan”.
10 See above 8.
11 Garlick, The impact of China’s Belt and Road Initiative; Xing, ibid..
12 Rolland, “China’s Vision”.
13 Aoyama, “One Belt, One Road”: China’s New Global Strategy”; Garlick, The impact of China’s Belt and Road Initiative
14 Kempin and Kunz, “France, Germany and the Quest for European Strategic Autonomy: Franco-German Defence Cooperation in A New Era”; Kalyanaraman, “What is ‘strategic autonomy’? How does it help India’s security?”
15 Kalyanaraman, “What is ‘strategic autonomy’? How does it help India’s security?”
16 Timmers, “Strategic Autonomy and Cybersecurity”.
17 Baru, “India and the World: A Geoeconomics Perspective.”.
18 Blackwill and Harris, War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft
19 Farrell and Newman, “Weaponized interdependence. How global economic networks shape state coercion”.
20 “China’s Peaceful Development 2011” White Paper lists China’s core interests as: state sovereignty; national security; territorial integrity; national reunification; political system and social stability; and basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social development..
21 State Council, “Made in China 2025.”
22 These expressions come from Deng Xiaoping’s 28-character foreign policy guideline (leng jing guan cha, wen zhu zhen jiao, chen zhuo ying fu, tao guang yan hui, shan yu shou zhuo, jue bu dang tou, you suo zuo wei) reported in several places with different variants (sometimes as the 24-word foreign policy), see Chen and Wang, “Lying Low No more?”
23 MOFA of the P.R.China, “Set aside disputes and pursue joint development”.
24 Aoyama, “One Belt, One Road”: China’s New Global Strategy”.
25 The concept of peaceful development (heping fazhan) was used by Hu Jintao at the Bo’ao Forum in 2004, as a replacement for a previous term “China’s peaceful rise” (Zhongguo heping jueqi), see Guo, “Introduction: Challenges and Opportunities for China’s “Peaceful Rise”“. The concept of “harmonious world” was used in 2005 in a speech given by President Hu Jintao at the United Nations world summit, see https://www.un.org/webcast/summit2005/statements15/china050915eng.pdf.
26 IMF, Country Report No. 19/266..
27 The concept of “common destiny” was mentioned in the keynote speech given by Xi Jinping at the Boao Forum on April 7 2013.
28 Parepa, “China’s Change.”.
29 For more details about this proposal see, Gladney, “La question Ouïgour. Entre islamisation et ethnicisation” and Houben, “Les nouvelles routes de la soie: le cauchemar de Brzezinski passe par l’Asie centrale”
30 The first mention of DSR was in 2015 in a White Paper jointly issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Commerce and China’s National Development and Reform Commission.
31 The list of countries can be consulted at the Belt and Road Portal (Yi Dai Yi Lu) https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/info/iList.jsp?tm_id=126&cat_id=10122&info_id=77298.
32 Reuters, “U.N. Security Council overcomes Chinese veto threat to renew Afghanistan mission”.
33 China Center for International Economic Exchanges and UNDP, “The BRI: a new means to transformative global governance towards sustainable development”.
34 He, Dragon’s Footprints.
35 Gao, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and China’s New Diplomacy”..
36 Jia, “The success of the Shanghai Five: Interests, norms and pragmatism”.
37 Zhang, “Chinese exceptionalism in the intellectual world of China’s foreign policy”.
38 Alden and Alves, “China’s regional forum diplomacy in the developing world”.
39 If not mentioned otherwise, data related to the SCO was collected from the official websites of the SCO, Chinese Ministry of Commerce, Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade
40 Yeh and Wharton, “Going West and Going Out: discourses, migrants, and models in Chinese development”; Bräutigam et.al,” Looking Back and Moving Forward: An Analysis of China-Africa Economic Trends and the Outcomes of the 2015 Forum on China Africa Cooperation”.
41 Kassenova, “China as an Emerging Donor in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan”.
42 China.org.cn, “China-Africa Trade Expected to Top US$100 Bln by 2010”.
43 Data collected from China-Africa Research Initiative, http://www.sais-cari.org/data-china-africa-trade.
44 Executive Research Associates Pty Ltd, “China in Africa. A Strategic Overview”.
45 Blagov, “Russia and China: United by Foreign Policy, Divided by Energy Prices”..
46 Jia, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: China’s Experiment in Multilateral Leadership”..
47 Data is collected from the China Africa Project and The Africa Report, https://www.theafricareport.com/21072/chinas-resources-for-infrastructure-deals-are-evolving/; https://chinaafricaproject.com/tag/angola-model/.
48 Lind, and Press. “Markets or Mercantilism? How China Secures Its Energy Supplies”.
49 Sattori, “China as Tajikistan’s ‘Lender of Last Resort’”..
50 MOFA of P.R.China, “Carry Forward Silk Road Spirit and Write a New Chapter for Cooperation”.
51 Marketos, China’s energy geopolitics: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Central Asia.
52 The Economic Times, “China conducts first military mobility test on bullet train for rushing troops to Xinjiang,” June 9 2015..
53 Gill and Oresman: China’s New Journey to the West: China’s Emergence in Central Asia and Implications for U.S. Interests.
54 Boland, “Ten years of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A lost decade? A partner for the U.S.?”.
55 Erickson: “Chinese Sea Power in Action: The Counter Piracy Mission in the Gulf of Aden and Beyond”
56 Sina News “Xi Jinping: China will provide US$100 million in military assistance to the African Union within 5 years”.
57 Reuters, “China Deploys Troops to U.N. Force to Protect South Sudan Oilfields – WSJ”.
58 Zhong, “Overseas security”; Arduino, China’s Private Army..
59 Hanemann and Huotari, “Record flows and growing imbalances. Chinese Investment in Europe in 2016”
60 Wen, “Strengthen Traditional Friendship and Promote Common Development”.
61 Pepe, “China’s Inroads into Central, Eastern, and South-Eastern Europe: Implications for Germany and the EU”.
62 Data is collected from Bucharest Guidelines 2013, Belgrade Guidelines 2014 and Budapest Guidelines 2017. All guidelines can be found at: http://www.china-ceec.org.
63 Przychodniak, “China and the Visegrad Group. Transformation and future of the cooperation”.
64 All data related to the Fund are available on the official website: http://china-ceefund.com/.
65 European Commission, “Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Elements for a new EU strategy on China”
66 BDI Policy Paper on China, “Partner and Systemic Competitor – How Do WeDeal with China’s State-Controlled Economy?”.
67 Data collected from Eurostat, see https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/China-EU__international_trade_in_goods_statistics#Trade_with_China_
by_Member_State.
68 Gaviria-Ochoa, “The Visegrad Group as a Chinese Gateway to the European Union”.
69 MOFA of P.R.China, “Wang Yi Meets with Deputy Foreign Ministers of V4 Countries”.
70 Végh, “From Pro-European Alliance to Eurosceptic Protest Group? The case of the Visegrad Group”.
71 For a detailed explanation on Chinese sub-regional platforms see, see Bu, “Zhongou ‘Ciquyu Hezuo’.”.
72 Xinhuanet, “China Trade with BRI countries booms in 2019.”.
73 If not mentioned otherwise, economic indicators are based on the UNCTAD statistics: https://unctad.org/en/Pages/Publications/Statistics-Trends-International-Trade.aspx; https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-Statistics.aspx.
74 WTO, World Trade Statistical Review 2019..
75 State Council, “China’s Foreign Aid (2014).”
76 See the web site of China International Development Cooperation Agency, http://www.cidca.gov.cn/..
77 Horn et al., “How Much Money?”.
78 China Banking News, “China’s Net Foreign Financial Assets.”.
79 Gopalan, “China M&A Bankers Face Another Grim Year.”.
80 Data collected from UNCTAD and Statista: https://www.statista.com/topics/5290/foreign-direct-investment-from-china/and https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment% 20Report/Annex-Tables.aspx.
81 Information listed on China Global Investment Tracker: https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/?ncid=txtlnkusaolp00000618..
82 The data related to investment was collected from the China Global Investment Tracker, Investment Monitor and https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/.
83 World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in China.”.
84 After the participation of Chinese companies in Romanian nuclear sector came under intense scrutiny, the Romanian government decided to cancel the project.
85 Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service, “International Security and Estonia 2019”; Kafkadesk, “Czech Republic warns against Huawei security threat”.
86 US China Economic Security Review Commission, “China’s Engagement with Africa:
Foundations for an Alternative Governance”.
87 Yellinek and Chen, “The ‘22 vs. 50’ Diplomatic Split Between the West and China Over Xinjiang and Human Rights”; Putz, “Last week, two coalitions sent competing letters to the UN Human Rights Council criticizing or backing China’s Xinjiang policies”.
88 Lind, “The Rise of China and the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship”.
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Laura-Anca Parepa
Dr. Laura-Anca Parepa is currently a Special Research Fellow at the Institute of Policy Studies, Tsuda University, Japan. She is also affiliated as Senior Researcher with Keio Research Institute at SFC. She holds a PhD in International Public Policy from University of Tsukuba, a MA from Bucharest National School of Political Studies and Public Administration and a BA from Beijing Language and Culture University. Before joining the academic field, she worked in the field of defense cooperation and diplomacy. Her main research interests are international security, emerging multilateral frameworks, Sino-Russian relations and comparative civil-military relations.